Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Boswell, S91G0043

• Decision Date: 16 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. S91G0043,S91G0043
• Citation: 261 Ga. 427,405 S.E.2d 869
• Parties: METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. BOSWELL.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 869

405 S.E.2d 869

261 Ga. 427

METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. BOSWELL.

No. S91G0043.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 16, 1991.

Charles N. Pursley, Jr., Paul A. Howell, Jr., Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Michael J. Gorby, Stephanie L. Scheier, Gorby, Reeves, Moraitakis & Whiteman, and Michael E. Fisher, Marta Law Dept., Atlanta, for Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.

James Booker and Ann V. Broussard, James Booker & Associates, P.C., Atlanta, for Boswell.

BELL, Justice.

In Boswell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 196 Ga.App. 902, 397 S.E.2d 165 (1990), the Court of Appeals held that in a tort suit the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) may be held liable for punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. Id. at 903, 397 S.E.2d 165. The Court of Appeals based the holding on its finding that the legislation creating MARTA, Ga.Laws 1965, pp. 2243, 2275, Sec. 22, as amended by Ga.Laws 1971, pp. 2092, 2102 (hereafter, the MARTA Act), authorizes the imposition of punitive damages in MARTA's capacity as a tortfeasor. Id. at 902-903, 397 S.E.2d 165. Because we find that, as a matter of law, an award of punitive damages against MARTA would violate public policy, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This case arose when a passenger on a MARTA train, plaintiff Boswell, suffered injuries from a criminal attack while at a MARTA station. He sued MARTA for compensatory and punitive damages, and moved for partial summary judgment on whether MARTA could be held liable for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of his motion, holding that the MARTA Act operates in tort suits to waive MARTA's immunity from punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. Boswell, supra, 196 Ga.App. at 903, 397 S.E.2d 165.

We find that public policy demands that MARTA not be subject to awards of punitive damages, since such awards would seriously damage the public interest. The issue whether an award of punitive damages in a suit against a governmental entity violates public policy was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), as follows:

In general, courts [have] viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised. [Id. at 263, 101 S.Ct. at 2757.]

...

[A]n award of punitive damages against a [governmental entity] "punishes" only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort. These damages are assessed over and above the amount necessary to compensate the injured party. Thus, there is no question here of equitably distributing the losses resulting from official misconduct. [Cit.] Indeed, punitive damages imposed on a [governmental entity] are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers. [Fn. omitted.]

Under ordinary principles of retribution, it is the wrongdoer himself who is made to suffer for his unlawful conduct. If a government official acts knowingly and maliciously to [injure others], he may become the appropriate object of the community's vindictive sentiments. [Cits.] A [governmental entity], however, can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials. Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself. [Id. at 267, 101 S.Ct. at 2760. (Emphasis in original.) ]

The expression of public policy articulated in City of Newport is in accordance with the public policy of Georgia. ¹ We hold that an award of punitive damages against MARTA would violate the public policy of Georgia, and therefore is impermissible as a matter of law.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except SMITH, P.J., who dissents.

SMITH, Presiding Justice, dissenting.

I dissent. The majority totally disregards the express language and the policy of the Legislature as plainly stated in the MARTA Act, (1965 Ga.Laws pp. 2243, 2275, Sec. 22, as amended by Ga.Laws 1971, pp. 2091, 2101), disregards important language contained in MARTA v. Binns, 252 Ga. 289, 313 S.E.2d 104 (1984), nullifies the express language of Section 22 of the MARTA Act, supra, and instead, infers an inappropriate substantive due process analysis cloaked in an irresponsible public policy rationale.

The language of the MARTA Act is clear. 1965 Ga.Laws, Sec. 22, supra at 2275, provides:

The Authority shall not enjoy governmental immunity from tort liability, but shall be liable therefor as any private corporation except that no execution shall be levied on any property of the Authority prior to ninety (90) days from the date of a final judgment against the Authority. The Authority shall contract for adequate insurance, indemnification or similar protection against any loss, liability, or other risk, hazard or responsibility to which it may be exposed or which it may accept on account of its property, personnel, or operations. (Emphases supplied.)

Corporations are liable for punitive damages. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1. MARTA is liable for punitive damages, unless of course punitive damages are no longer available for torts committed by private corporations. In Binns, supra, this Court upheld an award of punitive damages against MARTA as a self-insurer. In that case we also said,

... that in enacting Section 22 of the MARTA act [sic], quoted above, the General Assembly intended to subject MARTA to tort liability and to require MARTA to obtain the necessary insurance to cover any potential liability or other claims against it.... When it was authorized by the 1971 amendment of the MARTA Act to act as self-insurer, MARTA was not authorized to thereby limit its liability. Binns, supra [252 Ga.] at 291 . (Emphases supplied.)

The majority gets the cart before the horse. When presented with a question such as the one before us, we should: 1) look to see if a state law controls; 2) if such a law applies, as it does here, we should construe the statute only if it is ambiguous ² ; and 3) we should begin our construction with the presumption that the statute is valid and constitutional ³ and construe the statute, if possible, so as to uphold the statute in full ⁴. Given a clear statute, such as Sec. 22 of the MARTA Act, our function is to apply it, not to trample it.

The majority opinion leapfrogs proper analysis; blindly ignores the plain words of a statute, and is the most blatant example of judicial legislating that I have ever seen. The majority does not even attempt to hide its total disregard of the language and the public policy clearly established by the Legislature in the MARTA Act. In the process the majority fails to explain how its public policy rationale can supersede the clear language and legislative intent of the statute. When the Act was passed in 1965, there were two hundred and five members in the Georgia House of Representatives and fifty-four members of the Georgia Senate. Now six members of this Court deign to substitute their judgment for that of two hundred fifty-nine elected representatives.

The majority quotes from City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). City of Newport, in addition to being a non-binding federal case, is clearly distinguishable. It involved a construction of a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, "was designed to expose state and local officials to a new form of liability." City of Newport, supra 453 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 2755. In contrast, the MARTA Act defines MARTA as a "public body corporate" subject to tort liability, as "any private corporation." MARTA Act, supra at 2246, 2275. The liability involved here is not a "new form of liability." More importantly, as noted above, this Court has never shown that the language of, or policy behind, Sec. 22 of the MARTA Act is ambiguous and subject to a redefinition.

Today's decision is high-handed and usurps the power of the General Assembly. Court has never condoned using a federal court case to set Georgia public policy when no United States Constitutional question is involved. Nowhere does our Constitution or Code intimate that the courts shall run roughshod over a duly enacted Georgia statute in order to pursue a statement of public policy espoused in a federal statutory construction case. It is this Court's duty to sustain a statute's constitutionality if possible, not to hunt a way to abolish it.

In our system of government, the Legislature is the primary arbiter of public policy, because it is nearer to the people and can amend the laws to reflect the people's will. As noted above, we presume that a duly enacted statute is valid. This presumption extends to the public policy behind the enactment of the statute.

Allowing a party to seek punitive damages is sound public policy. Punitive damages are for the purposes of deterrence and punishment. OCGA § 51-12-5.1(a). They give notice to the wrongdoer that it must cease and desist from wrongful conduct or suffer the consequences. In this instance, punitive damages would give notice to the taxpayers and riders of MARTA of the deficiencies in the management of MARTA. Because MARTA is partially funded by taxpayers, the majority reasons that punitive damages would not affect the decision-makers, and the real wrongdoers would not be deterred. ⁵ To say that punitive damages will not deter MARTA officials ignores fundamental notions of accountability in government and business. While I agree with the majority that punitive damages affect profit and losses. I do not agree that they are not a proper deterrent. MARTA is a...