Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 6,6
• Citation: 245 N.W.2d 1,397 Mich. 337
• Parties: MICHIGAN CANNERS AND FREEZERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Michigan nonprofit Corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND BARGAINNING BOARD and the Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., a Michigan Corporation, Defendants- Appellees. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 1

245 N.W.2d 1

397 Mich. 337

MICHIGAN CANNERS AND FREEZERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Michigan nonprofit Corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND BARGAINNING BOARD and the Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., a Michigan Corporation, Defendants- Appellees.

No. 6, Oct. Term, 1975.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 25, 1976.

Warner, Norcross & Judd by Harold S. Sawyer, Ernest M. Sharpe, Grand Rapids, of counsel, for appellants.

Foster, Swift & Collins, P.C., by James A. White, Clifford D. Weiler, Michael J. Schmedlen, Lansing, for appellee Mich. Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Ass'n.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Jon M. DeHorn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for appellee Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

The instant case poses important questions of first impression regarding the constitutionality and construction of the Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act, M.C.L.A. § 290.701, Et seq.; M.S.A. § 12.94(101), Et seq. Plaintiff Michigan Canners and Freezers Association also challenges the decision of defendant Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board to accept and accredit the Michigan Asparagus Growers Division of defendant Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association (MACMA) as the sole bargaining representative of the Proceeding Asparagus Bargaining Unit.

However, there has been no hearing in the courts below on the merits due to uncertainty on the preliminary procedural question as to which court should properly serve as a forum for the presentation of the issues posed in this case.

We remand to the circuit court for consideration of two issues: first, the constitutionality of the Bargaining Act, and second, the applicability of the Administrative Procedures Act to accreditation proceedings under the Act.

I. FACTS

In November, 1973, the Michigan Asparagus Growers Division of Appellee Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (MACMA) petitioned defendant Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board for a determination of an asparagus bargaining unit under the Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act (henceforth referred to as the Bargaining Act).

The Board made such determination, and subsequently accredited Michigan Asparagus Growers as the sole sales and bargaining representative of the newly created Processing Asparagus Bargaining Unit, over the objection of plaintiff Michigan Canners and Freezers Association.

Michigan Canners brought an action in Ingham County Circuit Court alternatively as a petition for review of a final decision of an administrative agency under the Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L.A. § 24.201, Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(101), Et seq., and as an original action seeking an injunction and declaratory ruling on the unconstitutionality and construction of the Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act.

The circuit court dismissed this action, ruling that under § 5(2) of the Bargaining Act, all Board action requires review in the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, the circuit court explicitly declined to exercise its 'equitable jurisdiction' to examine the constitutionality of the Act. The Court so ruled because it did not want to establish a bifurcated review procedure in which constitutional issues would be before the circuit court while all other issues were before the Court of Appeals.

In May of 1974, Plaintiff filed for leave to appeal and a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals. Both were denied in October, 1974.

Michigan Canners subsequently applied to this Court for leave to appeal the dismissals by the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.

Prior to granting of leave to appeal by this Court, Michigan Canners filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals under § 5(2) of the Bargaining Act seeking a review of the constitutionality of the Act and the procedures followed by the Board in accrediting the Michigan Asparagus Growers Division.

MACMA moved to stay Court of Appeals proceedings pending decision by this Court on the application for leave to appeal.

This Court granted leave on January 15, 1975.

II. Remanding Constitutional Challenge to Circuit Court

As mentioned above, plaintiff has raised important questions regarding the constitutionality and construction of the Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act without developing a factual record at trial which would help provide a context in which to consider these questions.

To resolve these significant issues in such a factual vacuum would be imprudent where it appears that further factual development would substantially contribute to the proper disposition of the case.

Such is the case here, especially in that Michigan Canners has claimed that the Bargaining Act is unconstitutional because it exceeds the police power of the state. This claim in particular requires full development of facts which might support or undermine the claim that the statute is an invalid exercise of the police power.

