Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 11 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-12756 |
| Parties | MICHAEL MILLER, Plaintiff v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 15, 16)
On August 22, 2017, plaintiff Michael Miller filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), District Judge John Corbett O'Meara referred this matter to the undersigned for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claim for disability and disability insurance benefits. (Dkt. 4).1 This matter is before theCourt on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 15, 16). Plaintiff also filed a reply brief in support of her motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 17).
Plaintiff filed the instant claim for supplemental security income on March 20, 2014, alleging that he became disabled beginning June 1, 1998. (Tr. 12). The claim was initially disapproved by the Commissioner on August 15, 2014. (Tr. 12). Plaintiff requested a hearing and on April 22, 2016, plaintiff appeared, with counsel, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kari Deming, who considered the case de novo. (Tr. 33-79). In a decision dated June 16, 2016, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 9-25). Plaintiff requested a review of this decision and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council, on July 5, 2017, denied plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 1-6); Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004).
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and that the findings of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff, born in 1967, was 46 years of age on the date the application was filed. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff dropped outof school in the eighth grade based on his inability to comprehend what was going on in school.2 (Tr. 41-42). Plaintiff resides with his sister. (Tr. 69). Plaintiff is unable to read and write and his sister manages his mail and completes forms for him. (Tr. 59-60, 63). Plaintiff worked a few part-time low skill jobs over the years, including at a packing house, a fruit mart, a post office and an auto parts store. (Tr. 254). He also had brief stints in landscaping and cleaning uniforms. (Tr. 44-45).
The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to plaintiff's claim and found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date. (Tr. 14). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff's osteoarthritis, mild, and chronic left lower extremity pain secondary to healing deformity; minimal paresthesia of the left forearm, secondary to prior trauma; and chronic healing fracture of the clavicle were "severe" within the meaning of the second sequential step, and that plaintiff's minimal distal medial nerve neuropathy of the right hand, hypertension, elevated cholesterol, and obesity were not severe. (Tr. 14). At step three, the ALJ found no evidence that plaintiff's combination of impairments met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. (Tr. 14-16).
The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
(Tr. 16). At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Tr. 24). At step five, the ALJ denied plaintiff benefits because he could perform a significant number of jobs available in the national economy, based on the vocational expert testimony. (Tr. 24-25).
In enacting the social security system, Congress created a two-tiered system in which the administrative agency handles claims, and the judiciary merely reviews the agency determination for exceeding statutory authority or for beingarbitrary and capricious. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). The administrative process itself is multifaceted in that a state agency makes an initial determination that can be appealed first to the agency itself, then to an ALJ, and finally to the Appeals Council. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). If relief is not found during this administrative review process, the claimant may file an action in federal district court. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir.1986).
This Court has original jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, "we do not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). "It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003) (); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (). "However, the ALJ is not free to make credibility determinations based solely upon an 'intangible or intuitive notion about an individual's credibility.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247, quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *4.
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Therefore, this Court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because it disagrees or because "there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion." McClanahan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241; Jones, 336 F.3d at 475. "The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a 'zone of choice' within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts." Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (citing Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545).
The scope of this Court's review is limited to an examination of the record only. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001). When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings for substantial evidence, a reviewing court must consider the evidence in the record as a whole, including that evidence which might subtract from its weight. Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). "Both the court of appeals and the district court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council." Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or the reviewing court must discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) () (internal citation marks omitted); see also Van Der Maas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 198 Fed. Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006).
The "[c]laimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits." Boyes v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994); accord, Bartyzel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 74 Fed. Appx. 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2003). There are several benefits programs under the Act, including the DisabilityInsurance Benefits Program of Title II (42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.) and the Supplemental Security Income Program of Title XVI (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.). Title II benefits are available to qualifying wage earners who become disabled prior to the expiration of their insured status; Title XVI benefits are available to poverty stricken adults and children who become disabled. F. Bloch, Federal Disability Law and Practice § 1.1 (1984). While the two programs have different...
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