Martin v. Reinstein

• Decision Date: 13 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-SA 98-0260.,1 CA-SA 98-0260.
• Citation: 987 P.2d 779,195 Ariz. 293
• Parties: Derick MARTIN, Harold Ray, John Jones, George Milligan, Robert Arnold, John Turner, Danny Howland, Orton Innis, Harlan Dennis, James Nall, Jordan Madison; and Issachar Judah, Harry Gross, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Ronald S. REINSTEIN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

987 P.2d 779

195 Ariz. 293

Derick MARTIN, Harold Ray, John Jones, George Milligan, Robert Arnold, John Turner, Danny Howland, Orton Innis, Harlan Dennis, James Nall, Jordan Madison; and Issachar Judah, Harry Gross, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Ronald S. REINSTEIN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest.

No. -0260.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D.

May 13, 1999.

Review Denied October 26, 1999.

Barbara L. Spencer and Jamie McAlister, Phoenix, Attorney for Petitioners

Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney by Patricia L. Howe, Deputy County Attorney and Joseph B. Heilman, Deputy county Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest

OPINION

BERCH, Judge.

¶ 1 In this special action, Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Arizona's Sexually Violent Persons Act, Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") sections 36-3701 through -3716 (Supp.1998).¹ On October 14, 1998, we heard oral argument and issued an order accepting jurisdiction, denying relief, and indicating that an opinion would follow. This is that opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Arizona's Sexually Violent Persons Act

¶ 2 In 1995, the Arizona legislature determined that the public should be protected from persons who suffer from a mental disorder that makes them likely to commit violent sexual offenses; it further determined that such persons should be treated. In response to these concerns, the legislature passed the Sexually Violent Persons Act, which, in general terms, allows the State to confine persons who have previously been found guilty of violent sexual acts or have been charged with such crimes but were deemed incompetent to stand trial for them, if those individuals also suffer from a "mental disorder" that makes them "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence" in the future. See A.R.S. § 36-3701(7)(b) (definitions). The legislature recognized that such individuals do not suffer from a usual mental illness or disease that would make them subject to civil commitment under Arizona's general mental health statutes and therefore created a new statutory scheme, the Sexually Violent Persons ("SVP") Act. The legislature's goal was to find a way to treat sexually violent persons and to protect the public from them until they are no longer dangerous to others.

How the Act Operates

¶ 3 Before a potential SVP is released from custody, the attorney general or county attorney may petition the court for a determination that probable cause exists to believe that the person is an SVP and requires continued treatment and detention for the protection of the public. See A.R.S. §§ 36-3704, 36-3705. If such an order issues, the SVP is detained in a secure facility. See id. § 36-3705(B). He² may request a hearing on the probable cause determination and, if that determination is affirmed, may request a jury trial. See id. §§ 36-3705(C), 36-3706. The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence apply to the proceedings. See id. § 36-3704(B).

¶ 4 During the process, the Act provides procedural safeguards closely paralleling those that apply in criminal cases; for example, an accused SVP is entitled to appropriate notices and hearings, a probable cause determination, appointed counsel, and a jury trial. See id. §§ 36-3704 to -3707. As in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. § 36-3707(A).

¶ 5 If the accused is determined by the factfinder to be an SVP, the court may either (1) commit the SVP to the custody of the Department of Health Services, where he must be afforded "care, supervision or treatment until the person's mental disorder has so changed that the person would not be a threat to public safety if the person was conditionally released to a less restrictive alternative or was unconditionally discharged," id. § 36-3707(B)(1), or (2) "[o]rder that the person be released to a less restrictive alternative." Id. § 36-3707(B)(2). An SVP under the care of the Department of Health Services must be afforded treatment and must be examined at least annually to determine whether his mental disorder has sufficiently improved that he no longer poses a danger to the public. See id. § 36-3708. In addition, the SVP may petition annually for a change of status. See id. §§ 36-3709(B), 36-3714(B). The state bears the burden at each review to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that continued commitment is necessary. See id. § 36-3714(C).

The Petitioners

¶ 6 Petitioners are several persons against whom the state has filed SVP petitions. Although the underlying facts of each Petitioner's claim differ slightly from the facts relating to others' claims, all contend that the SVP Act is wholly unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. We focus here only on the facial challenges and do not decide the challenges to the Act as applied to any individual Petitioner. We therefore do not recite the facts of each Petitioner's case.