The police power, an attribute of state sovereignty, may be properly exercised through regulations which tend to foster the health, order, convenience and comfort of the people and to prevent and punish injuries and offenses to the public. It has as its object the preservation and/or improvement of social and economic conditions affecting the community at large. Such power is elastic in nature, changing shape as varying social conditions demand correction. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 315--316, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 259, 262, 149 N.W. 1053 (1914). People v. Raub, 9 Mich.App. 114, 119, 155 N.W.2d 878 (1967).

As a matter of law, the party challenging the act carries the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality which accrues to the statute. Irishman's Lot, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 338 Mich. 662, 667, 62 N.W.2d 668 (1954); Thayer v. Dept. of Agriculture, 323 Mich. 403, 410, 35 N.W.2d 360 (1949). To overcome this presumption, plaintiff must show either that there is no public purpose to be served by the statute, or that there is no reasonable relationship between the remedy adopted by the legislature and the public purpose. Grocers Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture, 377 Mich. 71, 75, 138 N.W.2d 767 (1966); Carolene Products Co. v. Thomson, 276 Mich. 172, 178, 267 N.W. 608 (1936).

As a practical matter, we ask both parties to contribute to the development of a factual context which will allow us to properly resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the Act under the principles outlined above. What are the conditions in the farming and food processing industry which led to the enactment of the Act? Is there an imbalance in the bargaining power of the growers and the handlers? If so, what are the consequences of that imbalance? Is the number of farmers in Michigan declining? Is the acreage of land devoted to farming on the decrease? Is there reason for concern about food supply in the future? Is there a trend toward larger farms, to the detriment of the small farmer, which might adversely affect the community at large? How will the operation of the Act be beneficial or detrimental to producers, processors and consumers in the short run, and in the long run?

If any of the potential problems suggested above do exist, is there any evidence that the remedies embodied in the Bargaining Act are or are not reasonably related to the purpose of alleviating the problem(s)?

Defendant MACMA questions the appropriateness of the circuit court as a forum for the presentation of these issues given the language of Section 5(2) of the Bargaining Act, M.C.L.A. § 290.705(2); M.S.A. § 12.94(105)(2), providing in relevant part:

'Any person aggrieved by a final order of the board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of an order in the court of appeals, by filing in the court a written petition requesting that the order of the board be modified or set aside.'

However, it is well established that a litigant challenging the constitutionality of a statute and seeking injunctive relief is not necessarily required to follow the appellate procedure provided for in the statute challenged. Diggs v. State Board of Embalmers, 321 Mich. 508, 513, 32 N.W.2d 728 (1948); Asta v. Department of Revenue, 338 Mich. 505, 511, 61 N.W.2d 608 (1953); Smigel v. Southgate School District, 388 Mich. 531, 557, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972).

We remand to the circuit court so that evidence relevant to these questions, and other questions related to the constitutionality of the Bargaining Act, may be received by that court.

III. Applicability of APA to Accreditation Proceedings

Plaintiff asserts that the Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L.A. § 24.201 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(101), Et seq. is applicable to the Bargaining Act, that the Board failed to comply with the requirements of APA.

Defendant MACMA disputes the applicability of APA to the Bargaining Act, and asserts that the circuit court is not the proper forum for consideration of this issue under Section 5(2). There has been no hearing on the merits of this issue in the courts below.

While the Court of Appeals no doubt has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter of construction, so also does the circuit court. Section 5(2) provides for original jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals only for review of final orders of the Agricultural and Marketing Board.

However, the issue of the applicability of the APA to the Bargaining Act is not limited to the validity of a particular order, but rather involves a broad question of construction of the statute itself.

Therefore, there is no reason why plaintiff should not be allowed to raise this question before the circuit court on remand along with the constitutional issues.

IV. Validity of the Declaration of Accreditation

The circuit court may not, however, consider Plaintiff-Appellant's challenge to the...