Millican v. Home Stores
| Decision Date | 23 July 1954 |
| Citation | 197 Tenn. 93,1 McCanless 93,270 S.W.2d 372 |
| Parties | MILLICAN et al. v. HOME STORES, Inc. 1 McCanless 93, 197 Tenn. 93, 270 S.W.2d 372 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
J. F. Wheless, Chattanooga, for appellant.
O. W. McKenzie, Dayton, for appellees.
This is a Workmen's Compensation Case which should have been styled in the reverse of the caption above, in that the Home Stores, Inc., is the appellant.
While Vance Morgan, pursuant to his duties as on employee of Home Stores, Inc., was returning in August, 1951, from Chattanooga to his place of employment in Dayton, the automobile in which he was riding became involved in a traffic accident in which several other automobiles of third parties were involved. He died in a few days as a result of the injuries received. His widow instituted this suit for an award to herself and their minor child of the compensation provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law Code, Sec. 6851 et seq. The Chancellor allowed the award less a credit hereafter discussed. The employer, Home Stores, has appealed.
In response to the insistence of employer that it is relieved of liability on the ground that it did not receive written notice within the time required, the Chancellor found that the 'General Manager of the Home Stores visited the deceased in the local hospital and was fully cognizant of the accident and its implications'. This finding of the Chancellor is well sustained by the evidence. Adams, the general manager of the Home Stores, testified that on the day after the accident he made an investigation and 'found out about the accident * * * when it happened and all about it'. Hence, the Chancellor's finding of actual notice, Code section 6872, is supported by material evidence.
Mrs. Morgan took a covenant not to sue from one of the third parties involved in the accident in consideration of the receipt of $700. She sued another of the third parties, and subsequently dismissed this suit with prejudice, and 'released' this party for $900. Both settlements were without the consent or knowledge of the employer.
The employer's insistence is that the receipt by Mrs. Morgan of money from third parties in settlement of her alleged claims against them did, because of the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law, section 6865, Code Supplement, relieve it, the employer, of any liability. In allowing the award provided by that law, the Chancellor credited the judgment with the $1,600 which Mrs. Morgan had collected from the respective third parties.
Well considered briefs as to the legal effect of these two settlements have been ably presented by the respective litigants with citation of decisions from other jurisdictions. In response to such citations the Chancellor very appropriately quoted from our case of Portin v. Portin (Foster-Creighton Co.), 149 Tenn. 530, 536, 261 S.W. 362, 363 that 'consideration of the decisions of other states would not be of particular help to us in the construction of our statute'. Decision of the question made in the case is controlled by whatever is the true construction of our Workmen's Compensation Law on the point. And in ascertaining that construction, the Act is to be construed, Code Section 6901, liberally in favor of persons entitled to its benefits. Johnson Coffee Company v. McDonald, 143 Tenn. 505, 514, 226 S.W. 215.
As originally enacted, the Workmen's Compensation Law provided that when the injuries were received under circumstances creating a liability upon the part of third parties for injuries to the employee he, the employee, was authorized to proceed against both the employer and such third party 'but he shall not be entitled to collect from both'. Section 6865 of the 1932 Code. As a result of that provision it was held in Walters v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 166 Tenn. 383, 389, 61 S.W.2d 666, 88 A.L.R. 654, that receipt of compensation by an injured employee from a third party in consideration of a covenant upon the part of the employee not to sue the third party extinguishes the right of such employee to compensation from his employer.
The law so continued until in 1949, by Chapter 277 of the Public Acts, our Legislature re-enacted Code Section 6865. The re-enactment is carried in the Code Supplement under that number. As re-enacted, in so far as pertinent here, it is provided that where the employee receives an injury for which a third party, as well as the employer, is liable.
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Cooper v. Logistics Insight Corp.
...must elect to pursue a remedy against either the employer or the third party responsible for his injury. Millican v. Home Stores, Inc., 197 Tenn. 93, 270 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1954) (citing Tenn.Code § 6865 (1932)). The General Assembly amended the applicable statute in 1949 to permit an employe......
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Hunley v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co.
...remains. Clearly, workers in Tennessee are authorized to settle claims against third-party tortfeasors. See Millican v. Home Stores, Inc., 197 Tenn. 93, 270 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1954). Further, "the Tennessee statute does not require the employee to obtain the ratification of the employer befor......
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Hunley et al v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co. et al, 99-00479
...remains. Clearly, workers in Tennessee are authorized to settle claims against third-party tortfeasors. See Millican v. Home Stores, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tenn. 1954). Further, "[t]he Tennessee statute does not require the employee to obtain the ratification of the employer before maki......
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Gaines v. Excel Industries, Inc.
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