Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges

• Decision Date: 30 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 57989,57989
• Citation: 402 So.2d 411
• Parties: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. David Wayne BRIDGES, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 411

402 So.2d 411

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. David Wayne BRIDGES, Respondent.

No. 57989.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 30, 1981.

Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Atty., and Ralph C. Rocheteau, Asst. County Atty., Miami, for petitioner.

Alan S. Ross of Weiner, Robbins, Tunkey & Ross, Miami, for respondent.

ALDERMAN, Justice.

We have for review by direct appeal an order of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit upholding the constitutionality of section 925.036, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), and construing it in such a manner as to permit the court to award in excess of the statutory amounts when extraordinary and unusual circumstances exist. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution (1972). We hold that section 925.036 is constitutional, that its language is mandatory and not directory, that, therefore, the trial court may not award in excess of the statutory limits, and that under this statute the maximum attorney's fee allowable in this case was $4,000, $2,000 for each life felony. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order awarding an attorney's fee in excess of the statutory limits.

After trial, Alan Ross, who was appointed by the trial court to represent a defendant charged with two life felonies, filed a motion and affidavit requesting payment of attorney's fees in the amount of $4,840. In his motion, Ross alleged that the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the case warranted a fee in excess of the $2,000 which he alleged was the maximum provided for by section 925.036(3). The trial court agreed with Ross, held the language of this statute to be directory only, and added the words "subject to extraordinary and unusual circumstances" to section 925.036. ¹ The Court explained that trial courts are in the best position to determine whether or not there are any circumstances which would entitle an attorney to fees additional to those allowed by section 925.036. With this construction, the trial court upheld the validity of section 925.036.

Initially, we note that both Ross and Dade County were under the misapprehension that the fee limits of section 925.036 could not be stacked and that the maximum allowable fee under this statute is $2,000. This is not the case, however. Construing section 925.036 in such a manner as to be in harmony with section 925.035, Florida Stat utes (1977), ² we recently held in Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So.2d 540 (Fla.1981), that the fee limits of section 925.036 could be stacked, ³ and we explained:

The potential for conflict between the two sections is evident. One sets limits on the fees which may be awarded, while the other requires reasonable compensation. In establishing limits on the fees which can be paid court-appointed attorneys per case per defendant, the legislature clearly intended to limit the burden which such representation places on public treasuries and to provide guidelines for courts to follow. Conceivably, in the absence of any kind of limitation on fees, a small county with limited resources could be placed in serious financial difficulties. Section 925.036, Florida Statutes, was intended to decrease the likelihood of such an occurrence.

Section 925.035, Florida Statutes, on the other hand, seeks to insure that counsel is made available to those charged with a capital offense who otherwise could not afford to hire an attorney and that the attorney appointed is reasonably compensated for his services. The conflict between sections 925.035 and 925.036 arises when "reasonable compensation" exceeds the limits imposed by section 925.036.

....

It would be much more reasonable and just to allow the attorney to stack the maximums for each offense for which his client was tried. Under that interpretation, the attorney would be more realistically and fairly compensated for the time spent on the case, and less likely forced to accept what might often turn out to be unfair compensation for his representation. At the same time, such an interpretation would still provide counties protection from exorbitant, limitless legal fees. Guidelines and maximums would not be abolished; they would simply be more realistic and equitable.

Given the differing interpretations of chapter 925, the proper one is that which allows stacking. It is the only construction which preserves and promotes the legislative goal of protecting county treasuries and providing guidelines for courts without impairing the section of the statute requiring reasonable compensation for court-appointed attorneys. It leads to more reasonable, sensible results.

395 So.2d at 542-43. With this construction of section 925.036, we found it unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of the statute because the requested fees fell within the fee limits of the statute.

Employing the construction we adopted in Wakulla County v. Davis, we hold that the maximum fee allowed Ross by section 925.036 for representation of defendant charged with two life felonies is $4,000. We also hold that this section is mandatory and not directory and that the trial court erred in construing it by adding the language which would permit the trial court to award fees higher than those specified by statute where the court determined exceptional circumstances to exist. This construction, the trial court found, was necessary to the constitutionality of the statute. We disagree with the trial court's construction of this statute and with its determination that this construction is necessary to save the constitutionality of section 925.036.

A legislative enactment is presumed valid and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute conflicts with some designated provision of the constitution. Whenever reasonably possible and consistent with the protection of constitutional rights, courts will construe statutes in such a manner as to avoid conflict with the constitution. But the court, in construing a statute, may not invade the province of the legislature and add words which change the plain meaning of the statute. State v. Elder, 382 So.2d 687 (Fla.1980). Furthermore, courts may not vary the intent of the legislature with respect to the meaning of the statute in order to render the statute constitutional. State v. Keaton, 371 So.2d 86 (Fla.1979). In the present case, we find that the construction given section 925.036 by the trial court which effectually amends the statute to make it directory rather than mandatory was unnecessary and unwarranted. The statute, plainly read as a mandatory limitation on the maximum fees allowable and construed by us in Wakulla County v. Davis to permit stacking, does not conflict with any specific constitutional provision.

Neither the due process nor equal protection clauses are implicated by section 925.036. In MacKenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So.2d 200 (Fla.1973), we upheld the constitutional validity of section 925.035 which established a maximum of $750 as reasonable compensation to counsel appointed to represent an indigent in a criminal case. This statute was challenged on the basis that it contravened the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida. Initially, we reiterated that the right to recover attorney's fees as a part of the costs in an action did not exist at common law and that it therefore was provided for by the legislature's enactment of section 925.035. We then held:

And, while appellant argues that Section 925.035 fails to comport with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida, as applied to the provision by defense counsel of extraordinary services, we are of the opinion that: 1) Section 925.035 does, both on its face and as applied, comport with the foregoing constitutional provisions; and, 2) if a change in the foregoing statutorily-provided compensation be called for, it is within the province of the Legislature, not the courts, to make such change. (Footnote omitted.)

288 So.2d at 201.

We further hold that Ross has failed to demonstrate that an indigent defendant's right to counsel has been impinged upon in any way by this statute. Indigent defendants are not denied counsel by section 925.036. At common law, it was the professional obligation of the lawyer to accept an assignment to represent an indigent party when directed to do so by the court, but there was no right to compensation from the government or any other source for representation of the poor. In the Interest of D. B., 385 So.2d 83 (Fla.1980). Since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which established a fundamental constitutional right to counsel in various classes of cases, questions have arisen as to whether lawyers should be relieved of their historical duty to represent the poor. Questions have even arisen as to whether requiring a member of the Bar to represent an indigent with no compensation or minimum compensation amounts to a taking of property without due process of law. We have held that lawyers should not be completely relieved of their responsibility to represent the poor although we have recognized the concomitant obligation of the government to provide legal representation when such is constitutionally required, and we have held that requiring a lawyer to perform his historical professional responsibility to represent the poor does not constitute an unfair "taking" of private property in violation of due process. In the Interest of D. B.

Unless it is demonstrated that the maximum amounts designated for representation in criminal cases by section 925.036 are so unreasonably insufficient as to make it impossible for the courts to appoint competent counsel to represent indigent defendants, we cannot say that section...