Lopez v. Bd. of Educ. of Bridgeport

• Decision Date: 26 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 19172.,19172.
• Citation: 310 Conn. 576,81 A.3d 184
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Carmen L. LOPEZ et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al.

310 Conn. 576

81 A.3d 184

Carmen L. LOPEZ et al.

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al.

No. 19172.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 23, 2013.

Decided Nov. 26, 2013.

Steven D. Ecker, with whom were James J. Healy, Hartford, and, on the brief, M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the appellant (defendant Paul Vallas).

Norman A. Pattis, Bethany, with whom were Bruce L. Levin and Kevin Smith, New Haven, and, on the brief, Barbara M. Schellenberg, Bridgeport, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Gregory T. D'Auria, solicitor general, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Henry A. Salton and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorneys general, filed a brief for the State Board of Education et al. as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and ESPINOSA, Js.^*

NORCOTT, J.

An action seeking a writ of quo warranto provides a “limited and extraordinary remedy” that is the “exclusive” avenue under both the common law and General Statutes § 52–491¹ for judicial review of, inter alia, a person's qualifications to hold a particular public office. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 10–11, 48 A.3d 652 (2012). In this public interest appeal, we consider whether, when an administrative agency has issued a license, certification, or waiver that is required by statute to hold a public office, a court may issue a writ of quo warranto because it has deemed a person to be unqualified for that office on the ground that the agency improperly granted the requisite license, certification, or waiver. The defendant Paul Vallas ² appeals, upon certification by Chief Justice Rogers pursuant to General Statutes § 52–265a,³ from the judgment of the trial court granting the writ of quo warranto sought by the plaintiffs, Carmen Lopez and Deborah Reyes–Williams,⁴ and ordering the removal of the defendant from his office as acting superintendent of the public schools of the city of Bridgeport. On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that he was not qualified to serve as a superintendent on the ground that he had failed to complete the “school leadership program” required by subsection (b) of General Statutes § 10–157,⁵ notwithstanding the conclusions to the contrary during the administrative vetting process by Stefan Pryor, the Commissioner of Education (commissioner), and the State Board of Education (state board). We conclude that a quo warranto action may not be utilized to avoid the administrative process by mounting a collateral attack on an administrative agency's decision to issue a license, certification, or waiver that renders a public officer qualified to hold his or her position. Accordingly,we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts, as set forth in the record and the trial court's memorandum of decision, and procedural history. In December, 2011, the Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport (city board) selected the defendant to serve as its acting superintendent of schools. The defendant has an extensive professional background in public education and state and local government, including: service as a school teacher in the 1970s; service in numerous high level state and municipal positions in Illinois; service as the chief executive officer of the public school systems in the cities of Chicago and Philadelphia; and service as the superintendent of the public school system in the city of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The defendant has not, however, taken any graduate courses in education and is not certified as a school superintendent in Connecticut.

Because the defendant is not certified to serve as a school superintendent in Connecticut, Robert Trefry, the chairperson of the city board at the time, requested that the commissioner approve the defendant's appointment as acting superintendent for a ninety day period from January 1, 2012 through March 30, 2012. Trefry simultaneously requested an extension of that ninety day period from April 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012. The commissioner approved these requests, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b),⁶ by two separate letters issued on December 23, 2011. The defendant's tenure as acting superintendent commenced on January 1, 2012.

During the defendant's tenure as acting superintendent, the legislature enacted Public Acts 2012, No. 12–116, § 58, which, effective July 1, 2012, amended the certification waiver process previously provided by General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b) and (c). As amended, § 10–157(b) permits the appointment of an acting superintendent “who is or is not properly certified for a probationary period, not to exceed one school year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education. During such probationary period such acting superintendent shall assume all duties of the superintendent for the time specified and shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state....” As amended, § 10–157(c) permits the commissioner, upon a local school board's request, to grant a waiver of certification to a person “who has successfully completed a probationaryperiod as an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and who the commissioner deems to be exceptionally qualified for the position of superintendent.” For the complete text of the current revision of § 10–157, see footnote 5 of this opinion.

On January 23, 2013, the commissioner sent a letter to Jacqueline Kelleher, who was elected chairperson of the city board following our decision in Pereira v. State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1, 37 A.3d 625 (2012), ⁷ approving the defendant's appointment as acting superintendent for a probationary period of January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013. Shortly thereafter, the defendant contacted Robert Villanova, the director of the Executive Leadership Program at the University of Connecticut's Neag School of Education (UConn), to inquire about the “school leadership programs” mandated by § 10–157(b). Villanova proposed a three credit independent study course in district leadership (independent study course) for the defendant, which they subsequently designed together. Thereafter, the commissioner reported to the state board that UConn had developed the independent study course as “an individualized, noncertification leadership program” specifically for the defendant. At its April 15, 2013 meeting, the state board approved the independent study course pursuant to § 10–157(b). The commissioner subsequently notified Thomas DeFranco, dean of education at UConn, of the state board's decision.

The defendant completed the independent study course by submitting six papers over the course of ten weeks from April 10, 2013 through May 30, 2013, along with attending a pair of meetings that were approximately two hours in duration and having several telephone conversations with Villanova. Villanova awarded the defendant a grade of “A” for the course. Subsequently, on June 14, 2013, Kenneth Moales, the current chairperson of the city board, requested that the commissioner waive certification for the defendant pursuant to § 10–157(b) and (c), on the basis of the defendant's completion of a school leadership program approved by the state board, successful completion of a probationary period, and a requested finding that he is “exceptionally qualified” to serve as a permanent superintendent. The commissioner made the requisite findings and granted that waiver by letter dated June 17, 2013.

In the interim, on May 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint; see footnote 2 of this opinion; seeking a writ of quo warranto that would remove the defendant from his office as acting superintendent. With respect to relevant pretrial motions practice, the trial court first denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the quo warranto action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, including seeking a declaratory ruling under General Statutes § 4–176, concluding that “no administrativeprocedure exists to redress the specific injury [the plaintiffs] claim—the unlawful holding of a public office.” ⁸ The trial court subsequently denied the defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude, on relevance and political question grounds, the admission of “any and all evidence relating to the merits or sufficiency of any ‘school district leadership program’ ” identified in the complaint or § 10–157.

After a two day court trial, the trial court issued a twenty-seven page memorandum of decision rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the defendant “did not complete a school leadership program” and, therefore, was “not entitled to a waiver of certification pursuant to § 10–157(c).” Consequently, the trial court concluded that “[t]he waiver [of] certification that [the defendant] receive[d] on June 17, 2013, was invalid.” Specifically, the trial court determined that the independent study course completed by the defendant was not a “school leadership program” as contemplated by § 10–157(b), notwithstanding its approval by the state board.⁹ In so concluding, the trial court rejected the defendant's argument that determining whether such a “school leadership program” passes muster is a task committed to the state board, noting that, unlike other statutes, § 10–157(b) “does not explicitly give or commit to the sole discretion of the state board ... the authority to define terms within the statute.” ¹⁰ (Emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, and granted a writ of quo warranto ordering the removal of the defendant from his office as acting school superintendent. This expedited public interest appeal...