Miller v. Davidson, No. M2006-00099-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 10/5/2006)
| Decision Date | 05 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. M2006-00099-COA-R3-CV.,M2006-00099-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | MILDRED ELAINE MILLER v. JAY HILL DAVIDSON. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County; No. 98-431; Jim T. Hamilton, Judge.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed.
L. Bruce Peden, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mildred Elaine Miller.
Larry Samuel Patterson Jr., Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jay Hill Davidson.
William C. Koch, Jr., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell and Frank G. Clement, Jr., JJ., joined.
This appeal involves a former husband's efforts to stop making monthly payments to his former wife as required by their marital dissolution agreement. Seven years after the divorce, the former husband filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Maury County claiming that these payments were alimony and that he was no longer required to pay them because his former wife had married again. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the disputed payments were alimony payments even though the parties' marital dissolution agreement had characterized them as part of the division of the marital estate. Accordingly, the trial court held that the former husband was no longer required to make the monthly payments to his former wife. The former wife has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by classifying the disputed payments as alimony and by relieving the husband of his obligation to continue paying them.
Jay Davidson and Elaine Davidson were married in May 1987 in Maury County. It was Ms. Davidson's fourth marriage, and Mr. Davidson's second. This marriage also failed, and the parties were divorced on July 28, 1998 in the Chancery Court for Maury County. The divorce decree approved and incorporated a marital dissolution agreement executed by the parties on July 4, 1998.
Like most marital dissolution agreements, the parties' agreement contained provisions regarding the division of the parties' marital estate and their other financial obligations. Under the agreement, Ms. Davidson received the marital residence on Pamela Drive and assumed the remaining mortgage debt on the residence. The parties also expressly waived any claim or right to alimony. In addition, the agreement contained the following provision that is at issue on this appeal:
As a further division of marital assets, Husband agrees to pay to Wife the sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month for fourteen (14) years commencing when the Husband relocates from the marital residence on or before ninety (90) days from the execution hereof as forth hereinabove, same to be payable on the 1st of each month for a period of one hundred sixty-eight months (168) months.
Mr. Davidson moved out of the marital residence and began making the required $600 monthly payments in a timely fashion.
Mr. Davidson married again. In 2001, Mr. Davidson and his new wife purchased the Pamela Drive residence from Ms. Davidson. Ms. Davidson used the proceeds from the sale of the Pamela Drive residence to purchase a new residence on Maple Court. As part of this transaction, Mr. Davidson and his new wife and Ms. Davidson signed an agreement on June 30, 2001 that, among other things, addressed the $600 per month payments the marital dissolution agreement required Mr. Davidson to make to Ms. Davidson.
The June 30, 2001 agreement was apparently prepared without the assistance of counsel, and its provisions are somewhat obtuse. Construed reasonably, it contains three obligations. First, the agreement limited Mr. Davidson's liability with regard to the Maple Court residence by requiring Ms. Davidson to pay the difference between her monthly house note for the Maple Court residence and the $600 monthly payments she was receiving from Mr. Davidson. Second, it required Mr. Davidson to pay for an insurance policy on his life that would be used to discharge his financial obligations to Ms. Davidson in the event that he died before his obligation under the marital dissolution agreement was fully paid. Third, it gave Mr. Davidson the option of continuing to make the $600 per month payments to Ms. Davidson beyond the period required by the marital dissolution agreement and provided that if he did, he and his new wife would acquire a two-thirds interest in the Maple Court residence. The agreement also provided that "[a]fter 08/01/20121 or whenever the loan on the property (Lot #11 Maple Court) is paid in full, the MDA (Marital Dissolution Agreement) will be considered to be paid in full thus ceasing the $600.00 payments."
Following the execution of the June 30, 2001 agreement, Mr. Davidson continued to pay $600 per month to Ms. Davidson for approximately four years. Ms. Davidson married again on June 24, 2005 and changed her surname to "Miller."2 On July 19, 2005, soon after learning of the marriage, Mr. Davidson filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Maury County seeking to be relieved of his obligation to pay Ms. Miller $600 per month until August 2012. Despite the fact that the marital dissolution agreement characterized these payments as part of the division of the parties' marital assets, Mr. Davidson insisted that these payments were alimony and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(3) (2005)3 provided grounds for discontinuing them.
The trial court heard Mr. Davidson's petition without a jury on September 16, 2005. On December 1, 2005, the court filed an order concluding that the $600 payments had actually been alimony in solido and that the June 30, 2001 agreement transformed them into alimony in futuro. Accordingly, the court concluded that Ms. Miller's marriage in June 2005 ended Mr. Davidson's obligation to make the $600 per month payments. Ms. Miller has appealed from this order.
The standards this court uses to review the results of bench trials are well-settled. With regard to a trial court's findings of fact, we will review the record de novo and will presume that the findings of fact are correct "unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." We will also give great weight to a trial court's factual findings that rest on determinations of credibility. In re Estate of Walton, 950 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 1997); B & G Constr., Inc. v. Polk, 37 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). If, however, the trial court has not made a specific finding of fact on a particular matter, we will review the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies without employing a presumption of correctness. Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).
The presumption of correctness in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) applies only to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law. Accordingly, appellate courts review a trial court's resolution of legal issues without a presumption of correctness and reach their own independent conclusions regarding these issues. Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tenn. 2001); Nutt v. Champion Int'l Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998); Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 60 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Placencia v. Placencia, 48 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
Issues involving the construction of a written contract involve questions of law. Guiliano v. CLEO, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999); Nat'l Ins. Ass'n v. Simpson, 155 S.W.3d 134, 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, a trial court's construction of a written contract is not entitled to a presumption of correctness on appeal. State ex rel. Pope v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 145 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn. 2004); Angus v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 48 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, reviewing courts must review a trial court's construction of a contract de novo and must make their own determination regarding its meaning and legal import. Hamblen County v. City of Morristown, 656 S.W.2d 331, 335-36 (Tenn. 1983); Hillsboro Plaza Enters. v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
Ms. Miller insists that the trial court erred by treating Mr. Davidson's monthly payments as alimony that was subject to be terminated under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(3). For his part, Mr. Davidson asserts that the payments under the marital dissolution agreement were alimony in solido even though they were characterized as part of the division of the parties marital property. Mr. Davidson also asserts that even if the $600 monthly payments were not originally alimony in solido, they became alimony in futuro as a result of the June 30, 2001 agreement. Ms. Miller has the better of both arguments.
The trial court's characterization of the $600 monthly payments as alimony in solido is clearly at odds with the plain terms of the marital dissolution agreement and the conduct of the parties. The parties expressly waived any claims for alimony and characterized the $600 monthly payments as part of the division of their marital property. Based on their mutual understanding that the payments represented a division of property, neither Ms. Miller nor Mr. Davidson treated the payments as alimony for federal income tax purposes.4 The marital dissolution agreement is clear on its face and requires no construction.5 Because there is no statutory prohibition against effecting a...
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