Metropolitan Dade County v. Golden Nugget Group

• Decision Date: 28 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2799,83-2799
• Citation: 448 So.2d 515
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, and Stephen L. Smith, Acting Tax Collector, City of Miami, and City of Miami Beach, Appellants, v. The GOLDEN NUGGET GROUP, a Florida Partnership, d/b/a Golden Nugget Beach Resort; Florida Resorts, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Hawaiian Isle Beach Resort; S & M Lancaster Properties, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Beach Harbor Hotel; Aztec Motel, Inc., a Florida corporation; Bop, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Desert Inn Motel; Castelita Investments, N.V., d/b/a Chateau By the Sea; Thunderbird Associates Ltd., a limited partnership, d/b/a Thunderbird Hotel; Blue Mist Corporation, a Florida corporation d/b/a Blue Mist Motel; Pan American Hotel, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Pan American Ocean Resort Hotel; the Suez Resort Motel; and Specialized Travel Systems, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

Page 515

448 So.2d 515

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, and Stephen L. Smith, Acting Tax Collector, City of Miami, and City of Miami Beach, Appellants, v. The GOLDEN NUGGET GROUP, a Florida Partnership, d/b/a Golden Nugget Beach Resort; Florida Resorts, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Hawaiian Isle Beach Resort; S & M Lancaster Properties, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Beach Harbor Hotel; Aztec Motel, Inc., a Florida corporation; Bop, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Desert Inn Motel; Castelita Investments, N.V., d/b/a Chateau By the Sea; Thunderbird Associates Ltd., a limited partnership, d/b/a Thunderbird Hotel; Blue Mist Corporation, a Florida corporation d/b/a Blue Mist Motel; Pan American Hotel, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Pan American Ocean Resort Hotel; the Suez Resort Motel; and Specialized Travel Systems, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 83-2799.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

Feb. 28, 1984.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1984.

Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty., and Vicki J. Jay, Asst. County Atty. and Stuart L. Simon, Miami, as Bond Counsel for Dade County; Jose Garcia-Pedrosa, City Atty., and Robert N. Sechen and Gisella Cardonne, Asst. City Attys., Lucia Allen Dougherty and Christopher G. Korge, Miami, for appellants.

Floyd, Pearson, Steward, Richman, Greer, Weil & Zack, and Gerald Richman and Bruce A. Christensen, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.

FERGUSON, Judge.

Defendants appeal a final order granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the levy and collection of taxes on the ground that the authorizing legislation, Act of July 19, 1983, Ch. 83-354, Laws of Florida 2355 [hereinafter "the Act"] and implementing Dade County Ordinance 83-91 [hereinafter "the Ordinance"], are invalid. Both parties ask us, additionally, to determine de novo the constitutionality of the two enactments, and seek an expedited disposition by this court.

The 1983 Legislature passed the Act into law as Senate Bill No. 9-C, creating Section 212.057, Florida Statutes (1983), which authorizes, inter alia, certain counties to levy a convention development tax on specified rentals or leases, and provides for the use of those tax revenues. Pursuant to the authority granted by this legislation, Dade County enacted the Ordinance which levies the tax and provides for the collection, distribution and application of the revenues.

Plaintiffs sought a determination that both the Act and the Ordinance were invalid and unconstitutional. The trial court found both enactments defective, but declined to pass directly on the question of their constitutionality. ¹ As the first issue on appeal, it is asserted that the Act and the Ordinance are not invalid. As a second issue, which was not addressed by the trial court, it is contended that both enactments are constitutional under the laws of Florida and the United States. We agree with appellants' contention that the Act is constitutional and valid, however, we affirm the trial court's determination that the tax collection section of the Ordinance is invalid.

I. VALIDITY OF TWO ENACTMENTS

The determined invalidity is based on a finding that the Act and Ordinance conflict with other provisions of Chapter 212, particularly Sections 212.18 and 212.20, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 212.18(2) provides:

(2) The department [of Revenue] shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the taxes, interest, and penalties imposed by this chapter.... [e.s.]

Section 212.20(1) provides:

(1) The department [of Revenue] shall pay over to the Treasurer of the state all funds received and collected by it under the provisions of this Chapter, to be credited to the account of the General Revenue Fund of the state. [e.s.]

More specifically, the Act was declared defective because it contains no mechanism for collection, and by implication provides that the revenues collected will be segregated and actually paid to municipalities for certain convention center projects in contravention of Section 212.20. Further, the Ordinance was found to be in irreconcilable conflict with Section 212.18, since it purports to authorize collection of the tax by the County Tax Collector.

