Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post No. 124 of American Legion

Decision Date14 December 1945
Citation24 So.2d 33,156 Fla. 673
PartiesMIAMI SHORES VILLAGE v. WM. N. BROCKWAY POST NO. 124 OF AMERICAN LEGION.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Perry A. Nichols, of Miami, for petitioners.

George J Baya, of Miami, for respondents.

Thomas H Anderson, of Miami, amicus curiae.

CHAPMAN, Chief Justice.

Section 8 of Article 8 of the Constitution of Florida grants to the Legislature the power to establish and to abolish municipalities, and to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the charters of same at any time. Chapter 18698 Special Acts of 1937, Laws of Florida, amended a previously existing charter of the Miami Shores Village, a municipal corporation of Dade County.

Grants of police power of the sovereign State through the Legislature are specifically enumerated and conferred under Sections 9 and 10 of art. 2, Chapter 18698, supra, to the municipality. It has the power to regulate the height, size and location of buildings and other structures within the boundaries. Likewise the right to regulate the use of buildings structures and lands for trade, industries, residence apartment houses, and all or any other purposes, * * * and for any of said purposes in promoting the safety, health, comfort, morals, convenience, peace, prosperity or general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality.

It has the power to divide the municipality into zones of such numbers, shapes and areas as may be deemed best suited to effectuate the purposes enumerated in Section 9, supra. Within the several zones it could regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, destruction or removal of buildings, land and structures, including billboards. The regulations were authorized to lessen traffic or street congestion so as to promote the common safety and prevent the overcrowding of land and to avoid undue concentration of population in any area or areas within the municipality. The exercise and enforcement of these enumerated powers were conferred by the charter on five members of the council, who were each elected by the voters of the municipality.

Sometime prior to April, 1945, the respondents, or some one in their behalf, signed an option agreement to acquire by purchase or otherwise described real estate situated within the municipality the use of which was restricted by Ordinance to residential purposes, and, accordingly, an application or request was made to the Village Council for the adoption of an Ordinance by the terms of which the residential restrictions on the use of the property would be removed, and the property re-zoned so as to permit the erection and construction thereon of an American Legion Home. Such an Ordinance was enacted and identified as Ordinance No. 140 under date of May 8, 1945. This Ordinance transferred or changed the use of the property from residential to a special one which made it lawful to erect and construct a Legion Home thereon. The special use to which the property was restricted by the terms of the Ordinance was identified as Zone L. The City issued a permit under Ordinance No. 140 for the erection and construction of the Legion Home on the day after its adoption, being May 9, 1945.

Shortly after the issuance of the permit supra, the respondents (1) employed construction engineers; (2) plans and specifications were prepared; (3) materials purchased; (4) excavations for the foundation were made; (5) the concrete was mixed and poured into the excavations as a foundation; (6) obligations for the costs of construction were outstanding on June 21, 1945; (7) the Village Council, on June 21, 1945, revoked the permit previously issued. Respondents assert that their action supra, after requiring the permit, in law is equivalent to a vested property right which cannot be impaired and the municipality is now estopped from revoking or cancelling said permit.

The municipality was the defendant below and is the petitioner here, and it now strenuously contends that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is wholly inapplicable and that the conduct of the respondents in the premises is equivalent to bad faith and their deportment is such that they cannot assert on this record the claim of vested property rights because (1) respondents were not the owners of the land during April, 1945, when applying for the permit; (2) their interests in the property are limited to the rights acquired under an option to purchase; (3) they did not own the title to the property on May 8, 1945, when the Council enacted Ordinance No. 140; (4) they knew or should have known that a majority of the residents of the municipality looked with disfavor on the re-zoning Ordinance; (5) that the adoption thereof immediately became an issue for those interested in the welfare of the municipality; (6) an election of Councilmen was to be held on June 19, 1945; (7) candidates were brought out pledged to the repeal of Ordinance No. 140 and the revocation of the permit; (8) prior to the election date hundreds of pieces of literature were distributed disapproving Ordinance No. 140; (9) the permit contained language viz.: (a) 'A further condition upon which this permit is granted is the understanding that the contractor or builder named above assumes the responsibility for a thorough knowledge of the ordinances and regulations pertaining to the work covered hereby shown on the plans or drawing or in the statements or specifications and that he assumes responsibility for work done by his agents, servants or employees'; (b) 'In consideration of the issuance of this permit I agree to perform the work covered hereunder in compliance with all ordinances and regulations pertaining thereto and in strict conformity with the plans, drawings, statements or specifications submitted to the proper authorities of Miami Shores Village. In accepting this permit I assume responsibility for all work done by either myself, my agent, servant or employee. /s/ C. F. Wheeler, Contractor or Builder.'; (10) the foundation work began a day or so before election day; (11) the newly elected members took office June 21, 1945; (12) Ordinance No. 140 was rescinded by the newly elected Council by adoption of Ordinance No. 144.

Despite the storm warnings and red light signals of disapproval of the issuance of the permit which appeared and were shown by the people of the municipality from about the date of the issuance, and existed continuously until the date of excavation and the pouring of concrete, the respondents earnestly contend that they acquired vested rights in the premises protected by our fundamental law and the doctrine of...

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27 cases
  • Warner v. City of Boca Raton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • August 31, 1999
    ...that no property interest arises from the unauthorized acts of municipal officers. See Miami Shores Village v. Brockway Post No. 124 of American Legion, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33, 35 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So.2d 433 (Fla.1963) ("Generally......
  • Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1974
    ...and prosperity of the people. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Assoc., 77 So.2d 465 (Fla.1955); Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post No. 124 of American Legion, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33 (Fla.1945); Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 183 So. 628 (Fla.1938); State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, et al......
  • Golden v. McCarty
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 30, 1976
    ...and prosperity of the people. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Assoc., 77 So.2d 465 (Fla.1955); Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post No. 124 of American Legion, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33 (Fla.1945); Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 183 So. 628 (Fla.1938); State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, et al......
  • Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 28, 1950
    ...101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114; State ex rel. Skillman v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541; Miami Shores Village v. William N. Brockway Post, No. 124, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33. And in such cases, we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the city council, or to questi......
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