Dusseau v. METRO. DADE CO. BD. OF COM'RS
Decision Date | 17 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC95217.,SC95217. |
Citation | 794 So.2d 1270 |
Parties | Charles DUSSEAU, et al., Petitioners, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jeffrey S. Bass of Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, FL, for Petitioners.
Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami Dade County Attorney, and Augusto E. Maxwell, Assistant County Attorney; and Arthur J. England, Jr., and Elliot H. Scherker of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondents.
We have for review Metropolitan Dade County v. Dusseau, 725 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), based on conflict with Education Development Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1989). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve in part and quash in part the decision in Dusseau as explained herein.
University Baptist Church owns 19.7 acres of land in Miami Dade County on which it seeks to build a large new church. The district is zoned for single-family one-acre estates, but churches are a permitted special exception. The project is opposed by Charles Dusseau and other local homeowners, who want just "a simple church." After exhaustive review, the project ultimately was approved by the following local agencies: the Zoning and Planning Department; the Department of Environmental Resources Management; the Public Works Department; the Water and Sewer Authority; the Fire Department; the Metro Dade Transit Agency; the School Board; the Solid Waste Department; the Parks Department; the Public Safety Department; and the Aviation Department. In spite of these approvals, the Zoning Appeals Board denied the application.
The County Commission heard testimony from both sides at a lengthy hearing and approved the project by a nine-to-two vote. The circuit court reversed, by a two-to-one vote. The court issued an eight-page majority opinion assessing the evidence presented by both sides and concluding as follows:
As there was no competent substantial evidence that the church met the criteria for a special exception and there was competent substantial evidence that the church did not meet the code criteria for the grant of a special exception, certiorari is hereby granted and the decision of the Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners is hereby reversed.
Dusseau v. Board of County Commissioners, No. 97-115-AP, slip op. at 8 .
The district court granted certiorari and quashed the circuit court decision, ruling as follows:
Dusseau, 725 So.2d at 1171 (citation omitted). This Court granted review based on conflict with Education Development Center v. City of West Palm Beach, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla.1989), wherein the Court set forth the appropriate standards governing certiorari review.
This Court recently addressed this issue in Florida Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So.2d 1089 (Fla.2000), wherein the Court set forth the applicable law governing an application for a special exception:
Florida Power & Light, 761 So.2d at 1091-92.
This Court in Florida Power & Light further explained that once a local agency has ruled on an application for a special exception, the parties may seek review under the two-tiered certiorari system:
Once the local agency has ruled on the application, the parties may seek review in the court system, twice. First, a party may seek certiorari review in circuit court, i.e., "first-tier" certiorari review. Although termed "certiorari" review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal. The court must review the record and determine inter alia whether the agency decision is supported by competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence. In contrast to the Irvine "competent substantial evidence" standard of proof, which the agency must apply at the fact-finding level, this first-tier "competent substantial evidence" standard is a standard of review, which the reviewing court must apply. Next, a party may seek certiorari review of the circuit court decision in the district court, i.e., "second-tier" certiorari review. Review at this level is circumscribed and is similar in scope to true common law certiorari review. As a practical matter, the circuit court's final ruling in most first-tier cases is conclusive, for second-tier review is extraordinarily limited.
These two standards of certiorari review were clarified by this Court in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982):
Florida Power & Light, 761 So.2d at 1092.
Although first- and second-tier certiorari review are similar in several respects, they are dissimilar in a key respect:
The Court later compared the two Vaillant standards and concluded that they are similar in several respects: The first prongs of both standards (i.e., the due process prongs) are the same, and the second prongs (i.e., the "essential requirements of the law" and "applied the correct law" prongs) also are equivalent. However, the Court noted a key difference: The third prong in the circuit court standard (i.e., the "competent substantial evidence" prong) is absent from the district court standard. Thus, the district court on second-tier certiorari review may not review the record to determine whether the agency decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.
Florida Power & Light, 761 So.2d at 1092-93 (footnotes omitted).
As noted above, although numerous local agencies recommended approval of the church's application, the Zoning Appeals Board denied the application. The Commission then conducted a lengthy hearing and approved the application. At the circuit court level, the court reviewed the record evidence on both sides and reversed the Commission's decision based on the following rationale: "[T]here was no competent substantial evidence that the church met the criteria for a special exception and there was competent substantial evidence that the church did not meet the code criteria for the grant of a special exception." This was error.
Although the circuit court phrased its reversal in terms of "competent substantial evidence," the plain language of its order shows that the court in fact reweighed the evidence, at length. Instead of simply reviewing the Commission's decision to determine whether it was supported by competent substantial evidence, the court also reviewed the decision to determine whether it was opposed by competent substantial evidence. The circuit court then substituted its judgment for that of the Commission as to the relative weight of the conflicting evidence. The circuit court thus usurped the fact-finding authority of the agency.
At the district court level, the court ruled as follows: "We find that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it reweighed evidence and completely ignored evidence that supports the Commission's ruling." Dusseau, 725 So.2d at 1171. This ruling was proper. The Court in Florida Power & Light explained:
Under Vaillant, the district court was required to determine whether the circuit court applied the correct law. As noted above, according to the plain language...
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