Walton v. Young

Decision Date02 September 1997
Citation950 S.W.2d 956
PartiesIn re ESTATE OF Carlton Elliott WALTON, Deceased, Jeffrey O. Walton, Administrator, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leslie YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Jimmy A. Duncan, Dan R. Alexander, Nashville, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jack Green, Nashville, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

REID, Judge.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's denial of a claim of paternity. For the reasons set forth, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded.

I

The decedent, Carlton E. Walton, died intestate. The decedent's son, Jeffrey O. Walton, qualified as the administrator of the decedent's estate. The petition filed in probate court states that Jeffrey O. Walton is the only child of the decedent.

Leslie Young, nee, Jackson, the claimant against the estate, filed a petition in the probate court alleging that she is the natural or biological child of the decedent, and, therefore, entitled to inherit from him according to the law of intestate succession.

The case was heard by the trial judge without a jury. The proof shows that when Young was born on May 9, 1972 her mother, Donna Fowler, had been married to Frank Jackson, Jr. for more than three years. The certificate of birth lists Jackson as the father. Fowler and Jackson were divorced in March of 1973, remarried in November of 1973, and divorced again in 1984. In addition, Fowler filed another complaint for divorce which was dismissed. In all of the divorce proceedings and proof, the parties asserted that Jackson was the father of the claimant. In the last divorce case, Jackson was awarded custody of the claimant and she lived with him until she was 16 years old.

According to Young's testimony, Fowler told her when she was 13 that Jackson was not her father, but Fowler did not tell her the decedent was her father until she was 18. Fowler testified that when she first learned that she was pregnant, she informed Jackson and told him the decedent was the father. She also confirmed Young's testimony regarding her conversations with Young when she was 13 and 18. Fowler testified that she continued to have sexual relations with the decedent intermittently until his death. According to Jackson's testimony, he told Young when she was 13 that the decedent was her father.

When Young was about 18, she sought out the decedent and they developed a relationship. The evidence regarding the nature of their relationship is not altogether consistent. Young lived with the decedent for short periods of time for several years before his death and during that time the decedent assisted Young financially.

According to an expert witness, blood tests of Young, Fowler, and Jackson show conclusively that Jackson is not Young's biological father.

The trial court found that Young failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was her biological father and dismissed her petition. The Court of Appeals, in its de novo consideration of the evidence, found that the decedent was the biological father of the claimant.

II
A

The claimant relies upon Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) as authority for her assertion of a right to intestate succession. The pertinent provisions of that section are:

If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person: ... a person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if: ... The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof,....

Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (Supp.1996).

This Court recently reviewed the procedure for asserting rights of inheritance pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-2-105 in Bilbrey v. Smithers, 937 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn.1996); see also Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn.1978). Although not raised in the trial court nor noted by the Court of Appeals, there is one important factual difference between Bilbrey and Allen and the instant case. In the prior cases, the mother of the person claiming paternity was not married when the child was conceived or born. In the instant case, the claimant's mother was married at the time the claimant was conceived and born. The issue of paternity cannot be considered until there has been a determination that the claimant was "born out of wedlock" within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-2-105. Whether a child whose mother was married at the time of the child's birth is a child "born out of wedlock," and therefore has standing to assert a claim of inheritance, has not been decided by this Court. In view of the Court's finding that the proof fails to establish her claim, that issue need not be considered in this case. 1

B

The only issue considered in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, and the only issue presented by the parties on this appeal, is whether the claimant established paternity by clear and convincing proof. As previously stated, this Court finds that the claimant failed to carry her burden of proof.

The proof shows that claimant Young is not the biological child of Jackson, who was married to her mother at the time she was conceived and born. Of course, that proof does not establish the identity of the claimant's father.

On every significant issue the evidence is equivocal. Fowler testified that Young was conceived while she and Jackson were separated, and Jackson in his testimony confirmed that the child was not his. Fowler also testified that she and the decedent were having sexual relations regularly during the time the child was conceived. However, Fowler's testimony does not foreclose the possibility that another person was the father.

The proof shows that the decedent referred to Young as his "young'n," which apparently is a colloquial expression for "young one." However, the proof also shows that the decedent had, in the best light, a fatherly penchant for young women and that he had similar relationships with at least three other young women. Those relationships included living together, providing financial assistance, and referring to each as his "young'n."

The evidence that the decedent acknowledged Young as his child is conflicting. The testimony of several casual acquaintances indicated that the decedent referred to Young as his child; however, the decedent's sister and a long time lover/friend both testified that they never heard him say Young was his child.

Obviously, the critical evidence is the testimony of Fowler. Based on this record, neither Young nor Jackson know the identity of Young's father, nor did the decedent. Fowler was the source of their information; consequently, the probative value of the testimony of Young and Jackson, as well as that of Fowler, depends upon Fowler's credibility. The evidence as it relates to this determinative issue was summarized by the trial court:

What is for me to determine today is whether or not [Young] has established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent Carl Walton was her father.... I cannot overlook the fact that the mother [Fowler] made representations for years in more than one lawsuit that [Jackson] was the father and, in essence, required or had the ability to require that Mr. Jackson financially support and raise [Young], but now that that financial obligation is gone she does a hundred and eighty degree reversal and claims that Mr. Walton was the father.

... [The only evidence of paternity has been Fowler's testimony]. Yet her credibility has been impeached because she has been shown to have sworn under oath to the contrary. Several witnesses testify that the decedent Carl Walton claimed that [Young] was his daughter and that [Young's] son was his...

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