Miller v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 17 January 1893
• Citation: 158 Mass. 127,32 N.E. 1039
• Parties: MILLER v. CURTIS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

158 Mass. 127

32 N.E. 1039

MILLER v. CURTIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

January 17, 1893

COUNSEL

William A. Gile, Chas. S. Forbes, and G.A. Drury, for plaintiff.

W.S.B Hopkins, H.E. Hill, and F.B. Smith, for defendant.

KNOWLTON J.

The defendant was allowed to introduce evidence of several transactions and conversations with the plaintiff, all occurring more than 20 years ago, which tended to show that she had repeatedly made false charges of indecent assaults upon her, with a view to extort money from innocent men. The defendant denies the charge made against him in the suit, and contends that the plaintiff is trying unjustly to obtain money from him. In any case where the question is whether the defendant has committed a crime, it would naturally affect the opinion of jurors to know that he had often committed similar crimes; but evidence of such facts is never admitted to prove a defendant's guilt. Com. v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452; Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16. That a person has committed one crime has no direct tendency to show that he committed another similar crime which had no connection with the first; and a person charged with one offense cannot be expected to come to court prepared to meet a charge of another. If the doing of one wrongful act should be deemed evidence to prove the doing of another of a similar character, which has no connection with the first, issues would be multiplied indefinitely, without previous notice to the defendant, and greatly to the distraction of the jury. It is too clear for argument, under the authorities, that most of the evidence excepted to was not competent on the question of liability, and the defendant does not seriously contend that it was.

It is argued, however, that it was competent on the question of damages, and the jury were instructed to consider it only on that question. There is much authority for the proposition that in a suit of this kind, when a plaintiff seeks damages for an injury to her feelings, growing out of the indecency of the defendant's conduct, her character in regard to chastity is in issue, and her damages depend somewhat on the question whether she is a virtuous woman, who would be greatly shocked at the peculiar nature of the assault, or a woman who is accustomed to yield herself to illicit intercourse. There has been much difference of opinion among judges in regard to the evidence to be received in such cases. It has been held that evidence of general reputation in regard to chastity is competent, and sometimes that specific acts of lewdness may be shown, and sometimes that they may not. Mitchell v. Work, 13 R.I. 645; Gore v. Curtis, 81 Me. 403, 17 Atl.Rep. 314; Watry v. Ferber, 18 Wis. 525; Ford v Jones, 62 Barb. 484; Gulerette v. McKinley, 27 Hun, 320, 324. See, also, Sheahan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217; Johnson v. Caulkins, 1 Johns.Cas. 116; West v. Druff, 55 Iowa, 335, 7 N.W. 636; White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250; Love v. Masoner, 6 Baxt. 24; Carpenter v. Wall, 11 Adol. & E. 803; Boynton v. Kellogg, 3 Mass. 188. If it were permissible to show specific acts of criminal intercourse on the part of the plaintiff to affect the damages to be awarded in actions for an indecent assault, it would not follow that the evidence excepted to in the present case should have been admitted. Most, if not all, of this testimony tended to prove, not that the plaintiff had had criminal intercourse with other men, but that she had falsely pretended that others had indecently assaulted her, with a view to extort money from them. The rule contended for certainly should not be extended so far as to admit testimony of common crimes and ordinary wrongful acts, merely to show general depravity. But we are inclined to hold the evidence incompetent on broader grounds. It is a general rule, which has been adhered to with great strictness in this commonwealth, that, when character is in issue, it may be shown only by evidence of general reputation, and not by proof of specific acts. This is the rule in actions of slander. Parkhurst v. Ketchum, 6 Allen, 406; Chapman v. Ordway, 5 Allen, 593; Clark v. Brown, 116 Mass. 504; McLaughlin v. Cowley, 131 Mass. 70. So, also, in prosecutions for rape, where the character for chastity of the woman is involved. Com. v. Harris, Id. 336. The same rule applies to all criminal cases where the accused introduces evidence of his good character, and there is evidence in rebuttal. Com. v. O'Brien, 119 Mass. 342. The principal reason for...