Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Accident Ass'n
Decision Date | 17 November 1908 |
Docket Number | No. 6,454.,6,454. |
Citation | 42 Ind.App. 483,85 N.E. 1032 |
Parties | SCHMID v. INDIANA TRAVELERS' ACCIDENT ASS'N. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; Vinson Carter, Judge.
Action by Matilda Schmid, guardian, against the Indiana Travelers' Accident Association. From a judgment for defendant on sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Wilson & Townley, for appellant. McMaster & Hedrick and Scott & Scott, for appellee.
Action by appellant against appellee upon a contract of insurance issued by appellee to one B. Frank Schmid, in which appellee agreed, with certain exceptions, that should the said Schmid sustain a physical bodily injury through external, violent, and accidental means, which injury should result in death, appellee would be liable to Schmid's beneficiaries in a certain sum.
Appellant in her complaint sets out Schmid's death, and the cause thereof, together with certain facts and circumstances connected therewith, and claimed that such death, upon the showing of such allegations, was a death from injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means, and that appellee was liable therefor under the terms of its contract. Appellee demurred to said complaint upon the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer the court sustained, and, appellant refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered against her for costs. The correctness of the ruling of the court is the only error assigned.
The policy, together with the application and by-laws of the association, which are made a part thereof, are set forth as exhibits to the complaint. So far as material to the solution of the legal questions presented, the provisions of such policy are as follows: “No claims of any character shall ever accrue upon this contract, unless it arises from physical bodily injury, through external, violent and accidental means, while this contract is in force, and then only when the injury shall, independently of all other causes, immediately and wholly disable the insured from performing any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation as above stated.” “This certificate of insurance does not cover injuries nor death, for which there is no visible mark upon the body of the insured; nor death or injury from any of the following causes: disease or bodily infirmity, or acts committed by the insured, while under mental aberration, fits, insanity, rupture, vertigo, walking in sleep, narcotics, intoxication, surgical treatment, sunstroke, freezing, voluntarily taking poison, handling or using dynamite or other explosives, riots or war, quarreling, dueling, wrestling, fighting, gymnastic sports, voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, injury resulting from the intentional act of the insured or other persons, or received while engaged in any unlawful act, or while in any gambling house, or house of ill-fame, or house of assignation, or any place prohibited by law; nor shall it cover suicide, whether the person is sane or insane.”
The following are the allegations of the complaint with reference to the manner of Schmid's death: It is further alleged that timely and due notice of and the particulars of Schmid's death were given, and that appellee denied liability;that the beneficiaries named in the policy were the minor children of said Schmid, and that appellant is their guardian.
The question for determination is whether the death of Schmid was the result of accidental means within the provision of the policy.
It is claimed by appellant that where “the performance of intentional acts is followed by a result which is not the natural and probable consequence of those acts; where the result is altogether out of the ordinary, and could not reasonably have been anticipated or expected-such a result is regarded as having taken place by accidental means; that the present case is clearly one of the latter class; that Schmid's death resulted from heart paralysis, occasioned by a strain upon the heart, which was the altogether unusual and unexpected result of muscular exertion, under the circumstances described in the complaint; that neither the strain upon the heart, nor heart paralysis, was the natural or probable consequence of such exertion; that such results could not reasonably have been anticipated or expected-hence the death must be regarded as accidental.” Horsfall v. Pacific, etc., Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 Pac. 1028, 63 L. R. A. 425, 98 Am. St. Rep. 846;Rustin v. Standard, etc., Co., 58 Neb. 792, 79 N. W. 712, 46 L. R. A. 253, 76 Am. St. Rep. 136; Martin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1 F. & F. 505; Atlantic Ass'n v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 709, 30 S. E. 939, 42 L. R. A. 188;Rodey v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 3 N. M. 316, 9 Pac. 348;Miller v. Fidelity, etc., Co. (C. C.) 97 Fed. 836;Western Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401, 29 C. C. A. 223, 40 L. R. A. 653;United States Mutual Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 60;Bailey v. Interstate Co. (Sup.) 40 N. Y. Supp. 513;American Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547, 23 S. W. 191, 21 L. R. A. 651, 42 Am. St. Rep. 374; Hamlyn v. Crown (1893) 1 Q. B. 750.
In the first case above mentioned, the insured in lifting a weight, while in a difficult position, strained the muscles of his heart, causing a violent dilation of the heart, from which he died. The court held that the injury was the result of an accident within the meaning of the policy. This holding is based on the reason stated as follows:
May in his work on Insurance, supra, in his definition of the word “accident,” fails to make any distinction between an accident and a result by accidental means.
In the Barry Case, supra, the court said: ...
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