Rivas v. Cozens

• Decision Date: 06 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70 2554.,70 2554.
• Citation: 327 F. Supp. 867
• Parties: Celestino V. RIVAS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert C. COZENS et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

327 F. Supp. 867

Celestino V. RIVAS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert C. COZENS et al., Defendants.

No. 70 2554.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

May 6, 1971.

Dennis R. Powell, Maurice R. Jourdane, David H. Kirkpatrick, Richard A. Gonzales, Neil M. Levy, California Rural Legal Assn., Salinas, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. and Victor D. Donenberg, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

Before HAMLIN, Circuit Judge and SWEIGERT and CONTI, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, who had been involved in an automobile accident and whose driving privileges were thereafter suspended under the California Financial Responsibility Law (Cal. Vehicle Code, § 16000 et seq.) pending their deposit of cash security amounts fixed by the Department of Motor Vehicles, bring this suit under Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to challenge the constitutionality of the California statute under which the Department acted.

For this reason, a three judge court was convoked as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.

The California Financial Responsibility Law, Vehicle Code, § 16000 et seq., amended 1967, requires that the driver of every motor vehicle which is in any manner involved in an accident originating from the operation of a motor vehicle on any street or highway which accident has resulted in damage to the property of any one person in excess of $200 or in bodily injury or in the death of any person, shall within fifteen (15) days after the accident report the accident on a form approved by the Department to the office of the Department.

Unless the driver involved in an accident described in § 16000 complies with one of the conditions of exemption specified in § 16050 (not applicable in this case because plaintiffs admit their inability to establish any of the available exemptions) the driver shall deposit security in a sum which shall be sufficient in the judgment of the Department to satisfy any final judgment in any amount for bodily injury or in excess of $200 for property damage resulting from such accident as may be recovered against such driver.

The Department determines the amount of security deposit upon the basis of reports or other evidence submitted to it but shall not require a deposit of security for the benefit of any person when evidence has not been submitted by such person within fifty (50) days following the date of the accident.

Whenever a driver has failed within fifty (50) days after an accident to establish his exemption from security and has failed to deposit security within ten (10) days after notice by the Department specifying the amount of security, the Department shall suspend the privilege of the driver to drive a motor vehicle. The suspension becomes effective not later than the seventy-sixth (76) day after receipt of the accident report by the Department.

Plaintiffs contend (1) that insofar as the statute denies a prior hearing before suspension, it deprives the suspended driver of the procedural due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that, since, according to plaintiffs, all other drivers faced with suspension of their driving privileges are afforded prior hearings, the statute, insofar as it denies a prior hearing to uninsured motorists, discriminates against uninsured motorists as a class and thereby deprives them of equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that insofar as the statute results in the suspension of driving privileges for failure to deposit security, it discriminates against poor persons as a class and thereby deprives them of equal protection of the law.

In support of their due process contentions plaintiffs cite and rely on such Supreme Court cases as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed. 2d 287 (1970), holding that a welfare recipient is entitled to a prior hearing before benefits can be terminated and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), holding unconstitutional a statute permitting garnishment of a debtor's wages prior to judgment; also such similar rulings as La Prease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.1970), holding unconstitutional a New York statute permitting pre-hearing seizures of property by creditors; Klim v. Jones, 315 F.Supp. 109 (N.D.Cal.1970) holding invalid the California innkeepers lien; Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 311 F.Supp. 795 (N.D.Ohio 1970), enjoining a housing authority from refusing a hearing to a person concerning his eligibility for public housing; Harrell v. Harder (D.C.Conn.1970), enjoining suspension of food stamp privileges without a prior hearing; Java v. California Dept. of Human Resources Development, 317 F.Supp. 875 (N.D.Cal.1970), invalidating revocation of unemployment insurance benefits without a prior hearing; Doyle v. Finch (D.C.Texas 1970), holding invalid a termination of social security benefits without a public hearing.

As more specifically applicable the pending case, plaintiffs cite and rely on People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P. 2d 180 (1961), declaring the Colorado Financial Responsibility Law unconstitutional insofar as it permitted suspension of driving privileges without an opportunity to be heard; Miller v. DePuy, 307 F.Supp. 166 (E.D.Pa.1969), declaring the Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Law unconstitutional upon the same ground; Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963), upholding the Arizona Financial Responsibility Law but only with the proviso that there is an implication in the statute that, if requested, an aggrieved person shall have an administrative hearing before the suspension becomes effective; also Williams v. Sills, 55 N.J. 178, 260 A.2d 505 (1970) upholding the New Jersey Financial Responsibility Law with the same proviso.

On the other hand, defendants, represented by California's Attorney General, cite and rely on cases upholding validity of similar financial responsibility laws notwithstanding absence of provision for a hearing prior to suspension of license, e. g., Escobedo v. State of California, etc., 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Orr v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 220, 77 Cal.Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712 (1950); Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1970); Trujillo v. DeBaca, 320 F.Supp. 1038 (D.C.N.M., 1970); Llamas v. Department of Transportation, etc., 320 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D.Wis.1969).

The Supreme Court of California in Escobedo v. State of California, etc., supra, upheld the constitutionality of the suspension provision of the State's Financial Responsibility Law against the challenge that there was no provision for prior hearing, holding that the statute did not violate due process in that respect because such a suspension would be reasonably justified by a compelling public interest; that such interest appeared from the obvious carelessness and financial irresponsibility of such a substantial number of drivers that to require a hearing in every case, before suspension of a license, would substantially burden and delay, if not defeat, the operation of the law.

The Supreme Court of California in Orr v. Superior Court, supra, construing its previous decision in Escobedo, supra, has further interpreted the California Financial Responsibility Law as meaning that, before ordering suspension of the license of a driver involved in an accident, the Department must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against the driver and so must consider culpability; that the Department should find no particular difficulty in determining from accident reports, which involved drivers are obligated to make (Section 16000), and from other evidence submitted to it (Section 16020) whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against the driver based on his possible culpability; that the Department need not decide as between conflicting versions of the accident but only whether there is any credible evidence on the basis of which, if believed by a trier of fact, the driver could reasonably be considered culpable; that, further, an order suspending a license is subject to a court review to determine whether the evidence before the Department supports its implied finding that there is reasonable possibility that a judgment for damages will be rendered against the driver.

Latham v. Tynan, supra, dealing with the precise question here presented, goes to the extent of holding that due process and equal protection claims similar to those of plaintiffs here do not present even a substantial enough constitutional question to have required three judges at the District Court level.

Trujillo v. DeBaca, supra, a three judge district court, distinguishing Goldberg v. Kelly and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., held that there was no merit to claims similar to those presented in our pending case.

In Llamas v. Department of Transportation, etc., a three judge district court, citing Escobedo v. State of California, etc., supra, held that there was no merit to the due process argument because the statute there, although authorizing suspension without a hearing, did provide, (as the California statute has been held in Orr v. Superior Court to provide) for a judicial review after suspension, and, further, because there was adequate and compelling need for dispensing with pre-suspension hearings that might obstruct the purposes of the statute; further, that there was no merit to the equal protection claims because the classification is obviously reasonable.

So far as the present state of the law on the pending issue is concerned, we note that two of the cases, relied on by plaintiffs as holding Financial Responsibility Laws invalid for lack of pre-suspension hearing, do not really support plaintiff's arguments.

Williams v. Sills, supra, expressly accepts the California cases of ...