Miller v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Case No. 3:19-cv-01375-IM
| Decision Date | 18 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-01375-IM |
| Parties | Adam MILLER, Plaintiff, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY; Gardner Trucking, Inc.; International Paper Co.; and Wingfoot Commercial Tire Systems, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
J. Randolph Pickett, Kimberly O. Weingart, R. Brendan Dummigan, and Shangar S. Meman, Pickett Dummigan McCall LLP, 210 SW Morrison Street, Suite 400, Portland, Oregon 97204. Peter O. Hansen, Law Office of Peter O. Hansen, 620 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1210, Portland, Oregon 97204. Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Anthony F. Latiolait and Walter M. Yoka, Yoka & Smith, LLP, 445 South Figueroa Street, 38th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071. Jeffrey D. Hern, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, 1211 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1600, Portland, Oregon 97204. Attorneys for Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.
Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ("Defendant Goodyear") filed a motion to dismiss count one of the first claim (strict products liability), count two of the first claim (negligence), and the third claim (intentional misconduct) of Plaintiff's complaint. ECF 15. In the alternative, Defendant Goodyear moves to strike allegations from the third claim. Id. On December 19, 2019, the Court held a hearing on this motion and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Gardner Trucking, Inc., ECF 17. Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by his attorney, J. Randolph Pickett, and Defendant Goodyear was represented by Walter M. Yoka and Jeffrey D. Hern. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant Goodyear's motion and dismisses the claims against Defendant Goodyear in Plaintiff's complaint.1
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. , 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n , 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint "may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Sol. , 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Starr , 652 F.3d at 1216. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell , 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. See Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co. , 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (). Plaintiff was a service technician employed by Defendant Goodyear, where his job required him to repair and re-inflate tires for commercial trucks and trailers. ECF 1-1 at 5 ¶ 2. This job involves risk and danger, for which a safety precautions like using a "tire cage" are generally required. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. On July 26, 2017, Plaintiff was inflating a used "run flat" tire when it exploded, propelling the tire and rim outwards and striking Plaintiff on the right leg and side. Id. at 6 ¶ 6. This incident caused physical injuries to Plaintiff as well as distress. See id. at 7 ¶¶ 9–10.
Defendant Goodyear's supervisors, including Vernon Mills and Eric Appleby, required employees to work on "potentially structurally compromised tires." Id. at 17 ¶ 43. Defendant Goodyear's managers and supervisors observed employees failing to use required tire safety cages. Id. at ¶ 45. However, they did not correct Plaintiff and other employees' unsafe practices, provide adequate training, post specific warnings or instructions, require use of tire safety cages, or supervise Plaintiff and other employees. See id. at 16 ¶ 42, 18 ¶ 46. Mills and Appleby knew that their actions would cause serious injury or death to Plaintiff or other employees. See id. at 16 ¶ 42. These actions, which had been ongoing for two years before Plaintiff's injury, violated Defendant Goodyear's policies and procedures regarding use of tire safety cages. Id. at 17 ¶ 44. Defendant Goodyear had previously experienced a similar incident in Portland, in which an employee was injured while inflating a tire without using a safety cage. Id. at 18 ¶ 47. That employee was not reprimanded or disciplined. Id.
On July 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed this action in Multnomah County Circuit Court against Defendants Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Gardner Trucking, Inc., International Paper Co., and Goodyear Commercial Tires and Services. ECF 1-1. Defendants removed the case to federal court on August 28, 2019, invoking this Court's diversity jurisdiction. ECF 1. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant Goodyear Commercial Tires and Services on September 10, 2019, as it had gone out of business before the events discussed in the complaint. ECF 12; see ECF 20 at 2 n.1. Defendant International Paper answered the complaint, and Defendants Goodyear and Gardner moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF 13; ECF 15; ECF 17; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Defendant Goodyear moves the Court to dismiss counts one (strict products liability) and two (negligence) of Plaintiff's first claim for relief, as well as the third claim for relief (intentional misconduct). Defendant Goodyear argues that the negligence and strict products liability counts are barred under the exclusive remedy rule in Oregon's workers' compensation laws. Regarding the intentional misconduct claim, Defendant Goodyear argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts necessary to demonstrate the company's culpability. In the alternative, Defendant Goodyear moves to strike certain allegations from the complaint.
In his briefing on the motion, Plaintiff concedes that both counts of claim one should be dismissed. Oregon's exclusive remedy rule bars most tort claims against employers for on-the-job injuries covered by the workers' compensation laws. See O.R.S. 656.018(1) – (2). While an exception exists for torts outside of the employment context, see id. at (3)(d), the Oregon Court of Appeals recently held that negligent conduct must occur "wholly outside the immune capacity" to qualify for this exception. Nancy Doty, Inc. v. WildCat Haven, Inc. , 297 Or. App. 95, 117, 439 P.3d 1018 (2019). In his complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was acting within the scope of his employment when he was injured. ECF 1-1 at 5–6, ¶¶ 2, 6. Accordingly, he conceded in his response brief that the strict liability and negligence counts of his first claim should be dismissed. ECF 20 at 3–4. This Court thus grants Defendant Goodyear's motion to dismiss counts one and two of Plaintiff's first claim for relief.
However, Plaintiff contends that his third claim for relief, which invokes a different exception to the exclusive remedy rule, should survive the motion to dismiss.
The exclusive remedy rule does not bar tort claims for injuries resulting from the "deliberate intention of the employer of the worker to produce such injury...." See O.R.S. 656.156(2). The Oregon Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase as requiring that "the employer must have determined to injure an employee and used some means appropriate to that end; that there must be a specific intent, and not merely carelessness or negligence, however gross." Kilminster v. Day Mgmt. Corp. , 323 Or. 618, 630, 919 P.2d 474 (1996) (quoting Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co. , 79 Or. 448, 453–54, 155 P. 703 (1916) ). "[A] specific intent to produce an injury may be inferred from the circumstances." Id. at 633, 919 P.2d 474. In other words, the facts must support a reasonable inference that the employer "wished to injure" the worker. Id.
The requirement of deliberate intention under O.R.S. 656.156(2) precludes vicarious employer liability. For example, the subsection does not permit liability when the employer ratifies the completed intentional torts of a co-worker. See Bakker v. Baza'r, Inc. , 275 Or. 245, 253–54, 551 P.2d 1269 (1976). The subsection also does not allow liability under a theory of respondeat superior. Hanson v. Versarail Systems, Inc. , 175 Or. App. 92, 101, 28 P.3d 626 (2001). Instead, the statute requires direct liability of a corporate employer, as the Oregon Court of Appeals held in a pair of 2016 decisions: Bundy v. Nustar GP, LLC , and Goings v. CalPortland Co. See Bundy , 277 Or. App. 785, 802, 373 P.3d 1141 (2016), rev'd on other grounds , 362 Or. 282, 407 P.3d 801 (2017) ; Goings , 280...
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