Michael E. Rice v. Keg & Cork, 86-LW-1835

Decision Date31 July 1986
Docket Number86-LW-1835,CA 2193
PartiesMichael E. RICE, Appellant, v. KEG & CORK, et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Anthony B. Pennington, Pennington & Kotecha, Springfield, for appellant.

Sanford H. Flack, Springfield, for appellee Aetna Building Maintenance.

Andrea F. Kravetz, Assistant Attorney General, Cincinnati, for appellee Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.

OPINION

WOLFF Judge.

On January 4, 1983, Aetna Building Maintenance hired Michael E Rice, appellant herein, as a supervisor at a yearly salary of approximately $17,000. This position required appellant to oversee several work crews which provided cleaning and maintenance service to various Aetna customers. Concurrent with the Aetna job, appellant also worked part-time at the Keg & Cork, a drive-through beverage retailer. This was a weekend job which paid appellant about $40.00 a week.

It appears from the record that in November and December of 1983, several of the Aetna accounts under appellant's supervision began to complain about the quality of the service that they were receiving. As a result of these complaints, the president of Aetna, Mr. J.R. Greenland called appellant in for a meeting on December 29. At this meeting, Mr. Greenland offered to keep appellant on, but only as a scrub crew leader, a downgraded position which would have paid appellant less and provided fewer benefits. Appellant refused this position, and on January 3, 1984, his employment with Aetna came to an end.

On January 11, appellant filed an application for a determination of benefits with the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services for the year beginning January 1, 1984. According to the notice of determination of benefit rights appellant's dismissal from Aetna did not disqualify him from receiving benefits as Aetna had not given him warning prior to the termination. Furthermore, the Bureau stated that appellant's refusal to take the lesser position with Aetna and his continued employment at Keg & Cork did not act to disqualify him. The Bureau determined that appellant was eligible to receive benefits in the amount of $153.00 per week. Appellant received benefits for the week ending January 7.

The record reveals that some time later, appellant received a job offer from a company in Texas. During the administrative proceedings, appellant stated that it had been his intention to accept this position. In anticipation of the move to Texas, appellant signed a contract on March 10 to sell his house to a relative who agreed to assume the mortgage and also paid appellant an additional $7,000. In preparing to take the new job, appellant also turned in his two weeks notice at the Keg & Cork. February 19, 1984, was his last day there.

On February 20, Aetna Building Maintenance filed notice of intent to appeal the Bureau's determination of appellant's unemployment benefits. In response, appellant requested a fact-finding interview which was held on March 5. The administrator's decision on reconsideration, dated March 13, concluded that Aetna had dismissed the appellant for good cause and disallowed the claim for the week ending January 7.

In a later proceeding, appellant testified that he decided to stay in Ohio in order to contest this decision, thus foregoing the job in Texas.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the March 13 decision and requested a hearing before a referee, which was held on April 5 and continued to May 10. The referee's decision, issued on May 29, reversed the decision on reconsideration and allowed appellant's claim for benefits for the week ending January 7. Aetna filed an application to appeal this decision with the Board of Review. The Board disallowed Aetna's application on August 15.

While the administrative proceedings with Aetna were pending, and after he had quit his job at the Keg & Cork, appellant filed an application with the Bureau on March 21 to re-open the claim he had filed earlier upon leaving Aetna. On the application, appellant gave as his reasons for leaving Keg & Cork that he needed time to prepare his appeal and to look for employment out of state. Appellant applied for and received benefits for the weeks ending February 25 and March 3, 1984.

As a result, another administrative proceeding began, unrelated to the earlier proceedings initiated by Aetna. The issues appellant presents on appeal have their origin in this second proceeding.

On June 11, the Bureau sent appellant notice that as a result of his leaving Keg & Cork, an eligibility issue had arisen regarding the benefits paid for the weeks ending February 25 and March 3. The determination of benefits, dated June 27, stated that under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) appellant's leaving his job with Keg & Cork in order to take an out of state job constituted a quit without just cause. Thus, the determination disallowed the claims for the weeks ending February 25 and March 3, and held that under R.C. 4141.35, appellant had to repay the benefits issued for those two periods. In response, appellant filed a request for reconsideration.

On September 17, 1984, the administrator mailed his decision on reconsideration. This decision held that appellant had quit his job at Keg & Cork without just cause and disallowed the claim for the week ending February 25. Another decision mailed the same day stated that appellant's benefit rights were suspended as of February 19 and as of March 3, appellant had not yet met the requirements to remove the suspension. Therefore, the second decision disallowed the claim for the week ending March 3. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a hearing before a referee was held on October 15, 1984.

At this hearing, appellant testified that he had quit his job at Keg & Cork in order to pursue the job opportunity in Texas. He stated that when the March 13 decision on reconsideration as to his Aetna benefits for the week ending January 7 went against him, he decided to stay in Ohio so that he could participate in the appeals process. Appellant stated that in so doing, he lost the chance to take the job in Texas. Appellant further testified that he had spent the entire $7,000 he had realized on the sale of his house to support himself and his family while he stayed in Ohio. There is also some indication in the record that appellant believed he would be financially unable to make the move to Texas without the benefits.

At the hearing, appellant's counsel argued that the quit from Keg & Cork had been a quit for just cause within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). As an alternate argument, counsel claimed that even if it was held that this was a quit without just cause, appellant's situation came under an exception to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) set forth in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a)(iii).

On October 18, the referee issued his decision which held that since appellant had quit the Keg & Cork job to take an out of state job and then failed to take the second job, the appellant had quit the Keg & Cork without just cause. Furthermore, the referee held that this quit without just cause was not covered by the exception provided in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a)(iii). The referee concluded that the disqualification for the week ending February 25 was properly imposed. Another decision issued by the referee on the same day upheld the disallowance of benefits for the week ending March 3. The Board of Review disallowed appellant's application to institute further appeals.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Clark County Court of Common Pleas. That court held that since appellant failed to take the job in Texas, he had quit his employment at Keg & Cork without just cause. According to the court, the Board's decision was lawful, reasonable, and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. From the judgment entry dismissing his appeal, appellant appeals to this court.

Appellant presents the following assignment of error for our consideration:

"APPELLANT QUIT HIS PART-TIME JOB AT KEG & CORK WITH JUST CAUSE WITHIN THE MEANING OF OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 4141.29(D)(2)(a) AND THEREFORE THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE TRIAL COURT IS UNLAWFUL, UNREASONABLE, AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."

The section of the code at issue, R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), provides as follows:

"Each eligible individual shall receive benefits as compensation for loss of remuneration due to involuntary total or partial unemployment in the amounts and subject to the conditions stipulated in sections 4141.01 to 4141.46 of the Revised Code.
(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions:
(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that:
(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work, provided division (D)(2) of this section does not apply to the separation of a person under any of the following circumstances:
* * * "

The term "just cause" does not easily lend itself to precise definition. Therefore, the determination of whether a claimant quit a job for just cause is necessarily a flexible process, highly dependent upon the facts of each individual case. One Ohio appellate court has held that just cause is " that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act." Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 10 at 12. In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that as part of his burden of establishing eligibility, a claimant for unemployment compensation benefits who has quit his employment must show just cause for the quit. Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17.

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