Miller v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company

Decision Date03 January 1910
Docket Number620
Citation105 P. 908,18 Wyo. 209
PartiesMILLER v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

ERROR to the District Court, Laramie County, HON. RODERICK N MATSON, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Affirmed.

Clyde M. Watts, for plaintiff in error.

By the statute requiring railway corporations to fence their track and keep such fence in repair, except within the boundaries of an incorporated city or town, the Legislature has made such exceptions to the requirement as it deemed proper. Station grounds outside of an incorporated city or town do not come within the exception. A place containing 150 people may be incorporated as a town. (Rev. Stat. 1899, Sec. 1521.) In any community containing so few people that it cannot incorporate under the law, the business to be done there will be so small that it will not be interfered with by fencing the railroad track. It would seem, therefore, necessary to construe the statute literally, and as requiring station grounds to be fenced unless situated within an incorporated city or town. (R. R. Co. v. Dumser, 109 Ill. 402; R. R. Co. v. Haus, 111 Ill. 114; R. R. Co. v Simpson, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 670; Bradley v. R. R Co., 34 N.Y. 427; Latty v. Ry. Co., 38 Ia. 250; R. R. Co. v. Franklin, 159 Ill. 99; Brandenburg v. Ry. Co., 44 Mo.App. 224; Jaeger v. R. R. Co., 75 Wis. 130; Kove v. Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 518.) Possibly where no exception is contained whatever in the statute, it may be construed as excepting from the necessity of fencing station grounds, not only within but outside of cities and towns, but where the statute expresses an exception it should be understood as excluding any other. (Greeley v. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 136.) If there is no wisdom in the law, it is for the Legislature, and not the courts, to remedy it. A construction is not authorized different from the natural and obvious meaning of the statute, in consideration of its results. When the meaning of the statute is doubtful, any evil consequences to the public which may flow from it may be considered, in order to give it a more beneficial construction; but when the legislative intent is clearly expressed, such consequences cannot be considered. (Black Interp. Law, 38, 58.) Farmers and live stock owners are entitled to the protection of their stock by the fencing of railroads even at stations; unless the statutes except such places. We believe that it would work no hardship on the defendant, and that it will be to the best interests of the people, to require it to fence its tracks, unless included within the limits of incorporated cities and towns.

Burke & Clark, for defendant in error.

There must be an implied exception in the statute requiring the fencing of railroad tracks, so far as station and depot grounds are concerned, whether they are situated within the limits of incorporated cities or towns or not. A considerable portion of the railroad business in this State is outside of incorporated cities and towns. Along the line of one railroad within the State for a distance of about 100 miles, a tremendous business is transacted, and yet along that portion of the road there is not an incorporated city or town. The same is true of other railroads in the State, and of the railroad of the defendant in this case. By the great weight of authority it is held that a statute like the one under consideration is to be construed as impliedly excepting station and depot grounds, notwithstanding that the statute expressly contains other exceptions. (Swearingen v. R. R. Co., 64 Mo. 73; Lloyd v. R. R. Co., 49 Id. 199; Morris v. R. R. Co., 58 Id. 78; Davis v. R. R. Co., 26 Ia. 529; R. R. Co. v. Beatty, 36 Ind. 19; Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 47 Mich. 265; Ry. Co. v. Lull, 28 Id. 515; 1 Redfield on Railways, 469; Thompson on Negligence, 519; R. R. Co. v. Sevcek (Neb.), 101 N.W. 981, 110 N.W. 639; Rosenburgh v. R. R. Co., 110 N.W. 641; Burnham v. R. R. Co., 119 N.W. 235; Wilmot v. R. & N. Co., 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203; 3 Elliott on Railroads, Secs. 1194, 1202; Schneekloth v. Company, 65 N.W. 663; McGrath v. R. R., 57 Mich. 555; R. R. Co. v. Jones, 111 Ind. 259; Beckdolt v. R. R. Co., 113 Ind. 343.) We maintain, therefore, that the rule is well established, both in states which have statutes similar to our own, and elsewhere with statutes containing no exception whatever, that there must be an implied exception to any statute requiring railroads to fence their rights of way, taking from the operation of the statute, depot and station grounds, where the convenience and necessity of the public, and the safety of the railroad employees, demand that no fence shall be constructed or maintained. A construction which would require station grounds to be fenced would work a hardship on the defendant and other railroad companies, as well as upon the people doing business with them.

BEARD, JUSTICE. POTTER, C. J. , and SCOTT, J., concur.

OPINION

BEARD, JUSTICE.

The plaintiff in error brought this action against the defendant in error, in Justice's Court of Laramie County, to recover the value of two head of cattle. Judgment was rendered in that court in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and defendant appealed to the District Court, where judgment was rendered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

The plaintiff alleged in his petition that the cattle were killed by an engine on defendant's road, and that the place where the cattle went upon the track was not within the limits of any incorporated city or town, but was at a point where the defendant had failed to fence its track as required by law. No negligence is charged other than the failure to fence. The defendant answered, admitting that the place at which the animals went upon the railroad was not within any incorporated city or town, but alleged that "at the point where the said cattle were struck by the engine of this defendant, this defendant maintained station grounds upon which were located a station and section house, switching track, and cattle yards, and that it was necessary for public convenience and necessary for the proper operation of its railroad in attempting to carry on business with due regard and care for the safety of employes, that the track be left unfenced at that point; and that it was further necessary that the public have access to the station grounds; and that the locality where these cattle were struck is one where the proper conduct of the business, considering both the public convenience and the operation of its railroad with regard to the safety of employes, requires that it be left unfenced, it being a point where freight is loaded and unloaded frequently, and where passengers are admitted to its cars, and where switching is frequently done." The plaintiff demurred to this defense, which demurrer was sustained by the justice, and, on the evidence produced, he rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. On appeal the demurrer was submitted to the District Court and was overruled, and the plaintiff electing to stand on his demurrer, judgment was rendered in favor of defendant. The foregoing statement, we think, sufficiently presents the issue.

It is at least doubtful if the answer, strictly construed, presents any defense, as it contains no allegation that the place where the cattle went upon the track was within the station grounds; the allegation being that the place where they were "struck" was so situated. But as both counsel have argued the case on the theory that the cattle were struck at the same place at which they went upon the track we will so consider it.

Our statute, Chap. 84, S. L. 1907, Sec. 1, provides that "all railway corporations, owning or operating a line of railway within the State, shall construct, maintain and keep in repair on each side of the track thereof, a sufficient fence, so connected with suitable cattle guards at all public road crossings as to prevent stock from getting on the railroad...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Ferrell v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1927
    ...& W. M. Ry. Co., 108 Mich. 1, 65 N.W. 663; Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Blankenbeckler, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 249, 35 S.W. 331; Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 18 Wyo. 209, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 626, 105 P. Under a statute requiring a railroad company to fence "on each side of its railroad," the Ut......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT