Halliburton v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole

• Decision Date: 07 April 2022
• Docket Number: M2021-00470-COA-R3-CV
• Parties: MICHAEL HALLIBURTON v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLE
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

MICHAEL HALLIBURTON v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLE

No. M2021-00470-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Nashville

April 7, 2022

Assigned on Briefs February 1, 2022

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 21-42-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor

This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied the inmate parole in March 2020. The inmate's administrative appeal was also denied. Thereafter, the inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court. However, the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to outstanding costs in prior civil cases. The inmate then filed a second petition with the chancery court. The chancery court dismissed the second petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not filed within sixty days of the Tennessee Board of Parole's final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102. The inmate appeals. We affirm.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

Michael Halliburton, Hartsville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Dawn Jordan, Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Board of Parole.

Carma Dennis McGee, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. Neal McBrayer and Kristi M. Davis, JJ., joined.

OPINION

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

I. Facts &Procedural History

A Shelby County jury convicted Michael Halliburton of one count of attempted first-degree premeditated murder, one count of domestic assault, and two counts of aggravated assault, for the brutal beating of his wife with a metal knife sharpener. State v. Halliburton, No. W2015-02157-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7102747, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016).

Mr. Halliburton first became eligible for parole in March 2018, but after a hearing, the Tennessee Board of Parole ("the Board") denied him parole. The Board denied him parole again after a hearing in March 2020. On July 1, 2020, the Board also denied Mr. Halliburton's request for an administrative appeal. The following week Mr. Halliburton received notification of the Board's decision to deny his request. Thereafter, Mr. Halliburton filed a petition for writ of certiorari on August 21, 2020. On November 13, 2020, however, the chancery court dismissed his petition without prejudice due to his outstanding costs in prior civil cases.^[1]

On January 15, 2021, Mr. Halliburton filed a second petition for writ of certiorari. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the petition stating that Mr. Halliburton's petition was filed more than sixty days subsequent to the Board's final decision. Therefore, the Board asserted that the petition failed to meet the statutory prerequisites of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 and the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. Additionally, the Board asserted that the savings statute was inapplicable to claims against the State of Tennessee and its agencies. Mr. Halliburton filed a response to the motion to dismiss, and the Board filed a reply to Mr. Halliburton's response.

In April 2021, the chancery court entered its final order. The chancery court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because the petition was not filed within sixty days of the Board's final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102. Furthermore, the chancery court held that the savings statute was not applicable to actions against the State of Tennessee, which included its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, and municipalities. Thus, the chancery court granted the Board's motion and dismissed Mr. Halliburton's petition. Thereafter, Mr. Halliburton timely filed his appeal.

II. Issues Presented for Review

Mr. Halliburton presents the following issues for review on appeal, which we have slightly restated:

1. Whether the Tennessee Legislature overstepped its constitutional bounds in violation of the Tennessee Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549, 86 U.S.L.W. 4189 (2018), regarding separation of powers by establishing the Board; 2. Whether the Board's use of the "Average Time Chart" is unconstitutional;

3. Whether the personnel for the Board violate due process because they are not learned in the law and their decisions concern liberty interests for paroled inmates;

4. Whether this Court's "confused parole jurisprudence" regarding liberty interests and due process should be revisited;

5. Whether the Board's failure to provide fair notice violates due process;

6. Whether the procedures regarding appeal to the chancery court unconstitutionally transform the chancery court from a court of equity into an appellate court;

7. Whether the language of the Board's discretionary determinations is unconstitutionally vague per Sessions v. Dimaya;

8. Whether the Board's unconstitutional establishment, legally unqualified personnel, pro forma language, secretive evidentiary procedures, and lack of effective judicial oversight make it an inquisitorial body that is anathema to the cultural and legal traditions of the American people;

9. What is the nature of the interest created by the State of Tennessee for itself and the parole eligible inmate in holding a parole hearing if there is no life, property, or liberty interest implicated;

10. Whether the dismissal of Mr. Halliburton's writ of certiorari renders Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 unconstitutional because it (a) violates the Tennessee Constitution and U.S. Constitution; and (b) makes fee payments a bar to prevent lawsuits by indigent inmates regardless of their merit;^[2]

11. Whether statutes and rules that are unconstitutional ab initio subject Mr. Halliburton to a statute of limitations so that he is denied access to the courts in order to challenge the very same unconstitutional statutes and administrative rules;

12. Whether the chancery court's and this Court's failure to address Mr. Halliburton's claims creates a constitutionally deficient review prejudicial to his case; and

13. Whether Chief Justice Page abrogated his sworn duty to impartiality in Mr. Halliburton's cases in violation of the Tennessee Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, thereby violating Mr. Halliburton's constitutional right to due process.

The Board presents the following issues for review on appeal, which we have slightly restated:

1. Whether the chancery court properly dismissed the petition as it was not filed within sixty days of the Board's administrative appeal decision; and

2. Whether the chancery court properly determined that the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105, is not applicable to Mr. Halliburton's petition against the Board, a state agency.

For the following reasons, we affirm the chancery court's decision.

III. Discussion

On appeal, Mr. Halliburton raises thirteen issues. However, the dispositive issue is whether the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's 'lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it.'" Moore v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole, No. M2020-00982-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4472061, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000)). As such, subject matter jurisdiction is "a threshold inquiry." Id. (quoting Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 445 (Tenn. 2012)). A court must dismiss a case if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). "Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) governs a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2012). The determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. at 712-13 (quoting Northland, 33 S.W.3d at 729). We are able to resolve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction by answering the two questions presented by the Board: (1) whether the chancery court properly dismissed the petition as it was not filed within sixty days of the Board's administrative appeal decision, and (2) whether the chancery court properly determined that the saving statute is not applicable to Mr. Halliburton's petition against the Board.

In regard to the first issue, we have explained that "[t]he common-law writ of certiorari serves as the proper procedural vehicle through which prisoners may seek review of decisions by parole eligibility review boards and other similar administrative tribunals." McLemore v Traughber, No. M2007-00503-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4207900, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2007) (citing Willis v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003)). "The only procedure for a prisoner to obtain judicial review of an action or decision of the Board is by a petition for common-law writ of certiorari." Id. (quoting Hickman v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 78 S.W.3d 285, 290 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 provides that a petition for writ of certiorari must be filed in chancery court within sixty days from the entry of the order or judgment.^[3]See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. "The purpose of the provision requiring that a petition for writ of certiorari be filed within sixty days of entry of final judgment is 'to promote the timely resolution of disputes by establishing filing deadlines that will keep cases moving through the system.'" Metz v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 547 S.W.3d 221, 225 (...