Miller v. Depuy

• Decision Date: 01 October 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 36820.
• Citation: 307 F. Supp. 166
• Parties: Charles F. MILLER v. Warner M. DEPUY, Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Robert Campbell, Supervisor, Financial Responsibility Division, Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

307 F. Supp. 166

Charles F. MILLER v. Warner M. DEPUY, Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Robert Campbell, Supervisor, Financial Responsibility Division, Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Civ. A. No. 36820.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

October 1, 1969.

David H. Kubert, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Nicholas A. Cipriani, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BODY, District Judge.

The plaintiff is suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin the Secretary of Revenue and the Supervisor of the Financial Responsibility Division of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles from suspending his driver's license and owner registration rights. Plaintiff's problems arose out of an accident involving plaintiff's truck which occurred on August 30, 1956. On August 30, 1956, one Anderson, as part of his employment by plaintiff Miller, drove Miller's truck on a regular daily run from Philadelphia to Grasonville, Maryland, on Chesapeake Bay, to buy and transport back a load of freshly-caught crabs to the plaintiff's restaurant, called the Maryland Crab House, in Philadelphia.

The round trip between Philadelphia and Grasonville was between 250 and 275 miles. On this day, Anderson took with him for company his cousin, John Crosby Boyd, age seventeen. As part of his job Anderson had made the trip to Grasonville fifteen or twenty times previously. At a time previous to the accident, Anderson had discussed with Miller, his employer, the question of whether or not he could take someone with him to Grasonville for company. Miller made no comment, but he did not forbid it.

At Grasonville, Anderson and Boyd both helped to load the fresh crabs on the truck and to put ice on them. When the truck was ready to start its return journey to Philadelphia, Anderson felt tired or ill and asked Boyd to drive for him. Although Boyd was only seventeen years old, there is no evidence that he was not a competent driver. Along the way they stopped and Anderson picked up a puppy dog. After a short distance, the puppy dog vomited and the truck was halted to enable the dog to run a little. As Boyd continued to drive toward Philadelphia, his attention was distracted by the restless antics of the puppy which Anderson was trying to keep on his lap. Because the driver was distracted, the truck veered to the left side of the road where it collided with an approaching automobile being operated by Louis Ungolo. Ungolo and his daughter were injured. His wife and son were killed.

A survival and wrongful death action was brought against Boyd, Anderson and Miller. Judgments totalling $57,783.92 were returned against Boyd and Miller in Civil Action No. 23016 on May 21, 1962. Miller was held liable for Boyd's actions based upon Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 153 Md. 264, 138 A. 1 (1923), and Restatement, Agency 2d § 79. Section 79, Illustration 5, reads:

"5. P employs A as a truck driver to carry a valuable load of perishable fruit to a distant town. Enroute, A becomes ill and unable to drive. Being unable to communicate with P, he employs B, a competent driver, to take his place for a trip. It may be found that A was authorized to employ B as P's servant."

The judgment creditors in the above civil action requested the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to send copies of the judgments to the Secretary of Revenue, since these judgments were unsatisfied within sixty (60) days.

In accordance with 75 Pa.Stat. § 1413¹ of the Vehicle Code, the Secretary of Revenue suspended the right of the plaintiff to own or operate an automobile in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the unpaid judgments. No action was taken by the State of Maryland against the plaintiff under the reciprocal provisions of its act, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not suspend the privileges of the plaintiff on the basis of any reciprocity.

On June 10, 1963 plaintiff was discharged in bankruptcy from liability to pay the judgment rendered against him on May 21, 1962 in Civil Action No. 23016. Plaintiff through his attorney made demand upon the Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for revocation of the said suspension of the license and owner registration rights. This demand was refused. The Secretary of Revenue cited Section 1414, 75 P.S., which provides in part:

"Such license, registration and nonresident's operating privilege shall remain so suspended and shall not be renewed nor shall any such license or registration be thereafter issued in the name of such person, including any such person not previously licensed, unless and until every such judgment is stayed, satisfied in full or to the extent hereinafter provided, and until the said person gives proof of financial responsibility subject to the exemption stated in sections 1413 and 1416 of this act.

A discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article."

No appeal was taken in the state court from the actions of the Secretary of Revenue.

The plaintiff filed the present action alleging a violation within 42 U.S.C. § 1983² in that he was deprived under color of state law, of a right secured by federal law. The plaintiff contends his rights to travel and earn a living have been abridged and that the discharge in bankruptcy under the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution takes precedence over Sections 1413 and 1414 of the Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Law.

The state contends that the suspension is within its police powers and relies on a previous decision in this case turning down a three-judge court request³ which stated that Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 82 S.Ct. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 641 (1962), was dispositive of the issue in this case and that no substantial constitutional question was presented requiring a three-judge court. The Kesler decision, discussed further below, upheld the financial responsibility law of Utah.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

While the court in Miller v. Smith, 236 F.Supp. 927 (E.D.Pa.1964) held that a three-judge court was not necessary, this Court is not thereby required to render a verdict for the defendant, as the defendants in their brief suggest. The Kesler decision, this Court believes, is not dispositive of many of the crucial questions presented by this case.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

This case does not present a problem of exhaustion of administrative remedies since under Damico, et al. v. California, et al., 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967) and Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.2d 492 (1961), exhaustion of state remedies is not necessary under Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In McNeese v. Board of Education, etc., 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963) the court noted that the Civil Rights Act was "to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have."

In point of fact, the plaintiff had no administrative remedy and was precluded from appealing the suspension in the courts of the state because the suspension under Section 1413 is considered mandatory. It has been held that appeals from suspensions of operators' licenses provided by 75 P.S. § 620 do not apply to the Financial Responsibility Section of the Vehicle Code. Com. v. Mercandante, 28 Beaver 104 (1967); Case of Williams Auto License, 17 Bucks 89 (1967).

While there are no allegations of willful or specific intent to deprive plaintiff of his federal rights, it was held in Monroe v. Pope, supra, that such intent is not necessary to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is true that the defendants were acting according to the statutory commands of the Vehicle Code and exercised no discretion since the provisions involved here are mandatory. The statutes themselves are violative of plaintiff's rights. The interest of the public official toward the plaintiff personally has no bearing upon this Court's jurisdiction of the matter.

EQUAL PROTECTION

This Court is of the belief that the plaintiff has been deprived of the equal protection of the laws in certain major respects. The fact that the rights suspended may not be considered to be constitutional rights is ineffective as an argument against denials of equal protection. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963):

"* * * the * * * court's construction of the statute cannot be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's `right' but merely a `privilege' * *"

See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

1. That 75 P.S. § 1414 (Financial Responsibility Act) does not distinguish between the person who actually is at some fault in causing an accident and a person in plaintiff's position who is held liable upon the vicarious theory of agency embodied in Restatement, Agency 2nd, § 7, is constitutionally defective. This is so because the state's exercise of the police power to promote safety on the highway can in no direct and compelling way be served by suspending a person's ownership certificate and operator's license where in fact he has not been shown to be in any way an unsafe driver.

This is not even a case where an employer may have been negligent in selecting a driver for his truck. The fortuitous circumstance of his driver becoming sick or tired and thereby necessitating using a stranger to drive, does not indicate that the employer is a danger on the highways.

2. Even if one were to ignore the above conclusion, this Court believes that the Financial Responsibility Act, 75 P.S. §§ 1413 and 1414, discriminates illegally against the person who is financially...