Mikkelsen, In re

Decision Date20 April 1964
Citation38 Cal.Rptr. 106,226 Cal.App.2d 467
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re Glen Kristian MIKKELSEN, a minor and Alleged ward of the Juvenile Court. Michael KUZIRIAN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Glen Kristian MIKKELSEN, Objector and Appellant. Civ. 21560.

J. Bryan Jones, Los Altos, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen. of the State of Cal., Derald E. Granberg, John F. Kraetzer, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

Glen Kristian Mikkelsen, a minor aged 13, appeals from a judgment of the Juvenile Court of Santa Clara County, which found that he came within the provisions of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, made him a ward of the court, and released him on probation to the care and custody of his parents and the probation officer. 1

The facts are not in dispute. The petition of the probation officer alleged that the minor was a person within section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because he had wilfully and lewdly exposed his person and private parts in the presence of others in violation of section 314, subd. 1, of the Penal Code. The minor and his parents were represented by counsel at the jurisdictional hearing. After the clerk of the court read the charging allegations of the petition, the juvenile probation officer asked the minor whether its contents were true. When the minor replied affirmatively, the probation officer requested that the petition be sustained. The court said: 'The petition is sustained,' and immediately thereafter, the minor's counsel objected as follows: 'We don't intend to waive the right to have evidence introduced. I think that Glen, or Kris, he is known as Kris, admits that the exposed himself. Now, lewdly, and the different parts of it, I don't know that that is the fact but the physical facts happened and we want to cooperate with your procedures but we don't want to waive any rights we may have, is all.'

The court almost immediately thereafter said: 'The petition is sustained and wardship is declared' and on the assurance that the boy would receive continued psychiatric treatment, he was ordered returned to his home. In the colloquy that followed, the minor's counsel argued against wardship and continued to contend, without avail, that there should be further evidence before the disposition. The family phychiatrist was in court with the parents and volunteered that six months' probation was adequate. Finally, the minor's counsel said: 'I am very familiar with the provisions of the Code we operate under here and I don't feel any evidence is introduced and there is evidence that should be introduced before the finding is made, I believe.' Whereupon, the proceeding terminated. The record makes no mention of any social study made by the probation officer.

The question presented on appeal is whether the hearing was properly conducted under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1961 as contained in the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Section 702 provides that if the court finds that the minor is a person described by sections 600, 601 and 602 '* * * it shall make and enter its finding and judgment accordingly and shall then proceed to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor.' Section 706 states: 'After finding that a minor is a person described in Sections 600, 601, or 602, the court shall hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor. The court shall receive in evidence the social study of the minor made by the probation officer and such other relevant and material evidence as may be offered, and in any judgment and order of disposition, shall state the social study made by the probation officer has been read and considered by the court.' Section 680 advises an informal nonadversary atmosphere and there appears to be no reason why the jurisdictional and the dispositional phases cannot be disposed of in a single bifurcated hearing provided there is compliance with the basic requirements of sections 702 and 706.

Counsel's objections ran to both phases of the proceedings but since we believe the dispositional hearing fatally defective, we give precedence to its consideration.

The 1961 act passed after a long and careful study by the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice, laid down rules relating to the minor's rights which require a new formality and the juvenile judge has few guideposts or authorities upon which to rely. The statute attempts to attain a hard working balance between preserving a guarantee of civil due process to the minor while retaining that informal court atmosphere which minimizes the proceedings' harmful effects and encourages the minor's receptivity to treatment. The conscientious juvenile judge motivated by the sole desire to rehabilitate the minor, is understandably concerned with the extent to which juvenile proceedings, when contested by counsel, become adversary in character (Judicial Council of Calif., 19th Biennial Report to the Governor and the Legislature, January 7, 1963, pp. 75-76).

However, the importance of due process in juvenile proceedings was recognized long before the recent revisions of the Juvenile Court Act. 'While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts cannot and will not shut their eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.

'It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon a charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor.' (In re Contreras, 109 Cal.App.2d 787 at 789, 241 P.2d 631 at 633; cf. In re Alexander, 152 Cal.App.2d 458, 313 P.2d 182).

We interpret sections 702 and 706 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to afford the minor an opportunity to have evidence presented relating to the disposition of his case. Here, the declaration of wardship was made simultaneously with the jurisdictional finding. Counsel clearly objected to this arbitrary procedure and expressed a desire to have...

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18 cases
  • People v. Weidert
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • September 19, 1985
    ... ... Many cases have noted the practical equivalence of adult and juvenile court delinquency proceedings. (E.g., In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, 8, and fn. 4, 201 Cal.Rptr. 342, 678 P.2d 917; In re Mikkelsen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 467, 471, 38 Cal.Rptr. 106.) In addition to the "quasi-criminal" nature of juvenile court delinquency proceedings (Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 801, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26), and the "widely held belief" that they are "in reality criminal proceedings" ... ...
  • Bacon, In re
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 8, 1966
    ... ... 680 specifically provides that 'Except where there is a contested issue of fact or law, the proceedings shall be conducted in an informal nonadversary atmosphere with a view to obtaining the maximum co-operation of the minor upon whose behalf the petition is brought * * *.' In In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal.App.2d 467, 470-471, 38 Cal.Rptr. 106, 108, Justice Taylor, discussing the Juvenile Court Law, enacted in 1961, in relation to due process in juvenile proceedings, stated as follows: 'The statute attempts to attain a hard working balance between preserving a guaranty of civil due process ... ...
  • Gault, Application of
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1965
    ... ... In 1961 California adopted a juvenile code which attempts to provide a practical balance between civil due process for the infant and the informal court atmosphere which minimizes the harmful effects of the proceeding and encourages the minor's receptivity to treatment. In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal.App.2d 467, 38 Cal.Rptr. 106. Our task is to determine the procedural due process elements to which an infant and his parents are entitled in a juvenile hearing and decide whether our statute may be construed to include them. Then we must decide whether petitioners and their son were ... ...
  • Shannon B., In re
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 23, 1994
    ...or the parent or guardian." Thus, the minor has the opportunity to present evidence relating to disposition. (In re Mikkelsen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 467, 471, 38 Cal.Rptr. 106.) The court may "receive and consider otherwise inadmissible evidence at the disposition hearing so long as it is re......
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