Miller v. Smith

• Decision Date: 20 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–0147.,11–0147.
• Citation: 229 W.Va. 478,729 S.E.2d 800
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner, Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner v. David K. SMITH, Respondent.

229 W.Va. 478

729 S.E.2d 800

Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner, Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner

v.David K. SMITH, Respondent.

No. 11–0147.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted April 11, 2012.

Decided June 7, 2012.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Benjamin

July 20, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va.Code § 29A–5–4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.” Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

2. “In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

3. The Secretary of Transportation's May 17, 2010, appointment of a designee to fulfill the statutory obligations regarding an orderly transition of jurisdictional authority from the Department of Motor Vehicles to the Office of Administrative Hearings was an appropriate exercise of discretionary power and in full compliance with West Virginia Code §§ 17C–5C–3 and 17C–5C–5 (2010).

4. “Statutory changes that are purely procedural in nature will be applied retroactively.” Syl. Pt. 1, Joy v. Chessie Emp. Fed. Credit Union, 186 W.Va. 118, 411 S.E.2d 261 (1991).

5. “ ‘A statute that diminishes substantive rights or augments substantive liabilities should not be applied retroactively to events completed before the effective date of the statute (or the date of enactment if no separate effective date is stated) unless the statute provides explicitly for retroactive application.’ Syllabus Point 2, Public Citizen, Inc. v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 198 W.Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996).” Syl. Pt. 2, Smith v. West Virginia Div. of Rehab. Servs. & Div. of Pers., 208 W.Va. 284, 540 S.E.2d 152 (2000).

6. “ ‘The presumption is that a statute is intended to operate prospectively, and not retrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words or by necessary implication, that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive force and effect.’ Pt. 4, syllabus, Taylor v. State Compensation Commissioner, 140 W.Va. 572 [86 S.E.2d 114 (1955) ].” Syl. Pt. 1, Loveless v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 155 W.Va. 264, 184 S.E.2d 127 (1971).

7. “The judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding.” Syl. Pt. 3, Miller v. Toler, ––– W.Va. ––––, 729 S.E.2d 137 (2012).

Darrell McGraw, Attorney General, Scott E. Johnson, Elaine L. Skorich, Attorney General's Office, Charleston, WV, Counsel for the Petitioner.

Matthew L. Clark, Kayser, Layne & Clark, Point Pleasant, WV, Counsel for the Respondent.

McHUGH, Justice:

This is an appeal by Joe E. Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “DMV”), from an order of the Circuit Court of Mason County reversing the administrative license revocation of Mr. David K. Smith. Upon thorough review of the record, arguments of the parties, statutory framework, and relevant precedent, this Court reverses the lower court's order and remands this matter for the entry of an order reinstating the administrative license revocation.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On July 9, 2009, Mr. Smith was stopped and arrested for DUI at a safety checkpoint established by West Virginia State Police on West Virginia Route 2 near Point Pleasant, West Virginia. Based upon Senior Trooper A.D. Wootton's observation that the Ohio license plate being displayed on Mr. Smith's car had not been issued to that vehicle, Trooper Wootton asked Mr. Smith to move his car from the traffic lane to the side of the roadway. Instead, Mr. Smith began driving slowly south on Route 2, and Trooper Wootton therefore entered his police cruiser and followed Mr. Smith for approximately one hundred yards before Mr. Smith finally drove off the roadway and stopped his vehicle. When Trooper Wootton directed Mr. Smith to roll down his driver's side window, Mr. Smith did not immediately comply. When the driver's side door was eventually opened, Trooper Wootton detected an odor of alcohol on Mr. Smith's breath, and Mr. Smith admitted to having consumed two margaritas. Trooper Wootton further observed that Mr. Smith had difficulty following directions, was unsteady, and had glassy eyes and slurred speech. Field sobriety testing indicated balance and gait difficulties, and the results of the preliminary breath testing indicated that Mr. Smith's blood alcohol concentration level was .293. Trooper Wootton arrested Mr. Smith for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Mr. Smith's license was administratively revoked on September 22, 2009. Mr. Smith challenged that administrative revocation, and subsequent to a March 3, 2010, administrative hearing, the DMV Commissioner ordered administrative license revocation effective August 4, 2010. In an undated order,¹ the DMV Commissioner found that the failure of the initial traffic stop to comply with the requirements set forth in State v. Sigler, 224 W.Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009), affected only the criminal ² portion of the proceedings and did not impact the authority of the DMV to administratively revoke Mr. Smith's license in this separate civil proceeding. The DMV Commissioner further found that the application of the exclusionary rule, as a bar to the utilization of evidence in the criminal context, would be inappropriate in civil license revocation proceedings.

In his appeal to the lower court, Mr. Smith argued that the DMV Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to issue the revocation order, based upon the passage of West Virginia Code § 17C–5C–3, effective June 11, 2010, granting jurisdiction for DMV appeals to the Office of Administrative Hearings. In response, the DMV Commissioner contended that jurisdiction was properly retained by the DMV because it was within the authority of the Secretary of Transportation to create interim rules to effectuate the transfer of jurisdictional authority from the DMV to the Office of Administrative Hearings. Specifically, on May 17, 2010, Secretary of Transportation Paul A Mattox, Jr., (hereinafter “Secretary”) wrote a letter to DMV Commissioner Joe Miller in which the Secretary explained that Ms. Jill C. Dunn had been appointed as the West Virginia Department of Transportation “designee to fulfill the Cabinet Secretary's statutory obligations pursuant to § 17C–5–1 et seq.”

On June 10, 2010, Ms. Dunn issued a memorandum (hereinafter “Dunn letter”) providing for the gradual transition of authority to conduct administrative hearings. The Dunn letter stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings would have jurisdiction over appeals on incidents occurring on or after June 11, 2010. Thus, according to the time frame established therein, the incident involving Mr. Smith would be encompassed within the jurisdiction of the DMV.

The lower court, by order dated January 5, 2011, found that West Virginia Code § 17–5C–3 ³ terminated DMV jurisdiction and conferred it upon the Office of Administrative Hearings immediately, as of the June 11, 2010, effective date of the statute. The lower court further found that the appointment of Ms. Dunn was not properly accomplished and had no legal effect since the Secretary's letter did not specifically mention § 17C–5C. The lower court also observed that while the version of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–2 in effect at the time of this incident did not include a requirement for a lawful arrest in a civil license revocation proceeding based upon driving under the influence, the 2010 amendment did include such a requirement. The lower court categorized that statutory amendment as procedural in nature and therefore found that it was retroactive to require a lawful stop incident to Mr. Smith's DUI arrest on July 9, 2009.

The DMV appeals to this Court, contending that it properly retained jurisdiction over this case and that the lower court erred in applying the exclusionary rule. The DMV requests reversal of the lower court's order and reinstatement of the order administratively revoking Mr. Smith's license to operate a motor vehicle.

II. Standard of Review

In syllabus point one of Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996), this Court explained our review of a circuit court's order in a case of this nature:

On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va.Code § 29A–5–4(a)⁴ and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

196 W.Va. at 590, 474 S.E.2d at 520 (footnote supplied). In syllabus point two of Muscatell, this Court further explained the standard where the circuit court decision differs from the administrative agency decision, as in the present case. “In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.”

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The DMV contends that West Virginia Code § 17C–5C–3 did not immediately divest it of jurisdiction upon the effective date of that statute, June 11, 2010. Rather, the DMV argues that West Virginia Code § 17C–5C–5 (2010) ⁵ provided significant latitude in facilitating a gradual transition period and statutorily specifying that the...