Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.
Decision Date | 06 September 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 24259.,24259. |
Citation | 391 F.2d 86 |
Parties | Mrs. Patricia B. MILLER, Individually, and on Behalf of her minor children, Denise and Daniel Miller, Appellant, v. AMUSEMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a Fun Fair Park, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Johnnie A. Jones, Baton Rouge, La., Norman C. Amaker, Henry M. Aronson, New York City, for appellant.
W. P. Wray, Jr., Baton Rouge, La., for appellee.
Before RIVES and DYER, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
Solely because of their race or color, Mrs. Miller and her two minor children were refused the services and facilities of Fun Fair Park, a privately-owned amusement center which serves the public. The facts and circumstances are adequately stated in the opinion of the district court, reported in 259 F.Supp. at 523. The controlling question is whether Fun Fair Park is "a place of public accommodation" as defined in Section 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
The claim is straitly narrowed by the following stipulation:
1
There is no claim or evidence that the discrimination or segregation is supported by State action, nor is there any claim or evidence of a violation of Section 202 of the Act:
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-1.2
The inquiry is narrowed to the question of whether an amusement park which offers no exhibitions for the entertainment of spectators3 is a "place of entertainment" as contemplated by Section 201(b) (3). The district court's opinion answered that question in the negative. That answer finds support in an earlier district court opinion, Robertson v. Johnston, E.D.La. 1966, 249 F. Supp. 618, rev'd on other grounds, 5 Cir. 1967, 376 F.2d 43, and is also supported by a more recent district court opinion, Kyles v. Paul, supra note 1. Apparently, this is the first appellate presentation of the question.
At the conclusion of the oral argument, this Court expressed "the opinion that the interests of justice require a complete and thorough search and analysis of the legislative history concerning 42 U.S.C.A. 2000a, b(3) and c(3)"; and with the consent of the parties requested "that the United States, acting through the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, file with this Court * * * its brief setting forth the legislative history of these provisions to the extent that that history may be pertinent to the issues involved upon this appeal and according this Court the benefit of any views that may be pertinent thereto." We are grateful to the Civil Rights Division for its response, in which it sets forth at length the pertinent legislative history and expresses the view that it "is inconclusive on these issues." We believe that that response may be of so much help not only in the future consideration of this case, but also in future cases which present this important and comparatively novel question, that we are attaching it as an Exhibit to this opinion.
APPENDIX
MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States is filing this memorandum in response to the Court's request of June 13, 1967. We set forth below the legislative history of 42 U.S. C.A. 2000a, (b) (3), and (c) (3) insofar as it appears pertinent to the issues in this appeal. Our study of that history has convinced us that it is inconclusive on these issues.
On January 28, 1963, President Kennedy said in a message to Congress that:
No action is more contrary to the spirit of our democracy and Constitution — or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen who seeks only equal treatment — than the barring of that citizen from restaurants, hotels, theaters, recreational areas and other public accomodations and facilities.
United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on Civil Rights, Part II, p. 1448.
In his civil rights message of June 19, 1963, the President said:
Events of recent weeks have again underlined how deeply our Negro citizens resent the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and accommodations which are otherwise open to the general public.
United States House of Representatives,...
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