Miller v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 19 December 1893
• Citation: 35 N.E. 651,140 N.Y. 457
• Parties: MILLER v. CAMPBELL.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

140 N.Y. 457

35 N.E. 651

MILLER

v.CAMPBELL.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 19, 1893.

Appeal from superior court of New York city, general term.

Action by Jacob F. Miller, as executor of Hannah S. Brick, deceased, against Robert Campbell, to set aside assignments of life insurance policies and to compel their redelivery. From a judgment of the general term (22 N. Y. Supp. 388) modifying a judgment for plaintiff, both parties appeal. Affirmed.

Miller & Miller,(Jacob F. Miller, of counsel,) for plaintiff.

George W. Van Slyck, for defendant.

GRAY, J.

This action was originally brought by Hannah, wife of Riley A. Brick, to set aside certain assignments of life insurance policies made to the defendant, and to compel their redelivery by him to her. Pending the action, she died, and her executor has continued it. The policies were five in number, and were all issued in 1872, upon the life of Mr. Brick. Four of them were issued by New York corporations, and one by a Massachusetts corporation. The assignments were made in 1877, and were intended to secure an indebtedness of Mr. Brick, the husband, to the defendant. At the time of their making there was one child living, who died in the year 1882. A judgment rendered for the defendant upon a previous trial was appealed from, and, being reviewed in the second division of this court, was there reversed. Brick v. Campbell, 122 N. Y. 337, 25 N. E. 493. A new trial was ordered, but previous thereto the defendant conformed, in part, to the decision in the court of appeals, and delivered up three of his insurance policies. Of the two policies remaining, one was issued by the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, of Massachusetts, and the other was issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, of New York. With respect to the former, the conditions are unchanged from what they were when the case was before the second division of this court; but the defendant insists that the question of a married woman's capacity under Massachusetts laws was considered under an erroneous assumption as to what those laws were, and that the proofs do not warrant a decision that she was incapable of disposing of a policy for her benefit. That policy, unquestionably, was a Massachusetts contract; but that fact does not influence the consideration of the validity of the agreement by Mrs. Brick to assign it. As between the Massachusetts corporation and the assured, the contract would be governed by the laws of that state, for it was made and was to be performed there. But the contract which is in question here is the agreement by the married woman to assign the policy, and its validity depends upon her capacity under New York laws to make it. Her status as a married woman was regulated by statute, and the disabilities under which she was at common law have disappeared in this state only as they have been by successive legislative enactments specifically removed. Chapter 80 of the Laws of 1840 was an enabling act with respect to the married woman, which permitted her to insure, or to cause to be insured, the husband's life for her or her children's benefit. It did nothing more towards enlarging her legal capacity with respect to such insurances, as it was held upon the previous decision in this court, following a long line of cases, commencing with that of Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9. Chapter 821 of the Laws of 1873 conferred capacity upon her to dispose of a policy, provided there was no child nor issue living, and finally, in 1879, (chapter 248, Laws 1879,) the legislature removed the restrictions upon her power to assign. The terms in which the act of 1840 and its successive amendments were couched are of general application to all insurances by or for married women upon the lives of their husbands, and are not to be deemed as affecting only insurances effected in this state. It was the policy of the law of this state, until the acts of 1873 and 1879, that the benefit of any such insurance should be beyond the power of the wife to lose by her acts. Hence, without further adding to the discussion of the question had upon the former appeal, it is our opinion that Mrs. Brick...