Miller v. State, U-479

Decision Date27 June 1974
Docket NumberNo. U-479,U-479
Citation297 So.2d 36
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals
PartiesJohn Mark MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McCORD, Judge.

The question presented on this appeal is whether or not the trial judge gave correct application to Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., (as amended by Ch. 73-71, Laws of Florida, 1973) in the credit he gave appellant for time spent in the county jail prior to sentence. Prior to the 1973 amendment, credit for jail time was permissive but it is now mandatory. Said statute now provides as follows:

'A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence.'

Appellant was originally charged in a four count information with two counts of grand larceny and two counts of petit larceny. He entered pleas of guilty to four counts of petit larceny and was sentenced to 60 days in the county jail on each count to run consecutively. On sentencing him, the trial judge stated: 'You will be given credit on the sentence or sentences for the number of days that you've already spent in jail.'

At a subsequent time, appellant was brought back before the court due to a difference of opinion between the state and appellant as to the number of days credit the court had given appellant for jail time. The court in the original sentence had simply relied upon the sheriff or the clerk to calculate the jail time and apply it to the sentence. It is noted that such reliance was not in compliance with the foregoing statute as it requires that the judge specify in the sentence the period of time which is credited for jail time. This was corrected by the judge, however, when appellant was brought back before th court. After considerable discussion between the judge and counsel, the judge allowed appellant 33 days credit for jail time. Appellant contends this credit should have been 147 days.

When appellant was arrested on the foregoing charges, he made bond but was subsequently arrested on charges of other offenses, some of which apparently were in another county and circuit (Taylor County). Because of these additional charges, appellant's bondsman went off of his bond for the offenses in this case. Appellant made bond again only to re-arrested on additional charges and his bondsman again went off of his bond on these offenses. It appears from discussion between counsel and the trial judge that during part of the time appellant was in jail, he was released to Taylor County for disposition of the charges there. We do not have before us any record as to what credit was given to appellant, if any, for time spent in jail on disposition of any of these other charges.

Appellant contends that the trial judge was in error under the foregoing statute in not giving him credit on his sentences in this case for the Full time he spent in jail awaiting disposition, not only of this case, but also of the other cases; that a defendant is entitled to credit On each sentence for the total time he is held in jail on multiple charges. We do not construe the foregoing statute to have the meaning which appellant ascribes to it, although under the facts of this case (which are not clear at this point) he may be entitled to credit on this sentence for the full time spent in jail. Certainly, it was not the legislative intent that a defendant be given credit on Each sentence for the Total time spent in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
33 cases
  • State v. Price
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 2 Julio 2002
    ...S.E.2d 754; Wilson v. State (1978), 82 Wis.2d 657, 264 N.W.2d 234; Cox v. State (1974), 214 Kan. 652, 522 P.2d 173; Miller v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974), 297 So.2d 36; United States ex rel. Derengowski v. United States Attorney Gen. (8th Cir.1972), 457 F.2d 812; Holland v. State (1971), 1......
  • State v. Owens
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 9 Febrero 2015
    ...dissent in Hoch points out two cases that clarify why holding the statute ambiguous is wrong. The Hoch majority cited Miller v. State, 297 So.2d 36 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974), to support its view of legislature's intent. Hoch, 102 Idaho at 352, 630 P.2d at 144. However, that case was based on a......
  • State v. Owens
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 9 Febrero 2015
    ...dissent in Hoch points out two cases that clarify why holding the statute ambiguous is wrong. The Hoch majority cited Miller v. State, 297 So.2d 36 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974), to support its view of legislature's intent. Hoch, 102 Idaho at 352, 630 P.2d at 144. However, that case was based on a......
  • State v. Sanchez, A-93-1084
    • United States
    • Nebraska Court of Appeals
    • 2 Agosto 1994
    ...(1980); State v. Richardson, 295 N.C. 309, 245 S.E.2d 754 (1978); Wilson v. State, 82 Wis.2d 657, 264 N.W.2d 234 (1978); Miller v. State, 297 So.2d 36 (Fla.App.1974); Holland v. State, 13 Md.App. 635, 284 A.2d 874 (1971); State v. Johnson, 167 N.W.2d 696 (Iowa The purpose of statutes which ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT