Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Landsman

• Citation: 165 A. 563,35 Del. 384
• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decision Date: 10 February 1933
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, d. b. a., v. MILTON LANDSMAN, p. b. r

165 A. 563

35 Del. 384

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, d. b. a., v. MILTON LANDSMAN, p. b. r

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

February 10, 1933

Superior Court for New Castle County, No. 313, September Term, 1932.

This was an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant on a policy of insurance, wherein the defendant company agreed to indemnify the plaintiff against loss of time from his occupation resulting from bodily injuries caused directly and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means.

The declaration alleged that while the said policy was in effect the plaintiff, in attempting to lift a sack of potatoes, an act within the course and scope of his employment as a salesman in a grocery store, violently wrenched and sprained his right shoulder and back; that by reason of the injuries so sustained the plaintiff suffered loss of time from his occupation and was, therefore, entitled to be indemnified by the defendant under the terms of the said policy.

The defendant demurred to the declaration and assigned the following grounds therefor:

1. That it did not appear from the declaration that anything of an accidental nature occurred to produce the injury;

2. That the plaintiff, in lifting the sack of potatoes, did exactly what he intended to do, in the manner in which he intended to do it, and that hence the injuries received by him were not the result of accidental means within the terms of said policy;

3. That the plaintiff was injured as a result of a voluntary act done for his own convenience or pleasure, or in his daily routine in the manner intended and in the exercise of his free will and choice, unaccompanied by any unforeseen accidental cause and that, therefore, the injury was not caused by accidental means within the terms of the policy.

The defendant's demurrer is sustained.

Paul Leahy for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Charles F. Curley and James Malloy for Milton Landsman.

PENNEWILL C. J., HARRINGTON and RICHARDS, J. J., sitting.

OPINION

PENNEWILL, C. J.

Obviously, under the pleadings, the only question the Court must determine is whether the injury complained of was caused by violent and accidental means.

The defendant correctly states in his brief that the clause contained in the policy "caused directly and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means" has received two distinct and opposed interpretations from the courts of this country.

One line of decisions hold that any injury that is accidental is covered by the clause. The other draws a distinction between an accidental injury and an injury caused by accidental means. Under the former holdings the injury here complained of would be covered by the policy; under the latter it would not.

The plaintiff contends, however, that the weight of authority and the better reasoned cases support his contention that the policy in issue indemnified him against the injury he received.

On the other hand, the defendant claims that the weight of well considered cases, as well as of reason, supports its contention that there is a distinction between an injury caused by accident and one caused by accidental means.

The distinction has been expressed by some courts in general language, as follows:

An injury is caused by accident when the result is accidental and by accidental means when the means that caused the injury are accidental. It must be admitted that such distinction does not clarify the law very much and some courts have frankly said there is no distinction between an injury caused by accident and one caused by accidental means. But no matter how technical the distinction may seem to be, many courts have recognized and acted upon it. Perhaps the difference in judicial decisions may be shown by a case similar in principle to the present one, where the plaintiff in voluntarily attempting to perform an act in the usual course of his occupation overtaxed his strength and imposed upon the vital organs a burden greater than they could bear. Such was a leading case cited by the defendant. Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462, 156 P. 1029, 1030, L. R. A. 1916E, 1197.

In that case the plaintiff undertook to carry a heavy casket down a flight of stairs. The entire operation was carried out precisely in the manner intended and designed by the plaintiff, but the exertion he assumed was beyond his strength and the result was a dilation of the heart and death. On these facts, the Court held, it could not be said the death was caused by bodily injuries affected through accidental means. In that case the Court said:

" A differentiation is made, therefore, between the result to the insured and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result. It is not enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unforeseen, but there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act or occurrence which leads to the injury or death. * * * 'The question, in the sense of this policy, is not whether death was the result of accident in the sense that it was a death which was not foreseen or anticipated. That is not the question. The question is, in the words of this policy, whether the means by which the injury was caused were accidental means. The death being accidental in the sense in which I have mentioned, and the means which led to the death as accidental, are, to my mind, two quite different things. A person may do certain acts, the result of which acts may produce unforeseen consequences, and may produce what is commonly called accidental death, but the means are exactly what the man intended to use, and did use, and was prepared to use. The means were not accidental, but the result might be accidental.'"

The distinction the Court sought to make in that case, between accident and accidental means, is made clearer by the following words in the opinion:

"In carrying it [the casket] down he did not slip or stumble, nor did the casket fall against him."

The necessary inference from these words is, that if the injury had been caused by the plaintiff's slipping or stumbling, there would have been a cause preceding the injury which the plaintiff could neither anticipate or control, and in such case the injury would have been caused by accidental means. And this is conceded by the defendant to be the law, because it is said in its brief:

"For example, if the insured slipped, if the bag he was carrying fell from his shoulder, and he attempted to catch it, if he wrenched or strained his body and then fell--any or all of these events would, under this particular policy, be acts which were beyond his control, and the injury would, of course, be the result of accidental means."

The defendant has cited many cases and quoted at considerable length from some of them but they are all to the same effect as the Rock Case to which we have particularly referred.

Some of the other cases cited by the defendant are: Bennetts v. Occidental L. I. Co., 39 Cal. App. 384, 178 P. 964; Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N.E. 1032, 1036; Feder, et al., v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa 538, 78 N.W. 252, 253, 43 L. R. A. 693, 70 Am. St. Rep. 212; Shanberg v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. (C. C. A.), 158 F. 1, 5, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1206; Fane v. Nat. Ass'n Ry. Mail Clerks, 197 A.D. 145, 188 N.Y.S. 222, 223; Seipel v. Eq. Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A.), 59 F.2d 544.

In order to make the distinction which many courts have made between accident and accidental means, as clear as possible, we will quote from a few of the cases cited above.

In the Schmid Case, it was said:

"As to what constitutes an accident, the reported cases are not all in accord. But our own decisions, with the weight of the decisions of other courts, we think hold that, where an injury occurs as the direct result of intentional acts, it is not produced by accidental means."

In the case of Feder, et al., v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, the Court said:

"Although a result may not be designed, foreseen, or expected, yet, if it be the natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done, or of conditions voluntarily assumed, it cannot be said to be accidental. * * * The evidence shows that the cause was the ruptured artery; but that was not accidental, if it was the natural result of an act voluntarily done by Feder. That he did anything but what he intended to do, in attempting to close the shutters, is not shown nor claimed. It is not even shown that he made any unusual exertion in what he did."

In the Shanberg Case, it was said:

"It would not help the matter to call the injury itself--that is, the rupture of the heart--an accident. That was the result and not the means through which it was effected. Carrying the door, or, after putting it down, the act of filling his lungs with air by drawing a long breath, was the means by which the injury was caused. Both were done by the assured voluntarily and in an ordinary way with no unforeseen, accidental, or involuntary movement of the body whatever. There was no stumbling, slipping, or falling; there was nothing accidental in his movements any more than there would be in walking on the street, or passing down the steps of his house. * * * Had the assured, while assisting in carrying the door, lost his balance and fallen and struck upon some unforeseen object, or slipped on the ice, his death might be said to have resulted from violent or accidental means."

In the Fane Case, the Court said:

"It is undoubtedly true that the act of lifting the mail bag produced an unforeseen consequence, and the consequence might commonly be called an accidental injury, and the result of lifting the bag might be accidental; but the wording...