State v. Price, 00-432.
Docket Nº | No. 00-432. |
Citation | 310 Mont. 320, 2002 MT 150, 50 P.3d 530 |
Case Date | July 02, 2002 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
50 P.3d 530
2002 MT 150
310 Mont. 320
v.
Richard Lee PRICE, Defendant and Appellant
No. 00-432.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs February 21, 2002.
Decided July 2, 2002.
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jim Wheelis, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney; John Parker, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana, For Respondent.
Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 By Information filed in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County, the Defendant, Richard Lee Price, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a fourth or subsequent offense, and four misdemeanors: failure to wear a seatbelt, driving while the privilege to do so is revoked, failure to yield the right of way, and failure to exhibit proof of insurance. Prior to trial, Price pled guilty to the misdemeanors. Following a jury trial, Price was convicted of the DUI charge and for that offense was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, and an additional four years of probation. For the misdemeanors, the District Court fined Price and sentenced him to two days in jail for driving with a revoked license and ten days in jail for failure to exhibit proof of insurance. All sentences were to run consecutively. The misdemeanor jail sentences were deemed served because Price had served eighteen days in jail awaiting trial. The District Court credited the remaining six days of time served to Price's DUI sentence. Price appeals from his DUI conviction and the District Court's application of time served. We affirm both the conviction and the sentence of the District Court.
¶ 2 The following issues are presented on appeal:
¶ 3 1. Did sufficient evidence exist to support Price's DUI conviction?
¶ 4 2. Did the District Court properly award credit for time served?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On March 15, 1999, the State charged Price by Information with one count of DUI, a fourth or subsequent offense, in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA (1997), as well as four misdemeanor offenses. In support of the DUI charge, the State alleged that "Defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, a 1988 gray Chevrolet Beretta, on a way of this state open to the public, Fourth Street North, while under the influence of alcohol." The misdemeanors for which Price was charged included failure to wear a seatbelt, driving while the privilege to do so is revoked, failure to yield the right of way, and failure to exhibit proof of insurance. All offenses were alleged to have occurred in Great Falls, Montana, on March 5, 1999.
¶ 6 Price pled guilty to the misdemeanors prior to trial. The DUI charge was tried before a jury on January 18, 2000. At trial, the State first called Great Falls police officer Shane Sorenson as a witness. Sorenson testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m. on March 15, 1999, he was on duty in his patrol car when he observed Price drive his vehicle from a stop sign and into the path of an
¶ 7 Sorenson noticed that Price had alcohol on his breath and that his speech was slurred. According to Sorenson, Price was asked by medical personnel whether he had been drinking that night, and Price responded affirmatively. Sorenson, however, was concerned that Price's incoherence may have been caused by a possible concussion given the nature of the accident.
¶ 8 Sorenson testified he then met with Price at the hospital approximately forty-five minutes to an hour after the accident. Sorenson noticed that Price's speech was still slurred, his eyes appeared to be bloodshot, and he still smelled of alcohol. Price was read his Miranda warning and given the Montana Implied Consent Advisory. Although Price initially agreed to give a blood sample, he subsequently refused citing his fear of needles. Price then agreed to give a breath sample. However, after Sorenson retrieved his portable breath tester, Price again refused, based on his professed belief that breath tests were inaccurate. Sorenson then issued Price a DUI citation "[g]iven the secondary indicators that I observed, given the eyes being bloodshot and glazed, given the incoherence and slurred speech, given the odor of the alcoholic beverages, then the primary indicator being impaired judgment, being that he pulled out directly in front of an oncoming vehicle at night with it's [sic] headlights on...." Sorenson did admit that if Price had taken a breath test which produced negative results for alcohol, he would not have issued Price a citation.
¶ 9 Price testified that when he pulled up to the stop sign prior to the accident, he and his girlfriend, Shelly Simons, were involved in an argument, and that out of frustration and anger, he accelerated. Price testified that after the accident, everything was a "blur," and that the impact of the collision caused his slurred voice.
¶ 10 Price did admit that he had been drinking prior to the accident. Price testified that at about 3:30 or 4:00 p.m., he and Simons shared approximately three-quarters of a quart of beer. Sometime later, Price drank what he characterized as "less than a beer" at Jakers, a local restaurant and casino. At about 7:00 p.m., Price and Simons went to a friend's house, where they stayed until about 9:00 p.m. At the friend's house, Price had a couple more beers. In all, Price admitted to consuming the equivalent of five beers in a six hour span. However, Price testified to his belief that the alcohol did not affect his driving.
¶ 11 Two other witnesses testified. Simons, who was with Price at the time of and preceding the accident, testified that Price's voice was not "incoherent or slurred" before the accident. She also testified that despite his consumption of alcohol, Price was not intoxicated. The final witness at trial was Price's emergency room physician, Dr. Betty Kuffel. Kuffel testified that when Price arrived at the hospital, he was "completely restrained and smelled of alcohol. He was cooperative. His speech was slurred and he appeared intoxicated." She identified no medical condition such as a head injury that would have accounted for Price's slurred speech.
¶ 12 Price filed a motion for a directed verdict based on his contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. His motion was denied. The jury convicted Price of DUI on January 18, 2000. On May 15, 2000, the District Court sentenced Price to the Department of Corrections for twelve months, followed by an additional four years of probation. For the misdemeanors, the District Court imposed fines and sentenced Price to two days in jail for driving with a revoked license and ten days in jail for failure to exhibit proof of insurance. All sentences were to run consecutively and the misdemeanor jail sentences were deemed served because Price had already served eighteen days in jail awaiting trial. The District Court then credited Price with six days of time served toward his DUI sentence.
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