Smiler v. Napolitano

• Decision Date: 05 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005-48-A.,2005-48-A.
• Citation: 911 A.2d 1035
• Parties: Irina SMILER et al. v. Stephen T. NAPOLITANO, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1035

911 A.2d 1035

Irina SMILER et al. v. Stephen T. NAPOLITANO, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence.

No. 2005-48-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 5, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Matthew D. Rocheleau, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

William T. Smitherman, Esq., for Defendant.

Sean M. Fontes, Esq., for R.I. Department of Attorney General.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice WILLIAMS, for the Court.

The plaintiffs, Irina and Lev Smiler (plaintiffs), appeal the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Stephen T. Napolitano (defendant), in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence. In this premises liability action, the plaintiffs call upon this Court to address the constitutionality of Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute, G.L.1956 chapter 6 of title 32, a statute we have addressed on numerous occasions. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and hold that the Recreational Use Statute does not violate the Rhode Island Constitution.

I Facts and Travel

August 28, 2000, was no walk in the park for Irina.¹ After setting out for a stroll in an area park, Irina was attacked by a swarm of bees as she approached a park bench. Attempting to evade the bees, Irina began running, tripped, and fell. The park, on the corner of Blackstone Boulevard and Hope Street, is owned and operated by the City of Providence (the city) and is open to the public at no charge.

The plaintiffs commenced this action on April 9, 2002, in Providence County Superior Court. The plaintiffs' complaint sought redress for Irina's personal injury, including her pain and suffering, and medical expenses. The plaintiffs also sought damages for Lev's loss of Irina's homemaker services and consortium.

The defendant moved for summary judgment on August 24, 2004, arguing that because the city is entitled to limited immunity under the Recreational Use Statute, judgment as a matter of law should be granted in its favor.² The plaintiffs countered that because the statute completely deprived them of a remedy, it was unconstitutional under article 1, section 5,³ of the Rhode Island Constitution, which recognizes that "[e]very person ought to obtain right and justice * * *." The motion justice granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute relieved defendant of liability and that plaintiffs had not established the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on December 22, 2004. The State of Rhode Island filed a motion to intervene in the appeal, which we granted on February 16, 2006.

II Analysis

A Standard of Review

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the motion justice. Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240, 1241 (R.I.2006). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact is evident from "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," and the motion justice finds that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Furthermore, this Court reviews matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc., 893 A.2d 216, 221 (R.I.2006). In so doing, this Court examines the statute as a whole, making every effort to effectuate the legislative intent. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 516 (R.I.2004). This Court has consistently afforded deference to legislative enactments, which we presume are constitutional and valid. Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 567 A.2d 358, 360 (R.I.1989). "[W]e are cognizant of the fact that our judicial role is to interpret and apply statutes and not to legislate * * *." Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 458 (R.I. 2006). Thus, a challenging party must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a statute is unconstitutional before a court may declare it invalid. Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 808 (R.I.2005). Furthermore, when a statute can be interpreted as having two meanings, only one of which is constitutional, we will construe the statute under its constitutional meaning. Rhode Island State Police v. Madison, 508 A.2d 678, 683 (R.I. 1986).

B The Rhode Island Constitution

To encourage landowners to open their property to the public for recreational use, Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute limits landowners' liability for personal injuries sustained by the users of such properties. See § 32-6-1. The Recreational Use Statute modifies the common law to change the legal duty that owners owe to users of recreational property. See Tantimonico v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., 637 A.2d 1056, 1060 (R.I.1994). This change from the common law treats users of public and private recreational properties as trespassers, thus reducing the duty of care owed to recreational users. See id.

Reflective of tort law pertaining to trespassers, landowners owe no duty of care to recreational users of their property. See Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458 n. 5. An exception lies, however, if a landowner finds a trespasser in a position of peril. Id. (citing Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 161 (R.I.2000)). After discovering a recreational user in a position of peril, landowners must "guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity." See § 32-6-5(a)(1).⁴ The plaintiffs contend that this exception is overly prohibitive and logically impossible to invoke, rendering the statute unconstitutional. We disagree.

Citing article 1, section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution, plaintiffs argue on appeal that the motion justice erred in his application of the Recreational Use Statute and assert that the statute completely bars people injured because of the negligence of the property owner from a remedy.⁵

In Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I.1984), we had the opportunity to address article 1, section 5:

"Clearly, [article 1, section 5], of the Rhode Island Constitution should not be interpreted to bar the Legislature from enacting any laws that may limit a party from bringing a claim in our courts. There are instances in which the Legislature permissibly placed reasonable limits or burdens on the parties' right to have their claims adjudicated by the courts.

"The total denial of access to the courts for adjudication of a claim even before it arises, however, most certainly `flies in the face of the constitutional command found in [article 1, section 5],' * * * and to hold otherwise would be to render this constitutional protection worthless." Kennedy, 471 A.2d at 198 (quoting Lemoine v. Martineau, 115 R.I. 233, 240, 342 A.2d 616, 621 (1975)).

The plaintiffs attempt to analogize Kennedy to the present case, but we, like the motion justice, are not persuaded.

In Kennedy, this Court struck down a products-liability statute of repose on grounds that the statute "completely denied `products-liability claimants of their day in court, notwithstanding the merits of their claims and the direct liability of the potential defendants.'" Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543, 547 (R.I.1985) (quoting Kennedy, 471 A.2d at 199). The statute of repose invalidated in Kennedy required all civil products liability claims for recovery of damages against any defendant to be brought within ten years after the product first was purchased for use or consumption. Kennedy, 471 A.2d at 197. In effect, the statute altogether precluded redress for people who were unaware that their claims were barred until after discovery ensued and the date of the product's initial purchase was ascertained. Id. at 197,200.

Only eighteen months after this Court struck down the products-liability statute of repose in Kennedy, we upheld a ten-year statute of repose that would bar claims against an improver of real property in Walsh. Walsh, 494 A.2d at 548. We held that the Legislature's modification of the common law to bar only claims against the improver did not unreasonably deny injured parties access to the courts. Id. We noted that even after the ten-year period had passed, injured parties still had a means of recourse by filing suit against owners or operators of the property instead. Id.

Unlike the products-liability statute of repose at issue in Kennedy, the Recreational Use Statute does not deprive litigants of their day in court altogether. There is a fundamental difference between a statute that categorically precludes all litigants from seeking redress for their injuries and one that lessens the common-law duty of care that owners of recreational property owe, thereby requiring successful litigants to prove willful or malicious conduct. In the latter situation, a litigant's inability to prove that particular conduct breaches a statutory duty does not offend our constitution. "If it were otherwise the legislature would be barred from altering by way of restricting or extending the provisions of the common law in any manner, regardless of social changes and the experiences of man over centuries. It was never contemplated that the constitution should be so construed." Fournier v. Miriam Hospital, 93 R.I. 299, 305, 175 A.2d 298, 301 (1961).

The result we reach herein is not only consistent with this Court's previous decisions but also is consistent with other states' judgments. The courts of both Connecticut and Florida have considered similar statutes in light of state constitutional provisions safeguarding the right of access to justice. See Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co., 7 Conn.App. 164, 508 A.2d 58, 63 (1986) (holding a recreational use statute constitutional because it did not preclude litigants from the right to redress for a particular injury, but, rather, redefined the injury that warrants redress or the class of persons who have...