Mills v. Wong
| Citation | 155 S.W.3d 916 |
| Decision Date | 16 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. W2002-02353-SC-R11-CV.,W2002-02353-SC-R11-CV. |
| Parties | Frank Fetzer MILLS, Jr., et al. v. Luis L. WONG, M.D., et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
and Miriam Johnson, as co-executors of the estate of Janet K. Johnson, M.D., and Kenneth F. Tullis, M.D.
Michael L. Robb, and Kevin Baskette, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee John F. O'Connell, M.D.
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR. and JANICE M. HOLDER, JJ., joined. WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., did not participate.
The plaintiffs in this medical malpractice action filed their complaint approximately three weeks after the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose, Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980), had expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their action should not be time-barred because the primary plaintiff was mentally incompetent during most of the repose period. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that due process requires tolling of the statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff's mental incompetency. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs relied on Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn.2000), and other precedents which provide for tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act statute of limitations, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2003), on the basis of a petitioner's mental incompetency. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. We hold that due process does not require tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff's mental incompetency. The legislature has the constitutional power to place reasonable temporal limitations on rights of action in tort. By contrast, a post-conviction petition, despite its procedurally civil nature, is available only to a person who is in custody following a criminal conviction and sentence; such a petition thus implicates life and liberty interests in a way that materially differentiates it from civil actions. Therefore, the precedents which require tolling for mental incompetence in the context of post-conviction petitions are inapposite to questions of tolling statutes of repose in civil tort actions.
Frank Fetzer Mills, Jr. ("Mr. Mills") was suffering from depression, insomnia and other mental and physical ailments. On November 17, 1994, he sought professional care at defendant Charter Lakeside Behavioral Health System, Inc. ("Charter"). Mr. Mills was admitted to one of Charter's treatment facilities where he was hospitalized at least until November 27, 1994 and possibly until December 3, 1994. He subsequently received care at one of Charter's rehabilitation facilities until December 29, 1994. During this period, defendants John F. O'Connell, M.D. ("Dr. O'Connell"), Kenneth F. Tullis, M.D. ("Dr. Tullis"), and Janet K. Johnson, M.D. ("Dr. Johnson") provided Mr. Mills with psychiatric and medical care. After his treatment at Charter ended, Mr. Mills continued to experience mental and neurological problems such as depression, speech abnormality, decreased physical coordination, headaches and tremors. When treatment by other physicians failed to improve his condition, in January 1997, he consulted Lee Stein, M.D. ("Dr. Stein"), who performed upon Mr. Mills a general physical examination and a variety of tests. On February 7, 1997, Dr. Stein performed an ophthalmological exam which revealed for the first time that Mr. Mills' condition was caused by Wilson's Disease, a treatable genetic disorder which ultimately proves fatal if left untreated.1 Shortly after this diagnosis, Mr. Mills obtained specialized treatment for the disease.
On January 21, 1998, Mr. Mills and his wife, Rebecca Smith Mills ("Mrs. Mills") (collectively the "plaintiffs"), filed a medical malpractice suit against Charter and Drs. O'Connell, Tullis, and Johnson2 (collectively the "defendants"), alleging that the defendants negligently failed to discover that Mr. Mills was suffering from Wilson's Disease.3 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' failure to discover the disease in 1994 caused Mr. Mills to suffer irreversible damage to his brain and to certain internal organs which could have been reduced or avoided by a proper diagnosis. Mrs. Mills also claimed that she suffered damages such as loss of her husband's services and consortium.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, maintaining that the plaintiffs' initial complaint was not filed within the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980). Considering the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the last date on which the defendants could have committed a negligent act or omission as to Mr. Mills was December 29, 1994, their final day of treating him. The plaintiffs did not file their initial complaint until January 21, 1998, approximately three years and three weeks later.
In response to the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs supplied affidavits of experts who concluded that, as a result of Wilson's Disease, Mr. Mills had been mentally incompetent from at least November 17, 1994 until approximately July 1997. The plaintiffs argued that due process requires the medical malpractice statute of repose to be tolled for the period of Mr. Mills' mental incompetency. The plaintiffs relied upon precedents which have tolled on the basis of mental incompetency the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions, contending that these precedents should apply in the present case.
Treating the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following this Court's decision in Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn.2000), the Court of Appeals held that there is no statutory basis for tolling the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of Mr. Mills' mental incompetency. The Court of Appeals further held that due process does not require tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose, stating:
While post-conviction relief may be characterized as a civil action, all the substantive rights involved are those stemming from a criminal action and protected by rules of criminal procedure. This Court is not willing to extend the due process analysis ... to a case involving the civil medical malpractice statute of repose.
Given these holdings, the Court of Appeals found to be moot the question of whether the statute at issue in the Post-Conviction Procedure Act cases is a statute of limitations or of repose. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal.
The primary issue now before us is whether due process requires tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff's mental incompetency. In order to resolve this question, we must first address preliminary statutory matters.
We begin by describing the medical malpractice statutes of limitations and repose. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116(a)(1)-(2) (1980) provides that "[t]he statute of limitations in malpractice actions shall be one (1) year ...," except that "[i]n the event the alleged injury is not discovered within the said one (1) year period, the period of limitation shall be one (1) year from the date of such discovery." This statute places a temporal procedural boundary on the bringing of a medical malpractice action. See Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn.1995) ().
However, the statute of repose sets an absolute limit on the time in which a plaintiff may bring a medical malpractice action. This statute provides:
In no event shall any such action be brought more than three (3) years after the date on which the negligent act or omission occurred except where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant[,] in which case the action shall be commenced within one (1) year after discovery that the cause of action exists.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980) (emphasis added). As with the Tennessee Products Liability Act statute of repose, Tenn.Code. Ann. § 29-28-103 (2000), the emphasized language expresses a legislative intent to place an absolute three-year bar beyond which no medical malpractice right of action may survive. See Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tenn.2000). The running of the statute of repose thus has a substantive effect. See Cronin, 906 S.W.2d at 913 ().
By statute, the absolute temporal bar imposed by the medical malpractice statute of repose may be tolled only in exceedingly limited circumstances. The statute of repose itself expressly provides for tolling on the basis of fraudulent concealment, Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3), but it says nothing about tolling on the basis of mental incompetency. The absence of an express tolling provision for mental incompetency when tolling is expressly provided for on another ground indicates legislative intent not to provide for tolling on the basis of mental incompetency. See Penley, 31 S.W.3d at 185-86.
Moreover, this Court held in Penley that the general legal disability statute provided in Tennessee...
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