Michael E., In re

• Citation: 14 Cal.3d 892,123 Cal.Rptr. 103,538 P.2d 231
• Decision Date: 04 August 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 18456
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: Previously published at 14 Cal.3d 892 14 Cal.3d 892, 15 Cal.3d 183, 538 P.2d 231 In re MICHAEL E., a minor, on Habeas Corpus. . In Bank

Page 103

123 Cal.Rptr. 103

Previously published at 14 Cal.3d 892

14 Cal.3d 892, 15 Cal.3d 183, 538 P.2d 231

In re MICHAEL E., a minor, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 18456.

Supreme Court of California.

In Bank.

Aug. 4, 1975.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 3, 1975.

Robert G. Eckhoff, Public Defender, Gilbert W. Lentz, Deputy Public Defender, and Robert L. Walker, San Francisco, for petitioner.

George P. Kading, County Counsel, and Marvin Levine, Deputy County Counsel, Santa Barbara, for respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Petitioner, a ward of the juvenile court, is confined in the Camarillo State Hospital pursuant to an order of the juvenile court authorizing his placement in that institution for treatment of a mental health problem. He contends through counsel that his confinement was effected without compliance with protections afforded to persons committed in analogous situations to state mental hospitals (see Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 5000--5401), and that for such reason he is illegally restrained and is entitled to his discharge. ¹ We conclude for reasons which follow that petitioner's writ of habeas corpus should be granted and that petitioner should be remanded to the juvenile court.

Petitioner, then 17 years of age, was declared a ward of the juvenile court on July 16, 1974, following the sustaining of a petition (§ 602) alleging that he had committed petty theft (Pen.Code, § 488) and had received stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496, subd. 1). A psychiatrist who acknowledged his lack of background information concerning petitioner reported prior to a dispositional hearing that his examination of petitioner disclosed 'some degree of psychotic condition,' and recommended further proceedings for a 'more definitive opinion and treatment.' A second psychiatrist expressed the opinion that petitioner had a 'disturbed mental capacity in reality testing, with total lack of insight into the nature of his predicament, including a marked impairment of judgment, and that (petitioner) is psychotic at the level of a probable borderline schizophrenia, although there is the possibility that he may be suffering a form of psychosis secondary to overwhelming stresses from sources not obtainable at this time due to his inability to relate an adequate history.'

At the dispositional hearing on August 13, 1974, a juvenile court referee ordered that petitioner 'be placed in the care and custody of the probation officer, for commitment to Camarillo State Hospital' and 'instructed' the probation officer to deliver petitioner to that hospital. A petition for rehearing was filed and heard before a juvenile court judge. (§ 558.) Both a probation department psychiatric social worker and petitioner's father advised the court that they felt the placement was proper. ² It was contended in behalf of petitioner that he could not be committed without compliance with the LPS Act. (See In re L.L. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 205, 114 Cal.Rptr. 11.) After receiving evidence on three different days and entertaining argument, the court, on September 5, signed a formal order which committed petitioner to the care and custody of the probation officer 'for ultimate placement in a private or public facility, including . . . Camarillo State Hospital. . . .' ³

On September 5, the probation officer, purportedly on petitioner's behalf, executed an application for 'voluntary' admission to Camarillo State Hospital, and petitioner has since been confined there. ⁴

Petitioner complains of the foregoing procedures on numerous statutory and constitutional grounds. Central to all of his complaints is the failure of the juvenile court to proceed in accordance with the LPS Act in effecting his commitment. ⁵ The failure of the court to have so proceeded is also claimed to have constituted a denial of petitioner's constitutional rights to a jury trial, to due process, and to equal protection of the laws. ⁶ Petitioner also contends that his commitment by the juvenile court could not have been authorized pursuant to section 6000 as that court is not a 'person entitled to (petitioner's) custody' within the meaning of said section 6000. ⁷ Finally, petitioner claims that if section 6000 is construed to permit such a commitment it is unconstitutional because it authorizes long term commitments of minors without affording them an opportunity to show that he or she is not mentally ill or dangerous, or that such confinement is not reasonably necessary to any legitimate goal.

