Miami Dade Coll. v. Allen
Decision Date | 24 April 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 3D18-2218,3D18-2218 |
Citation | 271 So.3d 1194 |
Parties | MIAMI DADE COLLEGE, Petitioner, v. Isabel del Pino ALLEN, Respondent. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., and Luke Savage, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Isabel del Pino Allen, in proper person.
Before SALTER, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
Petitioner Miami Dade College seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order denying its Motion for Protective Order, which sought to prevent Respondent Isabel del Pino Allen from deposing the College's President, Eduardo J. Padron, Ph.D. Because the trial court failed to find (1) that Allen had exhausted all discovery tools prior to seeking President Padron's deposition and (2) that the information Allen sought from President Padron was necessary and unavailable from another source, we grant the petition and quash the order under review.
On November 6, 2015, Allen sued the College, alleging, inter alia, that she was terminated from her position as a faculty member in violation of Florida's Whistle-blower's Act. The petition before us stems from Allen's attempt to depose President Padron in order to question him about two letters Allen sent disclosing the College's purported violations.1 In December 2015 and January 2016, Allen served interrogatories on the College. Allen did not direct her interrogatories to President Padron, and she did not seek information concerning the letters or President Padron's alleged personal involvement in her termination.
On February 20, 2018, Allen filed an Amended Complaint with three additional counts and four new defendants: Drs. Eduardo Padron, Lenore Rodicio, Malou Harrison, and Joy Ruff "in their respective official capacity as president of MDC, provost of MDC, president of the North Campus of MDC, and MDC's Coordinator of Equal Opportunity Programs." The College moved to dismiss the new counts and also moved to strike Padron, Rodicio, Harrison, and Ruff as defendants, arguing that there was no stated cause of action for suit against any of them. On June 26, 2018, the trial court granted the College's motion to dismiss two of the new counts (Counts II and III) without prejudice.2
On July 9, 2018, Allen filed an "Amended Counts II and III of Existing Complaint," attempting to restate two of the three recently dismissed claims. Allen listed Padron, Rodicio, Harrison, and Ruff as defendants in their "official capacity." The College again moved to dismiss. According to the College, its motion to dismiss remains pending.
On September 28, 2018, Allen filed a Notice of taking Deposition, seeking a videotaped deposition of President Padron. The College filed a Motion for Protective Order, arguing that Allen could not show that President Padron had "particularized, first-hand knowledge that cannot be obtained from any other source[.]" On October 11, 2018, the trial court entered an order denying the College's motion, finding that "Dr. Pardon [sic] has particularized first-hand knowledge of material facts." The court further determined that Allen was "entitled to depose Dr. Padron as to his receipt of her letters and any knowledge he has about the circumstances surrounding her termination."3 Following the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the College petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the trial court's order denying its Motion for Protective Order.
A party seeking certiorari review of a non-final order must first demonstrate that the order under review would result in a material injury that cannot be corrected on appeal (often referred to as "irreparable harm"). See Miami-Dade Cty. v. Dade Cty. Police Benev. Ass'n, 103 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). A finding of irreparable harm is jurisdictional and must be addressed before the merits. Id. If the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied, petitioner must then demonstrate that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law. Id.
We have jurisdiction to review the trial court's discovery order. See id. . We therefore address the merits of the Petition—whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it denied the College's Motion for Protective Order.
"Before requiring the head of a state agency to testify, a trial court must find: 1) the party seeking the testimony has exhausted all discovery tools in an attempt to obtain the information sought; and 2) the testimony sought is necessary and unavailable from other witnesses."4
Florida Office of Ins. Regulation v. Florida Dep't of Fin. Servs., 159 So.3d 945, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cty., 810 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ; Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Brooke, 573 So.2d 363, 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ); see also Dade Cty. Police Benev. Ass'n, 103 So.3d at 239.
Because President Padron is an agency head,5 the trial court was required to find (1) that Allen had exhausted all other discovery tools prior to seeking President Padron's deposition and (2) that President Padron's testimony was necessary and unavailable from other witnesses. Although the order under review found that President Padron has particularized knowledge of material facts, it is silent as to whether Allen exhausted all discovery tools or whether President Padron's testimony was necessary and unavailable from another source. Based on our review of the record, we determine that Allen did not comply with the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, Allen concedes that at least some of the information she seeks regarding President Padron's involvement was available from other witnesses. Therefore, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it denied the College's Motion for Protective Order.
In her Response to the College's Petition, Allen states that she has "concluded all other discovery," including serving two sets of interrogatories and taking depositions "of the other named defendants in the case." While it is true that Allen served two sets of interrogatories on the College, not a single interrogatory was directed to President Padron, nor did the interrogatories seek information concerning the letters that Allen sent to President Padron or President Padron's alleged personal involvement in Allen's termination. Further, Allen did not serve requests for production or any other discovery directed to President Padron concerning the letters or his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding her termination. With respect to the depositions of the other named defendants, Allen seems to concede, in her response to the College's Motion for Protective Order, that she was able to obtain some of the information she seeks from President Padron from other witnesses: "Allen has already presented ample evidence to prove that MDC and Defendant Padron violated Florida's Whistle-blower's Act ...."
In short, Allen has not shown, and the trial court did not find, that she had exhausted all other discovery tools in an attempt to obtain the information she seeks from President Padron or that the information was necessary and unavailable from another source. We therefore grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and quash the order under review.
Petition granted; order quashed.
While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I see no principled basis for broadly invoking reference to the "apex doctrine." Thus, I write separately.
Compelling Dr. Eduardo Padron, an agency head, to appear for deposition, in his official capacity, without the requisite showing of necessity, detrimentally affects "the efficient operation of the [executive] branch and government as a whole," thus, creating material injury irremediable on postjudgment appeal. Miami-Dade Cty. v. Dade Cty. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 103 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ; see also Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation v. Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 159 So.3d 945, 952-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) () (citation omitted); City of Sterling Heights Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin., Inc., No. 2:15-mc-0146 WBS AC, 2015 WL 9434782, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2015) ( ). The trial court strayed from the essential requirements of law by allowing the deposition to proceed, despite Allen's failure to demonstrate that Dr. Padron was uniquely able to provide relevant information, which could not be obtained from other sources, and that she had exhausted other means of discovery. See Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cty., 810 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (); see also Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (); see,...
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