Metro. St. R. Co v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 03 April 1893
• Citation: 91 Ga. 466,18 S.E. 816
• Parties: METROPOLITAN ST. R. CO. v. JOHNSON. JOHNSON. v. METROPOLITAN ST. R. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

18 S.E. 816

91 Ga. 466)

METROPOLITAN ST. R. CO.

v.JOHNSON.

JOHNSON.

v.METROPOLITAN ST. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 3, 1893.

Witness— Examination —Action by Husband for Injuries to Wife—Evidence—Damages.

1. Where a question to a witness is objected to as leading, and the court, without directly sustaining the objection, suggests a better form, which is adopted by the examining counsel, there is in this no cause for a new trial.

2. On the trial of an action against a street-railroad company for damages to the plaintiff occasioned by negligent injury to his wife, sustained in consequence of running a dummy against her while she was endeavoring to cross a street in front of a train, it is not competent to prove what was the usual custom of pedestrians when they undertook to cross a street along which cars drawn by dummies were passing.

3. In an action by a husband for loss of his wife's services, occasioned by a tortious personal injury to her, he can recover the reasonable value of such services as have been lost to him from the time of the injury to the date of trial; and in calculating the amount the jury may take into consideration the nature of the services, and all the circumstances of the case. There need be no direct or express evidence of value, either by the day, week, month, or any other period of time, or of any aggregate sum. The peculiar relation which the wife sustains to her husband and his household takes her services out of the rules of law which apply to computing the value of services rendered by hirelings or ordinary servants.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from city court, Atlanta county; Howard Van Epps, Judge.

Action by J. E. Johnson against the Metropolitan Street-Railroad Company to recover for damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff's wife. There was judgment for plaintiff, and a new trial denied. Defendant brings error, and plaintiff assigns error by cross bill of exceptions. Affirmed.

N. J. & T. A. Hammond, for plaintiff in error.

Burton Smith and W. H. Pope, for defendant in error.

BLECKLEY, C. J. 1. The court made no direct ruling as to whether the question objected to as leading was or was not so, but suggested what the presiding judge deemed a better form of question. This suggestion was adopted by counsel, and the question, in its original form, was not pressed. Surely no cause for a new trial can be found in this.

2. In trying the question of negligence by the company or by its engineer relatively to Mrs. Johnson on the particular occasion in controversy, and incidentally the question ofher contributory negligence, it was not competent evidence to show that the usual custom of pedestrians, as observed by the engineer, had been on former occasions to do thus and so. Their conduct would be no measure of diligence for Mrs. Johnson, because that measure is to be found, not in the conduct of such persons merely as the engineer had observed, but in the conduct of every prudent person who might be placed in like circumstances with those winch...