Millen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1938
• Citation: 13 N.E.2d 950,300 Mass. 83
• Parties: MILLEN v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

300 Mass. 83

13 N.E.2d 950

MILLEN

v.JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 30, 1938.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Gray, Judge.

Action of contract by Carolyn Millen against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company to recover the amount allegedly due plaintiff as beneficiary under life policy issued on the life of one who was subsequently executed for murder. Judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.D. Stoneman, S. S. Stoneman, and A. H. Kaufman, all of Boston, for plaintiff.

D. J. Lyne, of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

This is an action of contract whereby the plaintiff seeks to recover the amount alleged to be due her as the beneficiary under a policy of life insurance issued on the life of one Murton Millen on December 22, 1933, and made payable to the estate of the insured. Subsequently, the insured nominated the plaintiff, his mother, as beneficiary and the defendant indorsed on the policy this change of beneficiary without prejudice. The defendant pleaded in its answer a general denial and that public policy bars recovery under the policy. The trial was before a judge of the superior court sitting without a jury. The case was submitted on a statement of agreed facts supplemented by the oral testimony of two witnesses. There was a stipulation in the statement of agreed facts that the court may draw any permissible inferences from the agreed facts. See G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 126. The facts material to the grounds of this decision are these: The policy of insurance was dated December 22, 1933. The first premium was paid on February 5, 1934. The insured committed the crime of first degree murder on February 2, 1934, at Needham in this commonwealth. He was indicted for this crime. On June 9, 1934, the insured was found guilty of murder in the first degree. Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 447, 194 N.E. 463. On February 26, 1935, the insured, as the result of his conviction for murder in the first degree, in accordance with the laws of this commonwealth, was sentenced to suffer the punishment of death. This sentence was carried out on June 7, 1935. Due proof of the death of the insured was furnished to the defendant. These facts were found by the trial judge, as well as included in the statement of agreed facts. They must be accepted as true.

There is nothing in the policy in the case at bar which is precisely applicable to the facts here presented. The bald question, therefore, is whether an ordinary policy of life insurance is a binding contract to insure against a legal execution inflicted by the state as a punishment for crime.

The exact point has not been decided in this commonwealth, but there has been discussion of analogous questions. In Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550, 21 Am.Rep. 541, an action was brought upon a policy of life insurance when the insured voluntarily submitted herself to an illegal operation with intent to cause an abortion, as a result of which she died. It was held that it would be contrary to public policy to permit recovery in these circumstances, although there was no clause in the contract of insurance covering the point. It has generally been held that, if an ordinary policy of life insurance contains no provision in regard to death by suicide, ‘there is no liability under it to the legal representatives of the insured, if his death is intentionally caused by himself when of sound mind.’ Davis v. Royal Arcanum, 195 Mass. 402, 407, 81 N.E. 294, 295, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 722, 11 Ann.Cas. 777; Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co., Ltd., [1937] 2 K.B. 197, 215, 220. There is no liability to a beneficiary of the policy in the same circumstances. It has been held that, where the named beneficiary in a policy of life insurance murdered the insured, ‘It would be contrary to public policy to permit a beneficiary who has feloniously taken the life of the insured to recover on the policy.’ Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 567, 139 N.E. 816, 27 A.L.R. 1517. In DeMello v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 281 Mass. 190, 196, 183 N.E. 255, the insured was killed by public officers of the United States while he was...