Michalec v. State
| Decision Date | 24 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-11-00104-CR,03-11-00104-CR |
| Parties | Colette Elaine Michalec, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
HONORABLE NANCY WRIGHT HOHENGARTEN, JUDGE PRESIDING
The opinion and judgment issued herein on March 6, 2013, are withdrawn, and the following opinion is issued in lieu thereof. Appellant's motion for rehearing is overruled.
A jury convicted appellant Colette Michalec of the Class B misdemeanor offense of interference with the duties of a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15 (West 2011). The trial court assessed her punishment at confinement for 14 days in the county jail. See id. § 12.22 (West 2011). Appellant argues five points of error on appeal complaining about the denial of her motion to dismiss, the denial of her motions to suppress, a denial of due process, and insufficient evidence. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
In accordance with this Court's duty to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we set forth the following evidence heard by the jury: On November 30, 2009, Officer Robert Pfaff, a patrol officer with the Austin Police Department ("APD"), was on night-shift duty in East Austin. In the course of a normal shift, APD officers often run license plate numbers through the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") database to gather information on possible criminal activity, ranging from expired registrations to stolen vehicles. At approximately 8:40 p.m., Officer Pfaff ran the license plate number of a Mazda traveling westbound on Braker Lane. The information he received indicated that the Mazda's registration had expired. Pursuant to his normal routine under those circumstances, Officer Pfaff decided to pull the car over to investigate.
However, the Mazda did not pull over when Officer Pfaff activated his overhead lights, but simply continued driving. Even when the officer briefly activated his siren, the driver still did not immediately pull over. Moreover, as the Mazda kept driving, the officer noticed what he believed to be furtive movements inside the car, as though the occupants were trying to hide something under the seat—something he feared might prove a threat to his or the public's safety. Eventually, the Mazda stopped in the parking lot of a Walgreens Pharmacy. Based on prior experience, Officer Pfaff was apprehensive and cautious about this particular traffic stop. He got out of his patrol car and approached the driver's side of the Mazda, positioning himself so as to best protect himself if the driver proved to be armed.
As Officer Pfaff approached the Mazda, the driver requested to see his identification, an unusual request that further increased the officer's anxiety and safety concerns. Officer Pfaffnevertheless complied with the driver's demand and showed him his APD departmental identification. Officer Pfaff then asked the driver to get out of the car, his intention being to conduct a weapons frisk for safety. The driver did not comply with the officer's repeated instructions to exit the car. During the exchange, Officer Pfaff noticed a leather satchel resting on the driver's lap. At one point, he saw the driver's hands move from the steering wheel toward the satchel. Fearing that the satchel might contain a weapon and feeling a significant threat to his safety, Officer Pfaff reached through the window to secure it. In response, the driver grabbed the officer's arms. The two then wrestled over the satchel. Finally, to secure the situation and the driver, Officer Pfaff opened the car door, unbuckled the driver's seatbelt, and forcibly removed him from the car, requesting backup assistance as he did so. As the officer wrestled the driver out of the car, the satchel landed on the driver's seat.
Appellant was the passenger in the Mazda. While Officer Pfaff struggled with the driver, appellant got out of the car, walked around to the driver's side, came up behind the officer, and began yelling at him as he tried to contain the situation. After handcuffing the driver, Officer Pfaff was still concerned that the satchel's contents could pose a threat. He reached to secure the leather satchel, which was sitting on the driver's seat, but appellant, who had returned to the passenger's side of the car, reached across the center console, snatched it from his grasp, and fled toward the Walgreens. Officer Pfaff instructed her to stop, but she ignored his instruction, commenting, "What are you going to do?"
Backup officers arrived as Officer Pfaff was placing the handcuffed driver into his patrol vehicle. One of the backup officers found appellant inside the Walgreens store on her cellphone, still speaking with a 911 operator.1 That officer then handcuffed appellant and frisked her for weapons. Another officer took the satchel from appellant. The satchel was later found to contain personal items of the driver, including his identifying information and his concealed handgun permit.
After her arrest, appellant refused to divulge her identity or provide any identifying information. Police tried for over an hour to discover her identity, finally taking her to the main police station for fingerprinting. Appellant refused to cooperate with the fingerprinting procedure. To avoid any escalated violence, appellant was transported to the jail. Once there, jail personnel were able to obtain her fingerprints but unable to identify her from them. Police finally determined appellant's identity by calling family members after retrieving the phone numbers from her cell phone.
Appellant was subsequently charged by information with interfering with the duties of a public servant and evading arrest. At trial, the jury convicted appellant of interfering with the duties of a public servant but acquitted her of the evading-arrest charge. Punishment was to the court, and the trial judge sentenced appellant to serve 14 days in the county jail. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and her motions to suppress. She further argues that the trial court's ruling quashing hersubpoena duces tecum denied her due process. Finally, she complains that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction.
Motion to Dismiss
In her first point of error, appellant asserts that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her case and thus erred in denying her motion to dismiss.
"An information is a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense." Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.20 (West 1989). "The presentment of an . . . information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause." Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b); see Aguilar v. State, 846 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). County courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.07 (West 2005).
Appellant was charged by information, filed by the county attorney, with the misdemeanor offense of interference with the duties of a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15. Thus, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss. We overrule her first point of error.
Motions to Suppress
In her next two points of error, appellant complains about the denial of her motions to suppress. In her second point of error, she maintains that the traffic stop was unreasonable because the DPS check on the Mazda's license plate was an unreasonable search and seizure that violated her expectation of privacy in the license plate number and thus the trial court should havesuppressed the evidence flowing from the detention of the car. In her third point of error, appellant contends that Officer Pfaff conducted an illegal search when he opened the door and attempted to seize the satchel on the driver's lap and consequently the trial court should have suppressed any evidence obtained after the officer opened the door.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress will be affirmed if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 457-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Although we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458; Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. We afford almost total deference to the trial judge's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when the resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. State v. Johnson, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Johnson, 336 S.W.3d at 657;Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. All purely legal questions are reviewed de novo. Johnson, 336 S.W.3d at 657; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
At the suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and exclusive judge of the credibility of the...
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