Miller v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Norway

• Decision Date: 15 September 1987
• Citation: 537 A.2d 190
• Parties: Creighton E. MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY NORWAY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 190

537 A.2d 190

Creighton E. MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY NORWAY, a Delaware corporation,

Defendant Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Sept. 15, 1987.

Decided: Jan. 19, 1988.

Gregory A. Inskip (argued) and Peter M. Sieglaff, of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, Leonard C. Jaques, of The Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., Detroit, Mich., on behalf of appellants.

Bruce M. Stargatt (argued) and William D. Johnston, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Kenneth E. Rogers, and Karen F. Brand, Houston, Tex., on behalf of appellee.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., MOORE and HOLLAND, JJ.

HOLLAND, Justice.

The appellants ("plaintiffs"), survivors and representatives of the seamen who were injured or killed when their semi-submersible drilling rig capsized in the North Sea, brought suit against Phillips Petroleum Company Norway ("Phillips Norway"), claiming relief under American federal law and foreign law. The Superior Court granted Phillips Norway's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint after finding no subject matter jurisdiction and alternatively on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Miller v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Norway, Del.Super., 529 A.2d 263, 271 (1987). On appeal, it is argued that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over this controversy and that the suit should not have been dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens principles.

We have concluded that, as a matter of federal law, the Superior Court does have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy. However, we agree with the Superior Court's determination that the plaintiffs' claims are governed by Norwegian law. Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims because the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under federal law. We also affirm the dismissal by the Superior Court on the alternate ground of forum non conveniens.

Facts

Defendant-appellee, Phillips Petroleum Company Norway, is a Delaware corporation. Phillips Norway is engaged in the production of oil and gas in the Greater Ekofisk Development (the "Ekofisk Field") in the North Sea. On July 15, 1976, Phillips Norway entered into a bareboat charter agreement ¹ with Stavanger Drilling II A/S, a Norwegian corporation, with respect to the operation of the Alexander F. Kielland (the "Kielland").

The Kielland was a Norwegian flag vessel, owned by Stavanger Drilling and registered in Norway. It was designed and built in France as a semi-submersible drilling rig. ² However, the Kielland had always been used as an accommodation rig for off-duty workers--a form of floating hotel. The Kielland never left the North Sea after its delivery to Stavanger Drilling. The crew for the Kielland was provided by Stavanger Drilling pursuant to a separate personnel and services agreement with Phillips Norway. ³

The Kielland capsized during a storm on March 27, 1980, killing one hundred twenty-three of the two hundred twelve persons on board. The seamen on the Kielland at the time of the storm included citizens of Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The two Americans involved in this case (Messrs. Rolf Reme and Lars Hansen) were, in fact, dual nationals who resided in Norway at the time of their deaths. The Kielland capsized in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. ⁴ The Norwegian government and the Stavanger, Norway, police have conducted official investigations into the Kielland's capsizing, and the City Court of Stavanger, Norway, has exercised jurisdiction over the accident. ⁵

Procedural Background

On September 24, 1980, Stavanger Drilling, as owner of the Kielland, and Phillips Norway filed a petition in the City Court of Stavanger, Norway, for limitation of liability pursuant to Norwegian law. In accordance with that law, they filed security in the amount of approximately forty million United States dollars to pay all claims in those proceedings. It is represented to this Court that all proper persons were given notice to file their claims in that proceeding. This Court is also advised that Phillips Norway has complied with all requirements of Norwegian law in connection with the Norwegian litigation.

Applicable Norwegian law apparently provides that the City Court of Stavanger, Norway, has exclusive jurisdiction over all legal proceedings and/or claims of any kind or description which arise out of or in any way relate to the capsizing of the Kielland. It also appears that the failure to make a claim in the City Court of Stavanger precludes any claimant from making any claim in any other court or in any other jurisdiction. Finally, it is represented that claims may still be filed in the Norwegian action.

A majority of the Kielland survivors and of the estates of deceased seamen have been paid by Phillips Norway in full settlement of their claims. In fact, of the two hundred twelve people who were on board the Kielland when it capsized, two hundred two persons or their representatives executed general releases in favor of Phillips Norway in connection with the accident. These releases are all governed by Norwegian law. However, claims have been filed in the Norwegian proceedings by or on behalf of some persons who have given releases. Therefore, the binding nature of those releases, under Norwegian law, is a matter currently being contested in Norway.

Between January and May 1982, the plaintiffs in the present litigation initiated one hundred sixty-seven actions against Phillips Norway in the United States District Court for the Northern District for Ohio in connection with the Kielland's capsizing which is now the subject of this litigation. All Alexander F. Kielland Litigants v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Inc., No. 82-31, slip op. (N.D.Ohio Feb. 14, 1983). The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against Phillips Norway for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 12. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision. 745 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.1984). The United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. 471 U.S. 1055, 105 S.Ct. 2116, 85 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

On June 10, 1985, in the Superior Court of Delaware, the plaintiffs filed suit against Phillips Norway, essentially alleging the same causes of action that had been brought in the United States District Court. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged four bases for their recovery: (1) the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688; (2) the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768; (3) the general maritime law; ⁶ and (4) negligence and unseaworthiness under the applicable laws of Norway and/or the United Kingdom.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Our analysis of this case logically begins with a review of the basis for hearing this litigation, concerning a maritime accident in the North Sea, in a Delaware Court. Corporations and individuals alike enter into contracts, commit torts, and deal in personal and real property. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 531 A.2d 206, 214 (1987). Every Delaware corporation is accountable for such activities and subject to suit in a Delaware court of appropriate jurisdiction. 8 Del.C. § 122(2). In fact, every Delaware corporation must maintain a registered office in this State for the purpose of receiving service of process. 8 Del.C. §§ 131-136.

This litigation was commenced in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, a court of general jurisdiction. Del. Const. art. IV, § 7; 10 Del.C. § 542. Phillips Norway is a Delaware corporation. However the fact that the Superior Court has general jurisdiction to consider claims against Delaware corporations does not ipso facto involve an application of Delaware law or a federal law of the United States. Choice of law decisions relating to corporate activities are usually determined after construing the facts of each transaction. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d at 214-15.

This transaction involved a maritime accident. The primary allegations for relief by the plaintiffs in this case were based upon federal law. Therefore, the first issue for the Superior Court to resolve was whether or not this maritime claim came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. ⁷ Various decisions by the United States Supreme Court have made it clear that federal admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive "only as to those maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien." Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560, 74 S.Ct. 298, 301, 98 L.Ed. 290 (1954). This is not such a case.

State courts are "competent" to adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings that are in personam. Id.; Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2495, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Moreover, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have specifically held that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and Jones Act cases such as the present one. See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S.Ct. at 2500; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 243, 63 S.Ct. 246, 249-50, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942); Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 560, 46 S.Ct. 596, 597, 70 L.Ed. 1085 (1926); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37, 46 S.Ct. 410, 412, 70 L.Ed. 813 (1926). Indeed, a state court's concurrent jurisdiction to hear a Jones Act claim is so carefully guarded that, once an action is begun in state court, it cannot be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a).

The plaintiffs in this case properly asserted claims under federal law, and the Superior Court of Delaware had concurrent jurisdiction to hear them. ⁸ Cf. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v....