Miller v. Mercy Memorial Hosp. Corp.
Decision Date | 04 June 2002 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 118701. |
Citation | 644 N.W.2d 730,466 Mich. 196 |
Parties | Edward MILLER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Morrison Miller, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Manoo Boonsiri, M.D., Manoo Boonsiri, M.D., P.C., and Norma A. Flores, M.D., Defendants-Appellees, and Akbar Attary, M.D., Defendant. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Granzotto & Nicita, P.C. (by Mark Granzotto), Detroit, MI and Erlich, Rosen & Bartnick, P.C. (by Sheldon D. Erlich), Southfield, MI, for the plaintiff-appellant. Kitch, Drutchas, Wagner, DeNardis & Valitutti (by Susan Healy Zitterman), Detroit, MI, for defendant-appellee Mercy Memorial Hospital Corporation.
Collins, Einhorn, Farrell & Ulanoff, P.C. (by Noreen L. Slank), Southfield, MI, for defendants-appellees Boonsiri and Flores.
This case presents the issue whether the six-month discovery provision in M.C.L. § 600.5838a(2), applicable to medical malpractice claims, is incorporated in the wrongful death saving statute as a "period of limitation." MCL 600.5852. Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action on the basis of medical malpractice, alleging in part that defendants failed to timely diagnose cancer, which resulted in the death of plaintiff's decedent. The trial court dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Poffenbarger v. Kaplan, 224 Mich.App. 1, 568 N.W.2d 131 (1997), and held that the six-month discovery rule for medical malpractice actions was not incorporated by the wrongful death saving statute.1 We reverse the judgments of the trial court and Court of Appeals and overrule Poffenbarger to the extent that it held that M.C.L. § 600.5852 does not incorporate the six-month discovery rule.
We borrow the Court of Appeals statement of facts:
The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants Flores and Boonsiri under MCR 2.116(C)(7). The trial court subsequently granted summary disposition in favor of Mercy Memorial Hospital because plaintiff alleged it was vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Flores and Boonsiri. Plaintiff appealed as of right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Plaintiff has applied for leave to appeal.
The Legislature has prescribed the periods of limitation for medical malpractice actions. The general period of limitation for a malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(5). There are additional provisions specifically relating to medical malpractice actions. The pertinent provisions are in a portion of M.C.L. § 600.5838a(2):
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later....
and M.C.L. § 600.5852:
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provision unless the personal representative commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run.
Interpretation of these statutes is at the heart of this matter. The Court of Appeals in this case interpreted Poffenbarger as standing for the proposition that the six-month discovery provision under § 5838a(2) does not apply in a cause of action brought by a personal representative under § 5852. This reading had the effect of making the only "period of limitation" applicable to a medical malpractice cause of action brought by the personal representative under § 5852, the two-year period of limitation under § 5805(5). We respectfully disagree with this conclusion.
In Poffenbarger, it was alleged that certain defendants failed to diagnose lung cancer in plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff's decedent died within two years of the date of accrual of the alleged malpractice, i.e., within the period of limitation set out in § 5805(5). Suit against the relevant defendants was not filed within three years from the expiration of the two-year period of limitation. Defendants argued the claim was therefore time-barred. Plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate, argued that she could avail herself of the six-month discovery provision in § 5838a(2). Under this scenario, however, the suit would have been timely filed within three years of the expiration of this six-month discovery period.2 The Court stated that the issue was "whether the three-year period mentioned in the wrongful death saving provision of M.C.L. § 600.5852 commences after the six-month statutory discovery period provided for in M.C.L. § 600.5838a." Poffenbarger, supra at 3, 568 N.W.2d 131.3 However, the Court went on to state that the six-month discovery provision was not incorporated by the wrongful death saving statute. Id. at 10, 568 N.W.2d 131.
The Court of Appeals here relied on this statement from Poffenbarger and likewise held that the saving provision did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in this case.
As we review the interpretation and application of a statute, it is a question of law that we review de novo. Lincoln v. General Motors Corp., 461 Mich. 483, 489-490, 607 N.W.2d 73 (2000). We first review the language of the statute itself. If it is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed to expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999).
Following these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the six-month discovery rule is a "period of limitation" within the meaning of the saving statute. The plain language of § 5838a(2) provides two distinct periods of limitation: two years after the accrual of the cause of action, and six months after the existence of the claim was or should have been discovered by the medical malpractice claimant. MCL 600.5852, simply refers to "the" period of limitation. The provision does not limit or qualify which period of limitation applies, the two-year period of limitation rooted in § 5805(5), or the six-month discovery period found in § 5838a(2). As a saving statute, § 5852 applies to whatever period of limitation is or may be applicable in a given case, be it a professional malpractice claim or a breach of contract action. Indeed, Poffenbarger acknowledged that "[t]he period of limitation in a wrongful death action is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim." Id. at 6, 568 N.W.2d 131. As the trial court acknowledged in this case, the underlying claim here was a medical malpractice action brought under the six-month discovery period. Thus, it is the latter period of limitation that the wrongful death saving statute incorporates here. Contrary to defendants' assertions, the six-month discovery rule is a distinct period of limitation. It is a statutory provision that requires a person who has a cause of...
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