Miami–Dade Cnty. v. Dade Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass'n

• Decision Date: 12 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 3D12–2080.,3D12–2080.
• Citation: 103 So.3d 236
• Parties: MIAMI–DADE COUNTY and Miami–Dade County Mayor Carlos A. Gimenez, Petitioners, v. DADE COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

103 So.3d 236

MIAMI–DADE COUNTY and Miami–Dade County Mayor Carlos A. Gimenez, Petitioners,

v.DADE COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, Respondent.

No. 3D12–2080.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 12, 2012.

R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami–Dade County Attorney, and Lee Kraftchick, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioners.

Brendan M. Coyle and Andrew M. Axelrad, for respondent.

Before CORTIÑAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners, Miami–Dade County (“the County”) and Miami–Dade County Mayor Carlos A. Gimenez (“Mayor Gimenez”), seek a writ of certiorari to quash an order issued by a hearing officer of the Public Employees Relations Commission (“PERC”) denying the petitioners' motion to quash subpoenas from the Dade County Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”), which require Mayor Gimenez to testify in an unfair labor practice proceeding filed by the PBA, and also denying the petitioners' motion for a protective order. For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition and quash the order under review.

As the Florida Supreme Court recently explained in Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. American Educational Enterprises, LLC, 99 So.3d 450, 454–455 (Fla.2012):

The petitioning party must demonstrate that the contested order constitutes (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case[,] (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. A finding that the petitioning party has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal is a condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari jurisdiction. If the party seeking review does not demonstrate that it will suffer material injury of an irreparable nature, then an appellate court may not grant certiorari relief from a non-appealable non-final order. Similarly, if the alleged harm can be remedied on appeal, the harm is not considered irreparable, and thus certiorari relief is not merited.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, prior to addressing whether the petitioners can demonstrate whether the hearing officer's order departs from the essential requirements of the law, we must first establish that this Court has jurisdiction.

“Orders granting discovery requests have traditionally been reviewed by certiorari because once discovery is wrongfully granted, the complaining party is beyond relief.” Horne v. Sch. Bd. of Miami–Dade Cnty., 901 So.2d 238, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). As directly applied to Mayor Gimenez, if it is later determined on direct appeal that the hearing officer erroneously ordered Mayor Gimenez to testify in the unfair labor practice proceeding filed by the PBA, at that point, the resulting injury to Mayor Gimenez cannot be remedied on appeal. Further, although not directly relevant in this case, if this Court were to determine that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain this petition for writ of certiorari, virtually every legislator in this state could be ordered to testify as to his or her legislative decisions, without any recourse until it is ultimately too late. Such an outcome would detrimentally affect the efficient operation of the legislative branch and government as a whole. Thus, we conclude, as the appellate courts that have granted certiorari review on similar grounds have concluded, that this Court has jurisdiction to address the petitioners' writ of certiorari. See Horne, 901 So.2d at 240;City of Gainesville v. Scotty's, Inc., 489 So.2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Pinellas Cnty., 425 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Manatee Cnty. v. Estech Gen. Chems. Corp., 402 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

As we have concluded that the petitioners' have satisfied the jurisdictional prongs, we next address whether the hearing officer's order departs from the essential requirements of the law. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the order departs from the essential requirements of the law.

First, the PBA's subpoenas improperly seek testimony from Mayor Gimenez as to his motive for his legislative decision to veto resolutions of the Miami–Dade Board of County Commissioners. See, e.g. Rainbow Lighting, Inc. v. Chiles, 707 So.2d 939, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (holding that city commissioners' “motives in adopting ordinances are not subject to judicial scrutiny”); City of Gainesville, 489 So.2d at 1197 (holding that there is a “widely accepted tenet that the motives of municipal commissioners in enacting...