Miller v. Stovall
| Decision Date | 02 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NUMBER: 05-73447 |
| Parties | SHAREE MILLER, Petitioner, v. CLARICE STOVALL, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS
This matter is before the Court for the second time on Petitioner Sharee Miller's application for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. # 1). A jury convicted Miller of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and second-degree murder. Miller challenges the admission of a suicide note into evidence at her trial.
The Court heard oral arguments on July 26, 2012.
The Court holds:
(1) The Michigan Court of Appeals decided Petitioner's Confrontation Clause1 claim on the merits;
(2) This Court applies the deferential standard contained in the Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") to its review of Miller's habeas petition;
(3) The Michigan Court of Appeals made no decision that was contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(4) The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in Miller's trial proceeding;
(5) The Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), rev'd, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which was the controlling law at the time it made its decision on the merits; the suicide note bore sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible into evidence; and
(6) Even if this Court applied a de novo standard of review, Miller loses; she does not meet her burden to prove the suicide note lacked the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required by Roberts.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the writ; a Certificate of Appealability issues; and, Miller's bond is cancelled.
The factual background leading to Miller's petition was thoroughly recited in Miller v. Stovall, 608 F.3d 913, 915-18 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, Stovall v. Miller, 132 S.Ct. 573 (2011) (mem.). Thus, a brief history will do.
On December 22, 2000 Miller was convicted in state court of second-degreemurder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The prosecution alleged, and the jury found, that Miller plotted with her former lover, Jerry Cassady, to murder her husband Bruce. Miller started dating Cassady while she was married to Bruce. During that time she lied to Cassady; she told him that she was pregnant with his children, but Bruce abused her, causing her to have miscarriages. She also told Cassady that Bruce was involved in organized crime and that her life was in danger.
On November 7, 1999, Cassady told his brother Mike that he was leaving town and that if he did not return in a couple of days, Mike should look for a briefcase under Cassady's bed. The next day Bruce was murdered. By December, Miller left Cassady and started dating someone else.
On February 11, 2000, Cassady committed suicide in his bedroom. While cleaning Cassady's home following his brother's death, Mike found a briefcase and four notes. Cassady left three notes: to his youngest son, his ex-wife, and his parents. The notes were on top of the briefcase Cassady mentioned to his brother on November 7. Taped to the briefcase was a note directing Mike not to open it alone; the briefcase was addressed to an attorney.
Mike opened the briefcase in the presence of an attorney; it contained emails and America Online ("AOL") Instant Messages ("IMs") between Cassady and Miller. These communications revealed the pregnancies, miscarriages and Bruce's abuse, all of which proved to be lies. The evidence implicated Miller in Bruce's murder. This briefcase evidence was offered against Miller at her trial.
Cassady's parents gave the police the suicide note he wrote them. Over Miller's objection, the note was admitted at trial and is the subject of this Court's review of herhabeas petition.
The suicide note reads:
At the state level, Miller argued that Cassady's statements in the suicide note were inadmissible hearsay and that admission of the note would violate her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The circuit court admitted the note under "at least two possible theories." (Doc. # 14, 12/02/00 Tr. 36). It held that the statements were admissible as dying declarations or under the "catchall" (or residual) exception to the rule barring hearsay. (Id. at 36-39). It concluded that the statements bore adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy Miller's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her under Roberts. (Id. at 36). At the time of Miller's trial, Roberts was the controlling authority on the Confrontation Clause's application to hearsay statements; however, the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford replaced the Roberts' reliability test with respect to testimonial hearsay, which stood for the proposition that a defendant's right to confront an unavailable witness could be overcome if the hearsay statement "[bore] adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" 448 U.S. at 66.
Miller appealed her conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals. She argued: (1) the trial court violated the rules of evidence and her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right by allowing the State to introduce the suicide note, IM transcripts, and various e-mails between her and Cassady; (2) the trial court violated her due process right to a fair trial by admitting e-mails, including semi-nude and erotic photographs and videotape of her, which the court said in front of the jury was "pornographic"; (3) the prosecutor and trial court violated her due process right to a fair trial by admitting gruesome photographs of Cassady depicting a bullet hole in his head while sitting in a recliner with an open Bible in his lap. (Doc. # 1 at 2-3).
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected these arguments. It held: (1) the statements in Cassady's suicide note were sufficiently reliable to fit within the parameters of the residual exception to the hearsay rule and to satisfy Miller's constitutional confrontation right; (2) Miller's portions of the IM conversations were not hearsay and Cassady's portions, though hearsay, were admissible as statements against penal interest and did not violate Miller's right of confrontation; (3) the sexually graphic emails, photographs, and videotape and the photographs depicting Cassady after his suicide were relevant and not unduly prejudicial; (4) Miller was not denied a fair trial by the trial court's reference to the videotape as "pornographic"; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting voir dire; and (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the sentencing guidelines range. People v. Miller, No. 233018, 2003 WL 21465338, at *2-10 (Mich. App. June 24, 2003) (per curiam).
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