MGA Ins. Co. v. Charles R. Chesnutt, P.C.

• Decision Date: 27 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 05–10–00410–CV.,05–10–00410–CV.
• Citation: 358 S.W.3d 808
• Parties: MGA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. CHARLES R. CHESNUTT, P.C., and Charles R. Chesnutt, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

358 S.W.3d 808

MGA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,

v.CHARLES R. CHESNUTT, P.C., and Charles R. Chesnutt, Appellees.

No. 05–10–00410–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Jan. 10, 2012.Rehearing Overruled Feb. 27, 2012.

Diana L. Faust, R. Brent Cooper, Cooper & Scully, P.C., Dallas, for Appellant.

Charles Chesnutt, Charles R. Chesnutt, P.C., Dallas, TX, pro se.

Before Justices BRIDGES, MARTIN RICHTER, and MURPHY.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice MARTIN RICHTER.

MGA Insurance Company appeals from a summary judgment that it take nothing against Charles R. Chesnutt, P.C. and Charles R. Chesnutt. In one issue, MGA asserts the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

Underlying Lawsuit

In 1989, Vernon and Bonnie Johnson established a trust for their daughter Chelsea, and asked their friend, Charles Chesnutt, to serve as trustee. Chesnutt delegated the authority to make investment decisions for the trust to Vernon Johnson. Bonnie and Vernon Johnson were subsequently divorced. After the divorce, Bonnie Johnson discovered that the value of the trust had declined so she hired an attorney to evaluate whether she had a cause of action against Chesnutt, and hired a second attorney to file suit against Chesnutt.¹ MGA Insurance Company (MGA) provided a defense for Chesnutt in the Johnson litigation under a malpractice insurance policy issued to Chesnutt, P.C. During the course of the Johnson litigation, Chesnutt's attorney filed several motions to compel discovery, a motion for sanctions, and a motion for summary judgment. Hearings were conducted on Chesnutt's motion to compel and alternative motion for sanctions. In January 2005, Bonnie Johnson nonsuited her claims against Chesnutt. Thereafter, Chesnutt filed a motion for contempt and amended motion for sanctions, seeking a dismissal of the Johnson litigation with prejudice, and monetary sanctions against Bonnie Johnson and her counsel.

After a two day evidentiary hearing, the trial court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered a “death penalty” sanction and award of attorney's fees against Johnson. On July 19, 2005, the trial court signed a judgment dismissing Johnson's claims with prejudice and awarding Chesnutt his attorney's fees and costs. Johnson appealed the sanctions award and deposited cash into the registry of the court in lieu of bond. On April 27, 2007, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and upon denial of Johnson's petition for review by the Supreme Court of Texas, the judgment became final.²

Current Lawsuit

In April 2008, MGA notified Chesnutt that it asserted a contractual right to the sanctions award in the Johnson litigation because it paid Chesnutt's attorney's fees and costs of defense. After a year had passed, the money was still in the registry of the court so Chesnutt withdrew the money in April 2009. On October 7, 2009, MGA sued Charles R. Chesnutt, P.C., and Charles R. Chesnutt, individually, claiming assumpsit for money had and received, and seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to the sanctions award received by Chesnutt in the Johnson litigation. Appellees filed original answers asserting various affirmative defenses, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, laches, limitations, and waiver, and argued “the judgment that forms the basis of this lawsuit cannot rationally be construed to support the claims of MGA.” Chesnutt, P.C.'s answer was verified by an affidavit from Chesnutt, stating that MGA's suit was based upon the underlying Johnson judgment in favor of Chesnutt, individually, and not Chesnutt, P.C., and thus Chesnutt, P.C., was not a proper party to the lawsuit and should be dismissed.

Appellees filed a motion for traditional summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to summary judgment because they: (1) negated the essential elements of MGA's cause of action, (2) established each element of their affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and collateral attack on the judgment, and (3) established that MGA's suit in quasi-contract was barred due to the existence of a written contract between the parties. Appellees' summary judgment evidence included the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Johnson lawsuit, the insurance policy between MGA and Chesnutt, P.C., Chesnutt's affidavit, MGA's original petition with attachments, appellees' answers, and a copy of the transcript of a hearing on appellees' motion to transfer the current lawsuit from the 134th district court to the 101st district court, the trial court that signed the Johnson judgment. Appellant filed its response, and a sur-reply in response to appellees' reply. On February 17, 2010, the trial court signed an order granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

The standard for reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment is well-established. See Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex.1994); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex.1985). We review a summary judgment de novo. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex.2007); Kaye/Bassman Int'l Corp. v. Help Desk Now, Inc., 321 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied). We will affirm a summary judgment if the record establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215–16 (Tex.2003). For a defendant to prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, it must either disprove at least one element of each of the plaintiff's claims as a matter of law or conclusively establish all elements of an affirmative defense to the claims. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex.1996); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dall., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476–77 (Tex.1995). Once the defendant establishes its right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Talford v. Columbia Med. Ctr. at Lancaster Subsidiary, L.P., 198 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).

When reviewing a summary judgment, we examine “the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion.” Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex.2006)(per curiam) (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex.2005)). When the trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which it was granted, we will affirm the judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. See Provident Life, 128 S.W.3d at 216; Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 577 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).

III. Analysis

MGA's sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. MGA details five sub-issues for our review, asserting: (1) appellees failed to disprove one or more elements of MGA's equitable claim for money had and received and unjust enrichment; (2) appellees failed to establish each element of their affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel; (3) appellees failed to establish that MGA's lawsuit is a collateral attack on the Johnson litigation judgment; (4) Chesnutt, P.C. failed to establish entitlement to summary judgment based on defenses arising out of the Johnson litigation because it was not a party to the Johnson litigation and not included in the Johnson judgment; and (5) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding MGA's claim for money had and received and unjust enrichment, precluding summary judgment.

A. MGA's Claim

Appellees' motion for summary judgment attacked MGA's claim for assumpsit for money had and received in two ways. First, appellees argued MGA did not have an ownership interest in the sanctions award because ownership, for purposes of assumpsit for money had and received, derives from a prior ownership of the funds in question. Appellees reasoned that because the sanctions award was paid by Johnson and not MGA, MGA was not the prior owner of the funds in question. Second, appellees asserted MGA was not entitled to recover in quasi-contract because there was a written contract that governed the relationship between the parties.

Assumpsit For Money Had And Received

According to legal historians, assumpsit was developed to redress circumstances involving unjust enrichment or an implied promise to pay what in good conscience defendant was bound to pay the plaintiff. Tri–State Chem., Inc. v. Western Organics, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 189, 193–94 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. denied). Over time, assumpsit was divided into various categories. Id. at 194. Money had and received is a category of general assumpsit to restore money where equity and good conscience require refund. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Smith, 946 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no writ). “The question, in an action for money had and received, is to which party does the money, in equity, justice, and law, belong. All plaintiff need show is that defendant holds money which in equity and good conscience belongs to him.” Staats v. Miller, 150 Tex. 581, 584, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687–88 (1951) (quoting 58 C.J.S., Money Received § 4a). A cause of action for money had and received is “less restricted and fettered by technical rules and formalities than any other form of action. It aims at the abstract justice of the case, and looks solely to the inquiry, whether the defendant holds money which ... belongs to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg....