Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod

Decision Date12 December 1952
Citation61 So.2d 753
Parties31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2201, 22 Lab.Cas. P 67,293 MIAMI TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 430, et al. v. ORMEROD et al.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Leonard G. Egert, Claude Pepper Law Offices, Pepper, Lefevre, Orr & Faircloth, Miami, for appellants.

Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston, Robert H. Anderson and D. P. S. Paul, Miami, for appellees.

HOBSON, Justice.

The Chancellor who entered the final decree in this cause personally heard and observed the witnesses as they testified. In and by his final decree he permanently enjoined appellants from '(1) Threatening, molesting, assaulting, interfering with or intimidating the plaintiffs or any of them or their families, coercing or attempting to coerce the plaintiffs or any of them in their employment, committing or perpetrating any act of violence whatsoever or threats thereof against the plaintiffs or any of them or their families, bombing the property of plaintiffs or the places where they live whether owned by them or not, or the places where they are employed, or committing any act of malicious mischief toward the plaintiffs or any of them or their families, their property, or the place or places where they are employed. (2) Picketing plaintiffs' place of employment at 200 South Miami Avenue, Miami, Dade County, Florida.'

It is contended by appellants that there is in this record no competent substantial evidence which establishes the fact that the many acts of violence and intimidation which were disclosed by the evidence, were done or perpetrated by any of the appellants. It is further contended that there is no justification upon a proper evaluation of the evidence for the entry of a permanent injunction restraining the appellants from peaceful and lawful picketing.

It is true that there is no evidence which directly connects any of the appellants with the acts of violence by positively identifying any or all of them as the perpetrators thereof. However, we conclude upon this point that there is in the record competent substantial evidence from which the Chancellor was justified in drawing the reasonable inference that appellants were responsible for such acts of violence. We need not, but for the convenience of the bar will, cite authority for the well-established rule that this Court will not substitute its judgment for findings of facts made by the Chancellor, who by law is charged with the duty and responsibility of evaluating the evidence, if there is in the record any competent substantial evidence which sustains such findings of facts or from which such findings flow as logical and reasonable inferences. Harmon v. Harmon, Fla., 40 So.2d 209; Hamilton v. Laesch, 134 Fla. 591, 184 So. 110 and cases cited therein; Guerra v. Quiterrez, 66 Fla. 570, 64 So. 232; Mock v. Thompson, 58 Fla. 477, 50 So. 673. See also U. S. Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., Fla., 55 So.2d 741. This rule is particularly applicable when the Chancellor personally hears the testimony of all the witnesses.

The position taken by counsel for appellants that all of the acts of violence and intimidation, as well as all threats, occurred, if at all, prior to, and at a time too remote from, the institution and trial of this case to justify a permanent injunction against peaceful and lawful picketing and that very few threats or acts of intimidation were made or performed at or near the picket line or the business establishment of the Miami Herald with which organization the appellants had labor disputes, has given us more concern than did appellants' first contention. However, we have concluded the Chancellor was correct in this suit brought by 133 employees to protect their right to work without joining any union, in deciding that the picketing was not for the purpose of informing the public of the differences which probably exist between the Union and the Miami Herald, but that the real purpose of the picketing was unlawful in that it was disigned to force an employer to coerce its employees to join the appellant Union or to designate it as their bargaining agent. See Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, Fla., 44 So.2d 899 and Building Service Employees' International Union v. Gazzam, 1950, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045, reported again on rehearing denied in 339 U.S. 991, 70 S.Ct. 1019, 94 L.Ed. 1391; Wilbank et ux. v. Chester & Delaware Counties Bartenders, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local No. 667-A. F. of L., 1948, 360 Pa. 48, 60 A.2d 21, 23. The picket line was not established, nor did it exist for the purpose of influencing...

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5 cases
  • Sax Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotel Emp. Union Local No. 255 (A. F. of L.)
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 27, 1955
    ...restraining order, at which hearing all parties hereto were represented, are sufficient under our opinion in Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod, Fla.1952, 61 So.2d 753, the cases cited therein, and Treasure, Inc., v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Rartenders' Union, supra, Fla., 72 So.2......
  • Applebaum v. Laham
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 10, 1964
    ...being evidence in the record to support his findings, same will not be interfered with upon this appeal. See: Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod, Fla.1952, 61 So.2d 753; Board of County Commissioners v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 256; Walker v. Walker, Fla.App.19......
  • Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Emp. Union, Local No. 255 (A. F. of L.)
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • October 19, 1955
    ...on under such circumstances is unlawful cannot be gainsaid. It falls within the 'unlawful purpose' doctrine of Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod, Fla., 61 So.2d 753. We hold that the picketing in these cases was begun by respondents without first having submitted to the petitione......
  • Treasure, Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Emp. and Bartenders' Union, Local No. 133 (A. F. of L.), 133
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 14, 1954
    ...899, this Court held that the picketing was for an unlawful object and an injunction was proper. In the case of Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod, Fla., 61 So.2d 753, this Court held that the Circuit Court in Dade County was correct in deciding that picketing in that case was not......
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