Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Walker
| Decision Date | 04 August 1942 |
| Citation | 9 So.2d 361,151 Fla. 314 |
| Parties | METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. WALKER et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Orange County; Frank A Smith, judge.
E. W & R. C. Davis, of Orlando, for plaintiff.
G. P Garrett, of Orlando, for defendants.
In complying with the request of the Circuit Judge for instructions under Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice adopted by this Court the 17th of December, 1941, it is necessary for us to determine whether the counterclaim pleaded in the county court by virtue of Sections 1 and 2, Chapter 20426, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1941 (52.11 and 52.12, Florida Statutes 1941) was compulsory or permissive as contemplated in that law.
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company instituted an action in the county court for Orange County against Richard H. Walker and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company to recover upon an injunction bond executec by the former as principal and the latter as surety. In the suit in which the bond was given, the principal had sought to restrain Metropolitan Casualty Company from disbursing certain money to one Louise Cobb. Liability on the bond attached when the injunction was dissolved and the suit dismissed.
The defendant Richard H. Walker pleaded that the plaintiff was 'indebted to (him) in * * * the amount of * * * $915.00 * * * for work done and professional services rendered * * * by the said defendant, as doctor and surgeon, to Louise H. Cobb for the said plaintiff, at its request'. As we will see the conclusion of the plea is significant. It was: 'and defendant claims a set-off against the plaintiff in said amount * * *.'
We are aware of the lack of a definite rule by which there may be classified those causes that do and those that do not arise from the same transaction and we are conscious, too, of the necessity of determining each case upon the facts peculiar to it.
Under Section 1(a) of Chapter 20426, supra, a defendant 'shall state as a counterclaim, any claim, * * * which he has against the plaintiff, arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action' and by Section 1(b) he 'may state as a counterclaim, any claim, within the jurisdiction of the court, against the plaintiff not arising out of the transaction or occurrence.' (The italics are supplied.)
Thus if the defendant's and plaintiff's demands have sprung from the same transaction, the former must present his claim regardless of the amount and the jurisdiction of the court. If, on the other hand, the claims do not have a common origin, he may present the counterclaim if it is within the court's jurisdiction.
Here the amount sought to be recovered was less than five hundred dollars but the claim of the defendant exceeded that sum and the county court obviously had no jurisdiction of the latter. The county judge transferred the cause to the circuit court.
In Section 2 of Chapter 20426, such a course is required where the amount of the counter demand is beyond the court's jurisdiction to try and is compulsory. Evidently it was the aim of the legislature to require a defendant having a claim originating in the same occurrence as plaintiff's to plead it and if it was of an amount in excess of the court's jurisdiction, to make it incumbent on the court to transfer the cause to the proper tribunal. Section 2 of Chapter 20426, supra. If the counter demand did not arise from the common transaction, permission was given to present it in the same suit only if it was entertainable by that court; therefore no provision was included in Section 2 of Chapter 20426, supra, for transfer of causes involving permissive counter demands.
Of course, the nature of the demands of plaintiff and defendant may...
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...is barred, Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So.2d 53 (Fla.1949); if permissive, the claim can be relitigated. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Walker, 151 Fla. 314, 9 So.2d 361 (1942). Under this analysis, therefore, the plaintiffs' claims in this action are barred if they would have been compu......
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In re Int'l Oil Trading Co.
...definition of recoupment appears wholly subsumed by the definition of a compulsory counterclaim. SeeMetropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Walker , 151 Fla. 314, 9 So.2d 361, 362 (Fla.1942) ("the feature distinguishing a compulsory from a permissive counterclaim is the one that also distingu......
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