As the question of the applicability of the LPS Act will be seen to be determinative of petitioner's contentions, we give immediate consideration thereto. It was initially provided in section 5002 that the Act was not to 'be construed to repeal or modify laws relating to the commitment of . . . juvenile court wards . . .' among other classifications of persons. (Stats.1967, ch. 1667, p. 4074.) Section 5002, however, was amended in 1971 (Stats.1971, ch. 1459, § 1, p. 2875) to delete the commitment of juvenile court wards from those classifications which theretofore had been exempt from the applicability of the Act. ⁸ It thus follows that although laws relating to the commitment of mentally disordered wards of the juvenile court were at first intended to continue to be applied as exempt from the provisions of the Act, the 1971 amendment specifically extinguished that exemption. The Act must now be deemed to repeal or to modify laws as they relate to the commitment of juvenile court wards to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with provisions of the Act. (See In re L.L., supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 205, 213--214, 114 Cal.Rptr. 11.) In making any judgment whether a particular law is inconsistent with the LPS Act, we necessarily must be guided by the mandatory direction in section 5002 that mentally disordered persons 'shall' receive services pursuant to the Act. ⁹ It follows, accordingly that the actual commitment of a mentally disordered minor who is also a ward of the juvenile court can be accomplished Only in accordance with the LPS Act. We next examine the question whether petitioner was so committed.

Our construction of the LPS Act as applied to juvenile wards does not preclude the application of other statutory procedures when such procedures are consistent with or are in accordance with the LPS Act. Such a procedure or procedures are set forth in sections 6550 and 6551. The first mentioned section provides that if a juvenile court 'is in doubt concerning the state of mental health or the mental condition' of a ward, the court may invoke procedures set out in section 6551. The latter section provides that upon court order, the ward shall be taken to an approved facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation. Such treatment and evaluation procedures are nevertheless expressly required to be conducted in accordance with provisions of the LPS Act. (Ch. 2, art. 1, Detention for Evaluation and Treatment, § §§ 5150--5156.) If the professional person in charge of the approved facility finds that, as the result of a mental disorder, the ward is in need of intensive treatment he may be 'certified' for not more than 14 days of involuntary intensive treatment if the particular facility is able to comply and thereafter does comply with certain specified requirements of the LPS Act. (Ch. 2, art. 4, Certification for Intensive Treatment, §§ 5250--5258.) The ward may be detained for an additional 14-day period of intensive treatment if, during the first 2-week period or the 72-hour evaluation period, he exhibits suicidal tendencies. Such further detention and the procedures to be followed during the additional period must also comply with the provisions of the Act. (Ch. 2, art. 4.5, Additional Intensive Treatment of Suicidal Persons, §§ 5260--5268.) Thereafter the ward may be further detained for an additional 90-day period if, upon a petition by the professional person in charge of the facility, it is judicially determined and certified that the ward is an imminently dangerous person.

Again, the procedures for certification must be in accordance with provisions of the LPS Act. (Ch. 2, art. 6, Post-certification Procedures for Imminently Dangerous Persons, §§ 5300--5306.) Provision is also made in the Act for judicial recertification for additional 90-day periods if the person has threatened, attempted, or actually inflicted physical harm on another during the period of postcertification treatment and if he presents an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others. (§ 5304.)

The procedures authorized by sections 6550 and 6551 are manifestly nothing more than express statutory direction to initiate LPS Act procedures in a context wherein a juvenile court entertains 'doubt' as to the mental health of one of its wards. (See In re L.L., supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 205, 210--213, 114 Cal.Rptr. 11.) Although the initial stages of such detentions are for the relatively short periods of time designed to serve those exigent circumstances, successive detentions based on professional or judicial findings made in the course of treatment and evaluation may thereafter be imposed for a substantial cumulative period. Such consecutive detentions, however, are in all instances consistent with the procedures authorized by the Act. We thus conclude that sections 6550 and 6551 are available for the evaluation and treatment of a mentally disordered ward of the juvenile court although those sections are not themselves incorporated as a part of the LPS Act.

It is apparent that the People in the instant case did not purport to proceed in accordance with sections 6550 and 6551. Petitioner was not referred to Camarillo State Hospital for a 72-hour treatment and evaluation but rather was committed to the care and custody of a probation officer for 'ultimate placement' in a facility. The dispositional order suggested that placement in Camarillo State Hospital might be accomplished pursuant to ...