Metz v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 17 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. M2016–02031–COA–R3–CV,M2016–02031–COA–R3–CV
• Citation: 547 S.W.3d 221
• Parties: George METZ, et al. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TN, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

547 S.W.3d 221

George METZ, et al.

v.METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TN, et al.

No. M2016–02031–COA–R3–CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section, AT NASHVILLE.

August 23, 2017 Session

FILED October 17, 2017

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court March 15, 2018

Gina Crawley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Marilyn Metz, George Metz, Aubrey Pearson, Jacqueline Pearson, Berry Wright, and Evelyn Wright.

Jon Cooper, Director of Law, Lora Barkenbus Fox, and Catherine J. Pham, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

William N. Helou, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Ridge at Antioch, Limited Partnership.

D. Michael Swiney, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Andy D. Bennett and John W. McClarty, JJ., joined.

D. Michael Swiney, C.J.

This appeal concerns a determination by the Planning Commission ("the Commission") of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro") that the Forest View Park planned unit development was "active." Certain Forest View neighbors ("Petitioners") filed a petition for writ of certiorari against respondents Metro and The Ridge at Antioch, Limited Partnership ("Respondents," collectively) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County ("the Trial Court") challenging the Commission's decision. Metro filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. The Trial Court found fatal defects in the petition for writ of certiorari, including that it was not supported by oath as required. Petitioners appeal to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Background

Three decisions arising from three meetings of the Commission, all related to affordable housing development, are at issue on appeal. These meetings took place on March 24, April 14, and May 12, 2016. On April 14, the minutes of the March 24 meeting were approved and signed. On April 28, the minutes of the April 14 meeting were approved and signed. Finally, on May 26, the minutes of the May 12 meeting were approved and signed. As a result of these meetings, the Commission determined that the Forest View Park planned unit development was active.

On May 16, 2016, Petitioners filed their petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas seeking review of the Commission's decision. The petition alleged, in part, that "the Commission acted in an arbitrary and judicially excessive manner when it found the Forest View Park PUD to be active." The petition was not supported by oath. On May 23, 2016, Petitioners filed an amended petition. The amended petition was not supported by oath either. On June 6, 2016, Petitioners filed yet another amended petition, which also was not supported by oath. On August 5, 2016, Metro filed a motion to dismiss. Only on August 15 did Petitioners file a proposed new petition that was sworn to and otherwise compliant with the requirements for a petition for writ of certiorari. On August 19, 2016, the Trial Court conducted a hearing on Metro's motion to dismiss. On August 30, 2016, the Trial Court entered an order granting Metro's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Trial Court stated, as pertinent:

The Court finds that the latest of the challenged Planning Commission decisions was made May 12, 2016. The Petition was filed May 16, 2016. The Petition does not state that it is the first application for the writ and is not verified as required under the Tennessee Constitution.

The minutes approving the May 12 decision were approved and signed on May 26, 2016. More than sixty days have passed since those minutes were approved and signed. Because the Petition does not state that it is the first application for the writ and is not verified, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the Planning Commission's decision. Nor does the Court have jurisdiction to grant a motion to amend the petition or to convert it to a declaratory judgment action. Pursuant to Article VI, Section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution and Talley v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility , 358 S.W.3d 185, 192 (Tenn. 2011), this case is DISMISSED. Costs are hereby taxed to Petitioners. This is the final order.

Petitioners subsequently filed their "motion requesting relief." On October 20, 2016, the Trial Court entered its order denying Petitioners' motion requesting relief. The Trial Court stated:

This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 30, 2016 on the Petitioners' "Motion Requesting Relief" from the "Final Order of Dismissal" entered by this Court on August 30, 2016. Upon consideration of the Motion, the pleadings of the parties, the argument of counsel and the entire record, the Court finds that the Motion should be denied. This Order incorporates and reiterates the findings made by this Court at the hearing on September 30, 2016.

