Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Abbott

• Decision Date: 23 September 1968
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 43741,43741,2
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Inez C. ABBOTT
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 859

164 S.E.2d 859

118 Ga.App. 587

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Inez C. ABBOTT.

No. 43741.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Sept. 23, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 1, 1968.

Syllabus by the Court

A contract insuring against death 'as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sustained * * * solely through violent, external and accidental means,' and excluding death 'caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by disease, or bodily or mental infirmity,' does not cover death following an accident when pre-existing heart and lung diseases are contributing causes.

In this case an insurer appeals from a judgment for the beneficiary under a group accidental death and dismemberment insurance contract, and enumerates error on the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Lovejoy, Mayer, Allen & Quillian, Charles W. Allen, Charles J. Willis, LaGrange, for appellant.

Richter & Birdsong, Horace E. Richter, A. W. Birdsong, Jr., LaGrange, for appellee.

HALL, Judge.

The contract covered death 'as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sustained * * * solely through violent, external and accidental menas,' and excluded death 'caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by disease, or bodily or mental infirmity.'

Evidence of the following facts was presented and was not contradicted: The insured fell on steps at work and hit his head, thereafter became incoherent and unconscious, was hospitalized and before he died 2 1/2 days later was diagnosed as having pneumonia. The insured had pre-existing heart and lung diseases. Medical reports and opinions were that pneumonia, pulmonary emphysema, heart failure, and cerebral concussion from the fall were causes of death.

The plaintiff relies on the decision and opinion in Hall v. General Acci. Assur. Corp., 16 Ga.App. 66, 85 S.E. 600, in which Judge Russell reasoned that a contract for insurance against death resulting solely from an accident must be construed to insure against accident which is the 'underlying essential proximate cause' of death. We do not decide, but for the purposes of this decision may assume that there was some evidence that would authorize an inference and finding that the insured's injury from the fall was the essential proximate cause of his death. However, the Hall case, whether or not we approve its underlying policy, and any others which have followed it are nullified by the decision in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kellar, 213 Ga. 453, 457, 99 S.E.2d 823, in which the Supreme Court approved the holding in Harris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 66 Ga.App. 761, 19 S.E.2d 199, as well as other authorities, that under language like that in the present accident policy the insurer is not liable if the death of the insured was due wholly or in part to a pre-existing disease, notwithstanding an accident may have precipitated his death. Accord Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Braswell, 101 Ga.App. 133, 112 S.E.2d 804. Therefore, the issue is whether the evidence would authorize an inference and finding that pre-existing disease was not a contributing cause of the insured's death. In...