Miami-Dade County v. Perez

• Decision Date: 27 July 2022
• Docket Number: 3D21-2142
• Parties: Miami-Dade County, Appellant, v. Javier Perez, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Miami-Dade County, Appellant, v. Javier Perez, Appellee.

No. 3D21-2142

Florida Court of Appeals, Third District

July 27, 2022

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County Lower Tribunal No. 20-9071, Lisa Walsh and Gina Beovides, Judges.

Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Joni A. Mosely and Richard Schevis, Assistant County Attorneys for appellant.

Sodhi Spoont PLLC, Eric M. Sodhi, Joshua L. Spoont, and Nathaniel M. Edenfield, for appellee.

Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

EMAS J.

Javier Perez (plaintiff below) sued Miami-Dade County for injuries he suffered while attending his son's little league game in Tamiami Park, after a drunk driver crashed through a chain-linked fence and onto the baseball field, pinning Perez to the ground. Both of Perez's legs had to be amputated. The complaint alleged Miami-Dade County was negligent in constructing the baseball field in an unapproved location creating an unreasonably dangerous condition (Count I) and in failing to warn of the dangerous condition (Count II). The County moved to dismiss Perez's complaint, asserting entitlement to sovereign immunity. The trial court entered an order denying the motion, which the County now appeals.^[1]

We affirm the trial court's order because, at this stage of the proceedings and accepting as true the well-pled allegations of the complaint and attachments,^[2] the causes of action alleged in Perez's complaint are premised not upon the County's planning-level decisions, but upon the County's alleged operational-level actions. See Sanchez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 245 So.3d 933, 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court held 'that the separation-of-powers provision present in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution requires that 'certain [quasi-legislative] policy-making, planning or judgmental governmental functions cannot be the subject of traditional tort liability," but decisions made at the operational level-decisions or actions implementing policy, planning, or judgmental governmental functions-generally do not enjoy sovereign immunity") (quoting Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 1979)). "Planning level functions are generally interpreted to be those requiring basic policy decisions, while operational level functions are those that implement policy." Id. See also Osorio v Metropolitan Dade Cty., 459 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla 3d DCA 1984) (recognizing that, while the county's decision to install a "stop ahead" sign and the proper location for that sign constitute planning-level decisions which would be immune from suit, operational-level actions implementing those decisions would not be; reversing summary judgment in favor of county because a genuine dispute of material fact remains whether "the workers failed to implement the planning decision" when installing the stop ahead sign in a different location than that directed by the county's work order and whether that was a legal cause of the accident); City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So.2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 1982) ("[W]hen a governmental entity creates a known dangerous condition, which is not readily apparent to persons who could be injured by the condition, a duty at the operational level arises to warn the public of, or protect the public from, the known danger. The failure to fulfill this operational-level duty is, therefore, a basis for an action against the governmental entity.") Affirmed.

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^[1] We have jurisdiction, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(F)(iii) (authorizing appellate review of nonfinal orders that "deny a motion that asserts entitlement to sovereign immunity"); ...