Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins.

• Decision Date: 07 September 2010
• Docket Number: C. A. 09-0924
• Parties: DAVID F. MILLER v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AMICA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

DAVID F. MILLER v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AMICA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

C. A. No. 09-0924

Superior Court of Rhode Island

September 7, 2010

DECISION

CARNES, J.

This matter is before the Court for decision on the Motion of Defendants- Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan"), Amica Mutual Insurance Company, and Amica Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Amica"), and Allstate Insurance Company, Inc. ("Allstate") (collectively "Defendants")-for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I, II, III, V, and VI of the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiff David F. Miller ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Miller") pursuant to Rule 56(b) of Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally before the Court is the decision on the Motion of Defendants-Metropolitan and Amica-for Partial Summary Judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure is before the Court.

I Facts and Travel

This action arises out of alleged acts of insurance fraud committed by Plaintiff and the ensuing criminal investigation and prosecution of such. In 2001, the Rhode Island State Police ("RISP") undertook an investigation of Plaintiff's auto body shop. According to the police narrative of Detective Kershaw, representatives of "MetLife"^1[]requested a meeting to discuss alleged insurance fraud. Apparently Plaintiff had been inflating costs of repairs and recovering excess money from car insurance claims. Following this and other complaints, ^2[] RISP initiated an undercover investigation of Plaintiff.

During the first leg of the investigation, Defendant Metropolitan provided RISP with a vehicle that was taken into Plaintiff's auto body shop for repairs by an undercover officer. See Doucet Aff. 1. According to the affidavit of Detective Doucet, this initial 'sting' resulted in Plaintiff charging for fraudulent repairs in excess of $1, 100. Id. at 3. Later, another vehicle was supplied by Defendant Amica for an additional 'sting.' Id. Again, this vehicle underwent $1, 050 worth of fraudulent repairs by Plaintiff. Id. at 5. Following these investigations, Mr. Miller was arrested by the RISP and charged with Insurance Fraud and Attempting to Obtain Money under False Pretenses. See Pl.'s Ex. G at 7.

Thereafter, by March 28, 2005, the case against Miller was dismissed "due to evidentiary and proof issues." See Pl.'s Ex. B. The dismissal was conditioned upon Plaintiff's payment of restitution, relinquishment of or transfer of his Department of Business Regulation auto body license, and execution of a general liability release. Id. The release, signed on March 29, 2005, relinquished all Defendants from any causes of action against them arising from the criminal case against Plaintiff. See Pl.'s Ex. F.

Plaintiffs eight-count^3[] Second Amended Complaint, alleges Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations (Count I), Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations (Count II), Malicious Prosecution (Count III), Abuse of Process (Count IV), Continued Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations (Count V), Continued Tortuous Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations (Count VI), Violation of the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count VI) [sic], and Punitive Damages (Count VII). See Pls.'Sec.Am. Compl. The Complaint alleges that presumably because Miller was publicly pushing for change in the Rhode Island legislation regarding auto body dealers-specifically the legislation regarding labor rates used by the auto body repair shops, as well as the methods used and amounts of monies paid by insurance companies with regard to auto body work-Defendants began steering customers away from Plaintiff. Id. at 3-4. Allegedly, Defendants represented to their insured that Plaintiff overcharged for work performed and informed the same that "they did not warranty said work." Id. at 4. The Complaint insists that Defendants initiated audits and investigations that turned up no wrongdoing on the part of Plaintiff.

Moreover, according to Plaintiff, Defendants made false allegations about Plaintiff's business practices and work practices, including his improper estimate and repair methods, to the RISP. Id. at 5. Plaintiff avers that the RISP began to investigate Plaintiff as a result of these false allegations. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the RISP's investigation was financed by Defendants and directly resulted in the commencement of the prosecution and subsequent arrest of Plaintiff. Id. Such actions were allegedly taken in an effort to put Plaintiff out of business and to coerce their insured to use preferred auto body shops, which operate for the benefit of the insurance companies. "In essence, [the Plaintiff asserts that] the Defendants used the State's police power to . . . attempt to put Plaintiff out of business . . . ." Id. at 6.

The criminal charges against Plaintiff were eventually dismissed, and a general release of liability was signed by the involved parties. Plaintiff alleges that he was suffering from severe financial and emotional distress, along with the threat of incarceration imposed by the State of Rhode Island, when he was "coerced" into signing the release. Id. at 6. Plaintiff therefore filed suit, ^4[] asking this Court to find that Defendants tortiously interfered with his contractual relations and his prospective contractual relations prior to causing the State to initiate the criminal proceedings, and subsequent to the dismissal of the criminal proceedings (Counts I, II, V and VI); also asking the Court to find that the Defendants acts and omissions constitute a malicious prosecution (Count III); an abuse of process (Count IV)^5[]; and were in violation of the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count VI) [sic]^6[].

Collectively, Defendants presently move for summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, V, and VI, claiming that Counts I, II, V, and VI must fail because Plaintiff, individually, did not and does not currently have a valid contractual relationship upon which to base his tortious interference claims. As to Count III, Defendants claim that the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff did not terminate in his favor so as to sustain a subsequent claim for malicious prosecution. Furthermore, Defendant Metropolitan and Defendant Amica move for summary judgment on Count IV, claiming that Plaintiff did not allege any facts which would support a finding that the criminal prosecution against him was misused or misapplied in some way to accomplish an ulterior or wrongful purpose for which such prosecution was not designed.

II Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure empowers a trial justice, upon proper motion, to enter summary judgment. Our Supreme Court has established that

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after viewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact is evident from 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' and the motion justice finds that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, 969 A.2d 653 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, `038 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Super. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the court may not pass on the weight or credibility of the evidence but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 822 (R.I. 1980). Further, the "purpose of the summary judgment procedure is issue finding, not issue determination." Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 391 (R.I. 2008 (quoting Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Peloso, 121 R.I. 305, 307, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313 (1979)). During a summary judgment proceeding, "the only task of a trial justice in passing on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether there is a genuine issue concerning any material fact." Peloso, 121 R.I. at 307, 397 A.2d at 1313 (citations omitted). When no such issue exists, the case is ripe for summary judgment. Id. at 308, 1313. "Therefore, summary judgment should enter 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.'" Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

III Analysis

A Counts I, II, V, and VI

Defendants argue that Plaintiff, individually, has no viable claim under Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations ("Count I"), Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations ("Count II"), Continued Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations ("Count V"), and Continued Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations ("Count VI") of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint because those claims belong to the former corporate entity, Miller's Auto Body, Inc. ("MAB") not to Plaintiff, David F Miller as an individual. According to the Defendants, the contracts and any prospective contracts were with the business entity MAB, former plaintiff to this suit, which was the only entity legally capable of making auto body repairs to motor vehicles within the State of Rhode Island. Thus argued Defendants, none of the claimed contracts was between various customers and the individual Plaintiff, David F Miller. Instead, Defendants aver, the contracts were between various customers and the defunct...