Miller v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 May 1997
• Docket Number: CA-SA,No. 1,1
• Citation: 189 Ariz. 127,938 P.2d 1128
• Parties: , 244 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 19 Charles Lamar MILLER, and Maricopa County Public Defender, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of The State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, The Honorable Michael O. Wilkinson, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge, The STATE of Arizona, ex rel., Richard ROMLEY, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest. 96-0249.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1128

938 P.2d 1128

189 Ariz. 127, 244 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 19

Charles Lamar MILLER, and Maricopa County Public Defender, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of The State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, The Honorable Michael O. Wilkinson, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge The STATE of Arizona, ex rel., Richard ROMLEY, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 96-0249.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department A.

May 29, 1997.

[189 Ariz. 128] Richard Romley, Maricopa County Attorney by Gerald R. Grant, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, for Real Party in Interest.

Dean W. Trebesch, Maricopa County Public Defender by Vicki A.R. Lopez, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for Petitioner.

OPINION

NOYES, Judge.

After one judge granted Petitioner a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The case was then transferred to another judge, who denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed this petition for special action. We accepted jurisdiction and now deny relief.

I.

At Petitioner's trial on two counts of aggravated assault, one of the victims (his ex-girlfriend) surprised the State by changing her story and testifying that Petitioner had not assaulted her. The State impeached the victim with contrary statements she had made to police officers, and with testimony from those officers.

During final argument, Deputy Public Defender Vicki Lopez sought to bolster the credibility of the victim's new story by telling the jury that the victim had come from Massachusetts to testify because she was "not going to let the Defendant get convicted of something that didn't happen." This was the first mention of Massachusetts in the trial and it alarmed the prosecutor, Deputy County Attorney Lyn D. Kane, who thought the defense was unaware that the victim was living in Massachusetts. The victim had refused to be interviewed by defense counsel and the only evidence about where the victim lived was her testimony that she had moved to California after the alleged assault.

The prosecutor did not object to defense counsel's improper "Massachusetts" comment. Instead, he waited until rebuttal argument and then made his own improper comment about a matter not in evidence Did you hear any evidence that she was from Massachusetts? How did [defense counsel] know [the victim] was in Massachusetts? Unless [the victim] contacted the defendant recently and said, I am going to change my story and help you, that's another fact.

Defense counsel objected and the trial court, the Honorable Thomas Dunevant, III, instructed the jury to disregard the "inappropriate" argument of each counsel. Defense counsel did not move for a mistrial. The case went to the jury, which found Petitioner guilty on both counts. (The Count 1 victim was a police officer who testified that he had been assaulted by Petitioner.) Petitioner then filed a Motion for New Trial on Count II on grounds of the prosecutorial misconduct regarding the victim on that count. After a hearing, Judge Dunevant granted Petitioner a new trial and reported Mr. Kane to the State Bar. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss Count II on double jeopardy grounds. The State's response, in part, was to ask Judge Dunevant to recuse himself. He did so. The case was transferred to the Honorable Michael O. Wilkinson, who held a hearing and denied the motion to dismiss. This petition for special action followed.

II.

Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not appropriate for special action review. Andrade v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 113, 115, 901 P.2d 461, 463 (App.1995). Such review is appropriate, however, when the motion is based on a double jeopardy claim. Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 997, 111 S.Ct. 554, 112 L.Ed.2d 562 (1990); Quinton v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 545, 547, 815 P.2d 914, 916 (App.1991).

We will not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Hansen, 156 Ariz. 291, 294, 751 P.2d 951, 954 (1988). An abuse of discretion is "discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons." State v. Sandoval, 175 Ariz. 343, 347, 857 P.2d 395, 399 (App.1993) (citing Quigley v. City of Tucson, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982)).

III.