The Petitioners initially assert that the Final Order of Dismissal was not final, in part because the Order only addressed the May 12. 2016 decision of the Davidson County Planning Commission and did not address the Commission's March 24, 2016 and April 12, 2016 decisions. However, this Court finds that the August 30, 2016 Order was intended to completely conclude this case. The Order is styled a "Final Order of Dismissal" and specifically states that this case is dismissed with costs taxed to the Petitioners. The Order also definitively states that "[t]his is the final order."

Accordingly, given that the August 30th Order is a final decision dismissing this cause of action, the Court must assume the Petitioners seek relief from that Order under either Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, which governs motions to alter or amend a judgment, or Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, which generally allows a party to seek relief from judgments or orders under certain defined circumstances. The Court finds neither of these Rules justifies relief in this case.

Rule 59.04 offers relief to a movant wishing to alter or amend a judgment in very limited circumstances. As the Tennessee Court of Appeals has stated:

The purpose of a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend a judgment is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct errors before the judgment becomes final. Bradley v. McLeod , 984 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harris v. Chern , 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000) ). The motion should be granted when the controlling law changes before the judgment becomes final; when previously unavailable evidence becomes available; or to correct a clear error of law or to prevent injustice. Id . A Rule 59 motion should not be used to raise or present new, previously untried or unasserted theories or legal arguments. Local Union 760 of Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers v. City of Harriman , No. E2000-00367-COA-R3CV, 2000 WL 1801856, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000)perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2001), seeBradley , 984 S.W.2d at 933 (holding: a Rule 59 motion should not be used to raise new legal theories where motion for summary judgment is pending).

Kirk v. Kirk , 447 S.W. 3d 861, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re M.L.D. , 182 S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ).

A Rule 59.04 motion should not be granted when the movant is simply seeking "to relitigate a matter that has already been adjudicated." Morrison v. Morrison , No. W2001-02653-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31423848, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002) (citing Bradley v. McLeod , 984 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) ). The Court finds that Petitioners' motion is just that—an attempt to relitigate a matter already adjudicated by this Court.

The Motion for Relief also fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60.02. Tennessee courts have observed that Rule 60.02 motions must be narrowly construed and are sparingly granted. In re Joeda J. , 300 S.W.3d 710, 715–16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Such a motion requires movants to explain why they are entitled to the limited relief available under the rule on such grounds as mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Id. at 715. A Rule 60.02 motion is not to be used by a party "merely because he is dissatisfied with the results of the case." Id. (quoting Wilkerson v. PFC Global Group, Inc. , No. E2003-00362-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22415359, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2003) ). Thus, like Rule 59.04, a party may not use Rule 60.02 to relitigate matters already litigated. The Petitioners' motion is attempting to do just that. As they have not met the burden of identifying a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, neglect, or other circumstance envisioned by the rule, the Petitioners' motion to alter the prior Order is not justified.

In sum, the Court finds that the August 30th Order addressed all claims that were before the Court. Having read the filings in this case, the Court finds that there is no new argument or new evidence being presented by the Petitioners in their Motion for Relief. Accordingly, as the Petitioners' Motion for Relief seeks to relitigate issues that were adjudicated in the Court's final Order, the Court DENIES the Petitioners' Motion for Relief.

All other motions filed by the Petitioners after the Motion for Relief, including the Rule 59 motion filed by the Petitioners on September 28, 2016, are also DENIED, as they are repetitive and seek relitigation of issues already adjudicated.

The Court notes that Petitioners have already filed a Notice of Appeal. As the August 30th Order is final and adjudicated all matters in this cause, this matter is ripe for appeal.

It is so ORDERED.

Petitioners timely appealed to this Court.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Petitioners raise the following two issues on appeal: 1) whether the Trial Court's order of August 30, 2016 was a final, appealable order; and 2) whether Petitioners' petition for writ of certiorari should be treated as an action for declaratory judgment.

We first address...