B. Procedural History

¶ 7 On January 12, 1998, the trial court heard oral argument on the issues raised in the petition. It denied Petitioners' requested relief. Petitioners filed a special action in the Arizona Supreme Court. Following oral argument, the court declined jurisdiction on March 18, 1998, with two Justices dissenting. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration on April 21, 1998.

¶ 8 On September 18, 1998, Petitioners filed their special action in this court, seeking relief. We heard oral argument on October 14, 1998, and accepted jurisdiction.

C. Special Action Jurisdiction

¶ 9 This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide special actions and to grant relief. See A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4) (1992); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1, 4; Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 198, 836 P.2d 408, 411 (App.1992). The exercise of special action jurisdiction is appropriate if a case raises issues of first impression or involves purely legal questions, questions of public importance, or issues that are likely to arise again. See Andrade v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 113, 115, 901 P.2d 461, 463 (App.1995)

. We generally accept special action jurisdiction "only in those cases in which `justice cannot be satisfactorily obtained by other means,'" Pompa v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 531, 533, 931 P.2d 431, 433 (App.1997) (quoting King v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 147, 149, 673 P.2d 787, 789 (1983)), and may accept jurisdiction if doing so would conserve judicial resources. See id. All conditions are met here.

¶ 10 In this case, Petitioners are being held without bond in a maximum security wing of the Arizona State Hospital. They have no adequate remedy by appeal because there has been no final adjudication and other similarly situated inmates may be affected by the statute at issue here. See State v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 411, 414, 930 P.2d 488, 491 (App.1996)

. Respondents nonetheless urge us not to accept jurisdiction of the case because the legislature has amended the SVP law since the trial court's hearings in this matter, and by doing so has mooted some of the Petitioners' claims. Specifically, the legislature has substituted the rules of civil procedure for the rules of criminal procedure and has moved the SVP Act from Title 13, the title encompassing Arizona's criminal statutes, to Title 36, the title involving mental health. See footnote 1, supra. These changes, Respondents argue, resolve most of Petitioners' complaints because the changes are presumed to apply retroactively to cover Petitioners' claims. See State v. Leonard, 151 Ariz. 1, 4, 725 P.2d 493, 496 (App.1986) (procedural rules may apply retroactively unless retroactive application would impair vested rights); Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 96, 574 P.2d 1314, 1315 (App.1977) (same). Even if the changes do apply retroactively, however, this case still raises constitutional issues of first impression and statewide importance and thus is appropriate for review. See State v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. at 414, 930 P.2d at 491.

¶ 11 Respondents also urge us not to take the case because issues will remain to be litigated in the trial court. While it is true that the facts may differ among the Petitioners' cases, the underlying constitutionality of the Act must nonetheless be adjudicated before a trial court can determine whether any individual Petitioner is being or has been deprived of rights under the Act. As the number of Petitioners in this case indicates, several of these cases have been filed before the trial courts. Concern for those incarcerated, the risk of inconsistent adjudications, and the promotion of judicial economy motivate us to accept jurisdiction of this petition at this time.

¶ 12 This case also involves several claims regularly found to warrant review by special action: the denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds and the denial of bond. See Miller v. Superior Court, 189 Ariz. 127, 129, 938 P.2d 1128, 1130 (App.1997)

(double jeopardy); Ferreira v. Superior Court, 189 Ariz. 4, 6-7, 938 P.2d 53, 55-56 (App.1996) (double jeopardy); Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (double jeopardy); Davis v. Winkler, 164 Ariz. 342, 345, 793 P.2d 99, 102 (App.1990) (denial of bond). If Petitioners are required to go through trial, they will have been twice placed in jeopardy if indeed the Act violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, and their arguments regarding availability of pretrial release or bond will be mooted. This case thus raises issues appropriate for disposition in a special action.

¶ 13 We conclude that review by special action is warranted, and, in the exercise of our discretion, we accept jurisdiction. See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 197, 812 P.2d 1014, 1015 (App.1990)

.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

A. Introduction

¶ 14 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Arizona's SVP Act...