Before getting to the issue presented, we observe that Judge Dunevant was in the best position to rule on the motion to dismiss. He presided over the trial and he witnessed the misconduct which caused him to grant a new trial. The State argued that, because Judge Dunevant reported the prosecutor to the State Bar, a new judge should decide the motion to dismiss. We disagree. "A trial judge is presumed to be free of bias and prejudice," and rebuttal of this presumption requires proof of specific grounds for disqualification of the judge. State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 247, 741 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1987) (citation omitted); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 10.1. That the judge reported attorney misconduct to the State Bar showed proper regard for professional responsibility; it was not grounds to disqualify the judge. We move on.

Judge Dunevant's minute entry explained the factual basis for the grant of a new trial, as follows:

At the oral argument held March 8, 1996, on Defendant's Motion for New Trial, the prosecutor acknowledged that his argument was not based upon any evidence presented at trial and devoid of any good faith basis for making the argument. To use the prosecutor's words he engaged in "supposition" as to how defense counsel or Defendant might have known that [the victim] was traveling from Massachusetts for trial, and as to how, whether and when defense counsel or Defendant might have spoken to her regarding her testimony. Additionally, the uncontroverted record establishes that [the victim] had refused to be interviewed by Defendant and was not interviewed by the Defendant in this case.

....

In this case, the Court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's and defense counsel's comments in an attempt to cure the damage done by the prosecutor's improper remarks. However, the court's efforts could not cure the infirmity. The prosecutor's argument was not based upon any fact in evidence and was not based upon any good faith belief, but rather was based upon mere speculation and supposition. The prosecutor's argument and the inference that Defendant knew [the victim] had traveled from Massachusetts for trial and "was going to change her story to help the Defendant" created a misleading impression, an improper inference which was never cured at trial. The jury was never informed as to how defense counsel learned of [the victim's] travelling from Massachusetts. The prosecutor's improper remarks resulted in legal prejudice to Defendant. The credibility of [the victim] was pivotal to the jury's determination, particularly since she denied making critical statements to detectives regarding the charged aggravated assault. The prosecutor's argument could have left the jury with the erroneous impression that defense counsel, Defendant, or both had something to do with [the victim's] trial testimony (i.e., "recanting" her testimony). Accordingly, the prosecutor's misconduct manifestly affected Defendant's right to a fair trial. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion for New Trial in this case.

In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Wilkinson impliedly accepted not only Judge Dunevant's findings but also the State's "invited error" argument. He ruled as follows:

It is ordered denying Defendant's motion to dismiss re double jeopardy. Court finds that the cause of the mistrial was initially the comments made by Defendant's counsel. The prosecutor responded to those comments in an inappropriate manner, but yet, that response was initiated by the improper comment of Defendant's counsel.

IV.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Arizona Constitution provides that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10. Jeopardy attaches when a criminal trial begins and, "unless [it is] removed for some legal reason, the one in jeopardy cannot be again tried for the same offense." State v. Reynolds, 11 Ariz.App. 532, 535, 466 P.2d 405, 408 (1970) (quoting State v. Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407, 409, 377 P.2d 779, 780 (1963)).

Generally, when a mistrial is granted on motion of defendant, retrial is not barred on double jeopardy grounds. State v. Wilson, 134 Ariz. 551, 554, 658 P.2d 204, 207 (App.1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079-80, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). The defendant who requests a mistrial is generally deemed to have consented to a retrial, thus "remov[ing] the bar of double jeopardy." State v. Henderson, 116 Ariz. 310, 314, 569 P.2d 252, 256 (App.1977) (citations omitted). In federal court, a narrow exception exists to this general rule: When defendant's motion for mistrial is caused by prosecutorial misconduct designed to provoke defendant into making the motion, jeopardy remains attached and retrial is barred. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673-79, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2088-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).

Arizona has broadened the Oregon v. Kennedy exception. Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09, 677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (1984). The Pool court held that, in Arizona, the double jeopardy clause bars a retrial if the following factors exist:

1. Mistrial is granted because of improper conduct or actions by the prosecutor; and

2. such conduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any...