The newly enacted Section 212.057, Florida Statutes (1983), was expressly made a part of Chapter 212, a chapter entitled "Tax on Sales, Use, and Other Transactions." Chapter 212 details a comprehensive tax scheme providing for the administration, collection, records inspection, and enforcement by the Department of Revenue of all taxes imposed by the chapter. We disapprove of Attorney General Opinion No. 83-71, and the trial court's reliance upon it, which suggests that the Act is invalid because it does not contain a separate provision for administration, collection, enforcement, or disbursement of the tax revenues. Having enacted the Act as a part of Chapter 212, it was unnecessary for the legislature to republish those same extensive mechanisms.

The Act is consistent with Chapter 212. The tax is to be collected by the Department of Revenue as mandated by Section 212.18, and the funds paid over to the State Treasurer for deposit into the General Revenue Fund of the state pursuant to Section 212.20. We cannot find from the face of the Act that the legislature intended other than that these taxes be returned to the counties, less administrative costs, by future appropriation measures as contemplated by Section 215.32(2)(a). ² We conclude that the Act is not defective.

To the extent that Section 29-61 of the Ordinance authorizes collection of the tax by the Dade County Tax Collector, it is invalid as in conflict with Chapter 212. Appellants' fall-back argument--that the authority to collect the tax is inherent in the grant of authority to levy in the first instance--is untenable. A levy is a limited legislative function which declares the subject and rate of taxation; it does not comprehend the entire process by which taxes are imposed. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Amos, 94 Fla. 588, 605, 115 So. 315, 320 (1927).

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TWO ENACTMENTS

Appellees argue that the Act and Ordinance violate several provisions of the Florida and federal constitutions. Specifically, appellees maintain the Act is unconstitutional (a) as a special or local act which lacks referendum and notice provisions and concerns a prohibited subject, (b) as a violation of equal protection guarantees, (c) as a violation of due process requirements, and (d) as a violation of uniform taxation provisions. They further contend that (e) the Ordinance is unconstitutional. We undertake the examination of the Act, as we must, with the presumption of validity which favors every legislative enactment. Shelton v. Reeder, 121 So.2d 145 (Fla.1960).

A. The act is not unconstitutional as a special or local act which lacks referendum and notice provisions and concerns a prohibited subject.

Appellees first contend that the Act is unconstitutional as a special or local act, or as a general law of local application. If a special or local law, the Act violates Article III, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution, since it lacks notice and referendum provisions. Further, if the Act is either a special or local law, or a general law of local application, appellees claim that it concerns a prohibited subject--the assessment of taxes--in contravention of Article III, Section 11(a)(2).

The constitution does not define a special or general law, however, several early Florida cases have undertaken to do so. In Carter v. Norman, 38 So.2d 30 (Fla.1948), the Florida Supreme Court defined a general law as "[a] statute relating to subdivisions of the state or to subjects, persons or things of a class, based upon proper distinctions and differences that inhere in or are peculiar or appropriate to the class...." Id. at 32. ³ A general law may contain classifications, and the legislature has wide discretion in making such classifications, so long as they are reasonable.

A general law containing a classification scheme is reasonable and not arbitrary if there is a reasonable relation between the classification and the purpose of the legislation. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879 (Fla.1983). In Sanford-Orlando, a statute had been enacted which permitted the conversion of any harness racing track to dog racing if that track fell into a certain category. That category was based on the amount of income or "handle" received over a period of years. The thrust of the legislation was to allow conversion if the track was "financially ailing." A new statute was created which amended the former one, broadening it for the specific purpose of allowing Seminole Park and Fairgrounds and Seminole Greyhound Park to convert from harness racing to dog racing. Both the trial court and the district court of appeal had found the latter statute unconstitutional as a special law or general law of local application enacted in violation of Article III, Sections 10, 11(a), 12, and 20 of the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court reversed.

In addition to reiterating the definition of general law set out in Carter v. Norman, supra, the court noted that "a general law does not lose its general law status so long as it operates uniformly upon subjects as they may exist in the state, applies uniformly within permissible classifications, operates universally throughout the state or so long as it relates to a state function or instrumentality." 434 So.2d at 881. The court found that in light of the state interest--increased state revenues--the classification of financially ailing racing facilities was reasonably related to the subject matter. It was deemed insignificant that Seminole was the only track to benefit from the law, since the class had the potential of applying to other tracks.

In the instant case, appellants suggest that a rational relationship exists...