Meyer v. NILES TP., ILL.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78 C 4744.,78 C 4744.
• Citation: 477 F. Supp. 357
• Parties: Vera MEYER et al., Plaintiffs, v. NILES TOWNSHIP, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

477 F. Supp. 357

Vera MEYER et al., Plaintiffs, v. NILES TOWNSHIP, ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants.

No. 78 C 4744.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

July 24, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. by Barry A. Rose and Henry G. Rose, Evanston, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendant Dunne.

Emanuel Cannonito, Blue Island, Ill., for defendant Jesk.

Goldenson, Kiesler, Berman & Brenner, Chicago, Ill., for defendant Follett.

Milton A. Svec & Assoc., Berwyn, Ill., for defendant Glaser.

Schuyler, Ballard & Cowen, Chicago, Ill., for defendant Kolerus.

OPINION

BUA, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a denial of assistance under the Aid to Medically Indigent Program, ("AMI"), authorized by the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, § 7-1 et seq. (1977). AMI provides assistance to any person or family whose income is sufficient to maintain basic maintenance requirements, but whose resources are not sufficient to meet the costs of medical care. The original decision to grant or deny benefits is made by the applicant's township. Upon denial, the applicant may appeal the decision to the Public Aid Committee. Ill. Rev.Stat. ch. 23, § 11-8 (1977).

The plaintiff, Vera Meyer, was denied AMI assistance by Niles Township. She alleges that the denial of assistance was in violation of her constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the law. She seeks monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition to Niles Township and its supervisor, Edward Warman, other defendants include the Illinois Department of Public Aid and its director, Arthur Quern, who have general authority over the AMI program, George Dunne, President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, who appointed the defendant township supervisors to the Public Aid Committee, and the members of the Committee¹ who made the final decision to deny assistance. Before the court are Dunne's motion to dismiss and the motions of Public Aid Committee members, Kolerus, Follett, Jesk, and Glaser, to dismiss the claim for monetary relief.²

The complaint alleges that on October 5, 1977, the plaintiff was admitted to Skokie Valley Hospital for treatment of an injury sustained as a result of a criminal attack on her person.³ The plaintiff informed a hospital staff person of her inability to meet the costs of medical care and lack of insurance coverage. On October 7, a social worker, employed by the hospital, gave the plaintiff an application for medical assistance. Due to the confines of traction and influence of heavy medication, plaintiff was not able to complete the application until October 9. The County Department of Public Aid received the application on October 14. IDPA, after denying assistance under a medical assistance program other than AMI, forwarded plaintiff's application on December 14, 1977 to Niles Township for determination of eligibility for AMI benefits.

Plaintiff received a letter from Niles Township informing her that her application was not considered because it was not received within the five-day period of hospitalization as required by Niles Township and the state General Assistance Manual.⁴ On advice of counsel, Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation, plaintiff appealed to the Public Aid Committee. At the hearing, plaintiff offered evidence indicating her need for assistance, as well as her lack of fault in her failure to comply with the five-day rule. Plaintiff received notice approximately thirty days later of the Committee's decision to uphold Niles Township's action in denying AMI benefits because the application was not received by the township within the five-day period.

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other eligible persons in Cook County who have been denied assistance under AMI,⁵ seeks a declaratory judgment that defendants' treatment of plaintiff was in violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. In addition, the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for injuries she has suffered as a result of defendants' actions. She claims that because of the Committee members' concurrent positions as township supervisors, they cannot make an impartial decision on AMI appeals. Plaintiff and the class she represents also seeks injunctive relief against the defendants' continued administration of the AMI program.

I. George Dunne's Motion to Dismiss

George Dunne has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action against him. Dunne argues that plaintiff's complaint does not allege that Dunne personally participated in the AMI program and as such, he cannot be held liable under Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).

Plaintiff, in opposing Dunne's motion, claims that (1) the facts justify imposition of vicarious liability upon Dunne for his negligent failure to supervise members of the Public Aid Committee, and (2) even if the court finds that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint do not support the proposition that Dunne is vicariously liable for the actions of the Committee, his appointment of township supervisors to the Committee is unconstitutional.

A. Negligent Supervision.

Mere negligent supervision is insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As this court stated in Stringer v. City of Chicago, 464 F.Supp. 887, 891 (N.D.Ill.1979): "in order to establish the liability under § 1983 of supervisory officials for deprivation of constitutional rights through the acts of their subordinates, an affirmative link must be proven between their own acts or omissions and the actions directly causing the alleged violation." See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Negligent supervision by the defendant over those directly causing the constitutional deprivation does not supply the requisite link. See McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872, 98 S.Ct. 508, 54 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977).

The complaint does not clearly state whether plaintiff seeks to charge Dunne with negligence in his supervision of the Public Aid Committee or with a more culpable mental state such as recklessness. The distinction in this case is of no significance, however. Dunne, as President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, does not have supervisory authority over the AMI program. To the contrary, the Illinois Department of Public Aid administers and supervises the AMI program,⁶ pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, § 12-21.17 (1977). IDPA promulgates rules and regulations governing the administration of the AMI program and has the authority to audit the books and records of the local AMI programs. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, § 12-21.17 (1977). Thus, plaintiff's claim against Dunne based on negligent or otherwise improper supervision cannot stand.

B. Appointment of Township Supervisors to the Public Aid Committee.

Plaintiff also argues that the Public Aid Committee, as appointed by defendant George Dunne, is unconstitutionally constituted. Plaintiff alleges that the members of the Committee, because of their concurrent positions as township supervisors, cannot reach impartial decisions. Plaintiff, in her reply brief, appears to argue that Dunne's appointment of the members of the Committee is sufficient personal participation to hold Dunne liable for any resulting constitutional deprivation by that Committee.

The crux of plaintiff's argument is that township supervisors serving on the Public Aid Committee are necessarily biased against AMI applicants by virtue of their substantial pecuniary interest as supervisors. The supervisors' overriding interest in protecting township funds, she claims, prevents them from reaching an unbiased, disinterested decision on AMI appeals. As discussed below, that contention is not without merit. To hold Dunne personally liable, however, the court must first determine (1) whether plaintiff has an interest in her AMI appeal sufficient to invoke procedural due process protection, (2) whether the structure of the Public Aid Committee is a violation of plaintiff's due process right to have her AMI appeal decided by an impartial administrative panel, and (3) if the Committee is improperly structured, whether Dunne is protected in his appointment of the Committee by some form of official immunity.

1. The Plaintiff Was Entitled to Procedural Due Process Protection.

Before determining whether any procedural due process rights were violated, the court must determine whether plaintiff had any protected due process interest in her AMI appeal before the Public Aid Committee. See, e. g., Barry v. Barchi, ___ U.S. ___, ___ and n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365, (1979); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In order to do so, it must be found that plaintiff has a property interest in AMI benefits sufficient to warrant the application of federal due process protection.

The Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is particularly applicable here. The Court in Mathews found that the "interest of an individual in continued receipt of disability insurance benefits is a statutorily created `property' interest protected by the Fifth Amendment." Mathews, at 332, 96 S.Ct. at 901. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).

Although this case differs from Mathews in that Mathews addressed itself to hearings terminating assistance after the initial eligibility determination had been made, due process protection can apply to a hearing determining initial eligibility...