Miceli v. Miceli, s. 87-1395
| Decision Date | 03 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 87-1395,87-2607,s. 87-1395 |
| Citation | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1853,533 So.2d 1171 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1853 Darlene Lois MICELI, Appellant, v. Michael J. MICELI, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
John Asbell and Elizabeth J. Van Arsdale of Asbell, Hains, Doyle and Pickworth, Naples, for appellant.
Stephen W. Sessums of Sessums & Mason, Tampa, for appellee.
We have consolidated these appeals by the wife from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and a subsequently entered judgment awarding attorney's fees to the wife. We find merit in the wife's argument concerning the financial awards made to her in the final judgment and reverse those aspects of the final judgment. We affirm the judgment awarding attorney's fees.
The parties were married on March 7, 1975, and separated on December 26, 1983. At the time of the final hearing, the husband was fifty-two years old and the wife was thirty-eight years old. The husband has children by a previous marriage, but there were no children of this marriage.
At the time of the marriage, the wife owned nominal assets and worked full time for TWA as a flight attendant. The husband at the time of marriage owned substantial assets having a value in the neighborhood of $1,000,000; the precise value was disputed. At the conclusion of this marriage, the husband held title to twenty-five pieces of real property, seventeen of which had been purchased during the marriage. Additionally, he held title to stocks, bonds and notes which had been acquired during the marriage. The wife's evidence indicated that these assets had a value of approximately $13,000,000; the husband's CPA testified that the husband's net worth was $7,852,411. The wife, on the other hand, accumulated no assets because she spent her entire salary on her living expenses.
The wife continued to work for TWA throughout the marriage. Because TWA did not have a base in Florida, the wife had to fly out of Chicago, where she resided in an apartment which she considered to be the residence of both her and the husband. The husband apparently lived most of the time in Florida. The wife testified that she came to Florida to spend time with her husband as much as possible.
The wife, while still technically working for TWA at the time of trial, was on "preferential recall" because the TWA flight attendants' union had gone on strike on March 17, 1986. The wife had attempted to find other employment but was unable to do so. Although her "preferential recall" status meant that TWA would rehire flight attendants according to seniority and need, the wife testified that it was possible she may never be rehired.
The husband testified that during the marriage his occupation was that of an investor. He bought and sold stocks and bonds; and he bought, sold and financed real properties. He received income from various sources--interest on investments, dividends on stocks, income from businesses, income from rental properties, income from municipal bonds, and proceeds from sales of property or mortgages of property. There was testimony that the husband's net cash flow was over $400,000 per year during the marriage. The parties maintained no joint bank accounts and, as noted above, the assets acquired by the husband during the marriage were titled in the husband's name alone.
In the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the trial judge awarded the wife $150,000 "as lump sum alimony." Additionally, the wife was awarded the sum of $1,500 per month for a period of eighteen months as rehabilitative alimony; this despite the fact that the trial judge had awarded the wife temporary support of $3,000 per month pending the dissolution proceedings based on the wife's financial affidavit showing estimated monthly expenses of $3,450.
The final judgment contains no findings of fact on the subject of marital assets and equitable...
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