Miller v. Board of Sup'rs of Santa Clara County
| Decision Date | 30 September 1965 |
| Docket Number | S.F. 21635 |
| Citation | 63 Cal.2d 343,46 Cal.Rptr. 617 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 405 P.2d 857 Robert MILLER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Walter V. Hays, San Jose, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Donald H. Smith and Carmel C. Martin, Jr., Monterey, amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.
Spencer M. Williams, County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.
On plaintiffs' motion in this proceeding we exercise a continuing jurisdiction pursuant to our order of March 19, 1964 (Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 61 Cal.2d 885, 37 Cal.Rptr. 440, 390 P.2d 208), wherein we concluded, at least by implication, that the five supervisorial districts in Santa Clara County were not properly apportioner as to population. Specifically we stated '* * * should the board fail to discharge its duty to properly redistrict the county * * * by a date not later than January 15, 1965, this court shall hold further hearings and enter further orders as may be necessary or appropriate upon its own motion or the motion of any party and we hereby retain jurisdiction for such purposes.'
Plaintiffs herein contend that although the county has acted to reapportion the supervisorial districts, the redistricting fails to comply with constitutional and recent statutory mandates. 1 They seek relief by way of a peremptory writ directing the board to redraw the boundaries and present a proper ordinance for approval by this court. In the alternative they pray that the supervisorial redistricting commission as provided for in sections 25001.1 and 25001.2 OF THE GOVERNMENT CODE2 be ordered to convene, hold hearings and submit a proper redistricting plan for approval by this court, or that a special master be appointed for the same purpose. On May 12, 1965, on application of petitioners, we issued our order to show cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted.
It appears that the approximate population distribution among the districts at the time we first considered this matter was as follows:
APPROXIMATE POPULATION
SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICT AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
---------------------- -----------------------
First 26,000--3%
Second 160,000--20%
Third 100,000--14%
Fourth 296,000--37%
Fifth 213,000--26%
Thereafter the board undertook to reapportion and the present distribution is reported as follows:
APPROXIMATE POPULATION
SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICT AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
---------------------- -----------------------
First 96,000--12.1%
Second 186,000--23.4%
Third 148,000--18.6%
Fourth 181,000--22.8%
Fifth 184,000--23.1%
The ratio of population between the largest and smallest district is thus 1.93 to 1. Based on the foregoing approximate figures, an ideal district (one with 20% of the population of the county) would have a population of 159,000. The deviation of the largest district from the ideal is currently 20.0% and in the smallest district there is a deviation of 38.4%. 3
The board contends generally that in view of certain nonpopulation factors, the current apportionment complies with applicable law, relying primarily on Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal.2d 318, 33 Cal.Rptr. 101, 384 P.2d 421. We held in that case (see also Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal.2d 751, 36 Cal.Rptr. 616, 388 P.2d 888) that the fundamental factor in apportioning population among supervisorial districts is that they be 'as nearly equal in population as may be' and that the other factors mentioned in the statute 'may only be given a subsidiary effect and cannot warrant large deviations from equality of population.' (60 Cal.2d 318, 321, 33 Cal.Rptr. 101, 103, 384 P.2d 421, 423.) In the Griffin case we were confronted with an extreme example of factors other than population in Monterey County and approved a maximum disparity of 2.2 to 1. It is contended by plaintiffs that the factors which at that time were held to justify the variation in Monterey County do not exist in Santa Clara County, and we are persuaded that they are correct.
Santa Clara County has a heavy concentration of population from the San Jose-Santa Clara area to the north and a sparsely populated area to the south. However, geographically the first district, in the southern part of the county, is approximately as large as the remainder of the county. Districts 2, 3 and 4 all extend into the San Jose population center, while district 5 includes Palo Alto, Mountain View, Los Altos and parts of Sunnyvale in the northwestern part of the county. Primarily the controversy concerns the apportioning of greater population to district 1 and at the same time maintaining its general character. A large portion of district 1 is made up of the Diablo Range on the east, where there is very little population, and the Santa Cruz Mountains to the west. Most of the population in the district, however it may be described, is in the central valley through which the Monterey Highway passes, and in the eastern slopes of the Santa Cruz Mountains in the vicinity of Saratoga and Los Gatos. Neglecting the large, almost uninhabited areas the district can be made comparable in area to the other districts.
Plaintiffs have proposed a number of plans for redistricting, some of which result in population equality and others in a distribution ranging from 17 to 23% among the districts. In most such plans district 1 is shown to penetrate deeper into the fringe of the population center on the southern and southwestern outskirts of San Jose than in the present districting, thus gaining in population from districts 2 and 4. Some adjustment is then made whereby these districts regain a portion of their losses from districts 3 and 5. Such boundary adjustments, to give substantial equality among the districts, do not require radical changes, nor do they appear to result in unnatural territorial divisions.
Unlike districts 3 and 5 in Monterey County which are separated by the rugged Santa Lucia Mountain Range, thus constituting a 'broad, natural division' held to justify the board's refusal to further expand district 3 in Griffin, district 1 in the instant case can be expanded without transversing any barriers other than established political lines. It is true that district 1 has been largely agricultural in character, but even with its present districting agriculture represents a minority and it is manifest that agricultural interests can no longer justify the control of a single district by any scheme of districting in Santa Clara County.
The board urges that the newly enacted statute provides for an objective test which requires only that the population of any district, when added to the populations of any two other districts, equals at least 50% of the population of the county. Such provisions in the statute would permit a distribution of 24%-24%-24%-24%-4%, for instance, if construed in the manner urged. Obviously this neglects not only the 'as equal as may be' requirement of the statute but gives no recognition to constitutional requirements which well may go beyond the provisions of the statute.
Following our decisions in the instant and Henderson cases the United States Supreme Court ruled on a number of reapportionment cases. Thus, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, although not requiring that 'mathematical equality' was the criterion, it was held that, (377 U.S. 533, 579-580, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1391; see also Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 722, 84 S.Ct. 1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 688, 690, 84 S.Ct. 1441, 12 L.Ed.2d 609; WMCA Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 647-648, 653, 84 S.Ct. 1418, 12 L.Ed.2d 568; Westbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481. Although we are not here dealing with voting apportionment at the level of the state legislature, as generally dealt with in the foregoing, cases, no reason appears why equal protection assures...
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