Davis v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum

• Decision Date: 15 May 1907
• Citation: 195 Mass. 402,81 N.E. 294
• Parties: DAVIS v. SUPREME COUNCIL ROYAL ARCANUM.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

195 Mass. 402

81 N.E. 294

DAVIS v. SUPREME COUNCIL ROYAL ARCANUM.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 15, 1907

COUNSEL

Fred H. Williams and Frank M. Copeland, for plaintiff.

John Haskell Butler and Victor J. Loring, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

This is an action of contract, brought by the beneficiary designated in a certificate of membership issued by the defendant to the plaintiff's husband. The defendant is a fraternal beneficiary order organized under the laws of this commonwealth. The certificate contains no provision in regard to death by suicide. The insured committed suicide by shooting himself while he was of sound mind. The principal question before us is whether, under these facts the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

It is settled upon sound principles, and by a great weight of authority, that, even if an ordinary policy of life insurance contains no provision in regard to death by suicide, there is no liability under it to the legal representatives of the insured, if his death is intentionally caused by himself when of sound mind. Hatch v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 120 Mass. 550, 21 Am. Rep. 541; Ritter v Mutual Life Insurance Company, 169 U.S. 139, 18 S.Ct 300, 42 L.Ed. 693; Burt v. Union Central Life Insurance Company, 187 U.S. 362, 23 S.Ct. 139, 47 L.Ed. 216; Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398, 67 N.E. 83, 63 L. R. A. 347; Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am. Rep. 332; Hopkins v. Horthwestern Life Association Company (C. C.) 94 F. 729-731; Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. S.) 194-211.

The reason for the rule is found in the terms of the contract, and the implication drawn from the nature of the transaction between the parties. As was said in Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, ubi supra: 'It is not contemplated by a policy taken out by the person whose life is insured, and stipulating for the payment of a named sum to himself, his executors, administrators or assigns, that the company should be liable if his death was intentionally caused by himself when in sound mind. When the policy is silent as to suicide, it is to be taken that the subject of the insurance, that is the life of the insured, shall not be intentionally and directly, with whatever motive, destroyed by him when in sound mind. To hold otherwise is to say that the occurrence of the event, upon the happening of which the company undertook to pay, was intended to be left to his option. That view is against the very essentials of the contract.' It is an implied condition of the policy that the insured shall not take his own life. Weber v. Supreme Tent of K. of M., 172 N.Y. 490-493, 65 N.E. 258. ^[1] In the words of the court in Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398-405, 67 N.E. 83, 63 L. R. A. 347: 'It is a fundamental, though unexpressed, part of the original contract that the insured should not intentionally cause his own death.' This is equivalent to saying that as a matter of construction of the contract, there is, in the promise to pay on the death of the insured, an implied exception of death by his own intentional act while he is of sound mind. It is said in the cases that it would be against public policy to make or enforce a contract to pay one's estate a sum of money on his death by suicide. See Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 169 U.S. 139-154, 18 S.Ct. 300, 42 L.Ed. 693. This is a statement, in another form, of the reason for holding that, in a policy that is silent as to suicide, death by suicide is impliedly excepted from the conditions which create a liability.

The plaintiff contends that, if this is so as to an attempted collection by the executor or administrator of the insured it is not so when the policy is payable to a beneficiary. On this point the decisions are conflicting. In the present case, under the terms of the contract, the beneficiary may be changed at any time by the insured. It is often said that, under such a certificate, the beneficiary has no vested interest in the money to be paid, but only an expectancy. Marsh v. American Legion of Honor, 149 Mass. 512, 21 N.E. 1070, 4 L. R. A. 382; Anthony v. Massachusetts Benefit Association, 158 Mass. 322-324, 33 N.E. 577; Order of Golden Cross v. Merrick, 165 Mass. 421-425, 43 N.E. 127; Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398, 67 N.E. 83, 63 L. R. A. 347. The precise question before us is discussed at length in the case last cited, in which it is held that, in an association of this kind, 'the beneficiary takes the certificate subject to change without his consent, in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the association, and has no vested interest in either the certificate or the money to be paid under it.' It is accordingly held that the beneficiary, under such a certificate, has no greater rights than the executor or administrator of the insured would have if there were no beneficiary. See Hartman v. Keystone Insurance Company, 21 Pa. 466. The cases which rest on a contrary doctrine do not seem to us to be founded on sound principles. They depend on considerations which are not applicable to a contract of this kind. Parker v. Des Moines Life Association, 108 Iowa, 117, 78 N.W. 826; Patterson v. Natural Premium Life Insurance Company, 100 Wis. 118, 75 N.W. 980, 42 L. R. A. 253, 69 Am. St. Rep. 899; Rawson v. Milwaukee Mut. Life Ins., 115 Wis. 641, 92 N.W. 378. The writers of the opinions in these cases seem to ignore the fact that, by the true construction of the contract, as between the association and the insured, there is an implied exception of death by suicide from the statement that death creates a liability, and that as the contract as to the person to be paid is all the while in the control of the insured up to the time of his death, it...